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1 Introduction
In his work on industrialization and development, Alexander Gerschenkron (1962) emphasized
the importance of banks in promoting long-term investment and technology adoption. His
remark was triggered by a particular nancial innovation: the provision of long-term nance
by banks, which emerged toward the end of the 19th century and quickly gained popularity.
Despite general agreement on the connection between long-term nance and development (for
example World Bank (2015)), low-income countries (LICs) today exhibit an endemic presence
of loans with short maturities (see Figure 1).
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We develop a novel explanation for the lack of long-term nance in LICs based on bank
intermediation and the role of deposit volatility. Our mechanism is illustrated through a banking
model and tested in Pakistan, exploiting exogenous variation in deposit volatility on the universe
of corporate loans and a rm-level investment survey. Given this specic context, we refer to
the discount rate as the liquidity cost paid by banks.
The mechanism relies on the maturity-transformation of banks, which convert short-term
deposits into long-term loans. We highlight that volatile deposits and a high discount rate aect
disproportionately the bank cost of supplying long-term loans because of a liquidity risk. The
interaction between the cost of central bank liquidity and deposit volatility is key, because it
creates a non-convexity in bank funding costs. For instance, small stochastic deposit withdraw-
als are covered by the bank with its liquidity at no extra cost, whereas large withdrawals force
borrowing from the central bank at a premium rate. As a result, the equilibrium spread between
the long- and short-term lending rate increases in the interaction between deposit volatility and
the discount rate, leading rms to lower loan maturities, long-term investment and output.
A unique natural experiment provides exogenous variation in deposit volatility. Zakat is
a recurring contribution that Muslims are expected to donate to the poor. In Pakistan, such
Sharia-compliant obligation is directly managed by the government, in the form of a yearly
2.5% levy on bank deposits exceeding a wealth threshold. Three features of this obligation are
central in creating deposit volatility. First, the timing of the levy. This is applied on only those
deposits held in banks on the rst day of every Ramadan. Therefore individuals can avoid
the levy by withdrawing before the payment date and re-depositing afterwards. Second, the
value of the threshold. Sharia law denes the wealth threshold as the price of 612.32 grams (52
tolas) of silver, and Pakistani authorities announce it only 48{72 hours before collection. Third,
the deposit levy generates a notch. Individuals below the threshold enjoy a zero levy, while
those with 1 Rupee above the threshold pay 2.5% on the overall amount - not just the part
exceeding the threshold. As a result, individuals slightly above the threshold have large gains
from engaging in withdrawal-and-redeposits than individuals further away from it. As a result
of these unique features, the number of Zakat contributors uctuates directly with the silver
price, and the sharp discontinuities in timing and threshold generate extensive withdrawals and
redeposits in a short period (between 4 and 6 months).
Our identication exploits the volatility of silver price in the quarter before Zakat as a
source of exogenous variation for deposit volatility. If the price of silver is constant in the
quarter before Ramadan, then the deposit drop is predictable. However, the higher silver price
volatility, the wider is the range of possible realizations that the nal drop can take. This
increases the expected costs of liquidity for banks, which are passed onto borrowers through
higher lending rates. Our reduced-form evidence on deposit volatility combines the volatility in
the international price of silver with two measures of bank exposure to Zakat. The rst exploits
the exemption of some religious groups from the levy and, hence, their lack of withdrawal-
and-redeposit. By combining the geographic variation in the ATM network at bank level, with
a religious map of Pakistan, we compute the share of ATMs in withdrawal-prone areas. The
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second measure uses bank-level information about how close the average depositor lies to the
threshold, the deposit ratio. These two sources lead to qualitatively analogous estimates, with
larger magnitudes observed under the latter.
Beyond the natural experiment, a credible investigation of this mechanism requires the local
availability of high-quality documentation regarding banks' balance sheets and a credit registry.
Also in this respect, Pakistan is the ideal country because its central bank, the State Bank of
Pakistan, has kept a detailed credit registry for a long period. This allows us to combine the
natural experiment with the universe of corporate lending, resulting in more than one million
loans between 2002 and 2010. Given that deposit volatility aects loan supply through higher
funding costs, then we exploit variation within-bank-rm and across-banks to separate loan
supply from demand, as pioneered by Khwaja and Mian (2005, 2008). Complementing these
datasets with a detailed survey of rm investment permits to further analyse how changes in
nancial characteristics aect real variables.
In the presence of a high silver price volatility and discount rate, we nd a drop in loan
maturities, which increases with the bank exposure to Zakat. In the same context, the av-
erage lending rate drops, in line with the predictions of our mechanism: as the long-term
lending rate increases, rms switch from a\high-maturity{high-lending rate"product to a \low-
maturity{low-lending rate" product. Finally, in terms of loan characteristics, we do not observe
movements in the amounts borrowed. We further investigate the nancing redirection and two
margins are found to be key: 1) a long-to-short redirection, with a decline of loans with a
maturity of 5 years or more, and an increase of those with a 1-year maturity; 2) a short-to-very
short redirection, with an increase in loans with a maturity of 3 months or less, and loans
that are originated-and-repaid before the levy. Beyond a rich series of robustness checks, we
exploit another Islamic celebration, also based on the Lunar calendar (Eid Adha), as the ideal
placebo for our test. This generates a similar decline in deposits due to religion, but without
uncertainty on withdrawals generated by silver prices. As a result, we replicate our empirical
strategy for this alternative period and cannot reject the null hypothesis of not statistically
signicant eects on maturities, rates or quantities.
To characterize how rms' investment responds to Zakat, we match a detailed rm-level
survey with the loan-level data. This veries that rms linked to banks that are more exposed
to Zakat do not alter their overall investment amount, but change its composition with a de-
cline in xed capital investment and an increase in working capital. We subsequently quantify
a policy counterfactual answering the following question: how would output respond if a tar-
geted liquidity program neutralized the Zakat uncertainty on deposit volatility by temporarily
lowering liquidity costs? In order to address this, we combine the theoretical model with the
elasticities from the loan-level analysis. Our results state that the output gains of this policy
lie between 0.042%, based on the ATM share estimates, and 0.205% on the deposit ratio ones.
Although the existence of this mechanism does not depend on the income level of a country,
its extent and economic costs are likely to be more relevant in LICs for two reasons: their
deposits are more volatile and their nancial systems exhibit high discount rates or, often, non-
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existent interbank markets and central bank liquidity facilities. For these reasons, although the
results of our analysis are specic to Pakistan, this work oers three policy implications that
extend beyond this context. First, monetary policy can promote a reallocation of maturities
toward the short term through its liquidity operations and discount rate. Second, nancial
regulation moderating bank deposit volatility (i.e. deposit insurance, multiregional and mul-
tinational banking) can promote long-term nance and investment. Third, promoting nancial
institutions in LICs can lower long-term lending rates by allowing commercial banks to smooth
deposit shocks. In particular, we argue that LICs central banks need to guarantee a stable,
reliable and accessible source of liquidity to the banking system. This is rarely the case: we
collect new data showing that more than 50% of African central banks do not provide stable
liquidity.
Figure 1: Loan Maturities and Development
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Notes: This gure shows a scatter plot between the average maturity of loans in months on the y-axis and the log of real
GDP per capita on the x -axis. Data on the average loan maturity are from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys. Each dot is a
country observation: the correlation is 0.39 and statistically dierent from zero at 1%. Data on log of the GDP per capita are in
2005 constant dollar from the Penn World Tables (Feenstra et al. (2015)).
This paper participates to three debates. First, it contributes to the literature on long-
term nance and development by showing that bank funding costs can generate a redirection
of loan maturities and rm investment toward the short term.1 Second, this is the rst paper
to study a natural experiment on loan supply generated by a change in the second moment
of a bank liability. Our contribution lies at the intersection of the literature on credit, that
has focused on the rst moment of bank liabilities2, with an emerging literature focusing on
depositor behaviour.3 Third, it further examines the role of nancial institutions in completing
markets and the eect of monetary policy on real variables.4
In Section 2, we introduce our theoretical and empirical framework, identication and the
main equations. In Section 3, we describe the data and present the main results, robustness
1This literature was pioneered by Levine (1997), Caprio Jr and Demirguc-Kunt (1998), Demirguc-Kunt and
Maksimovic (1998) and Diamond (2004), and more recently developed by Qian and Strahan (2007) and Bae
and Goyal (2009).
2Paravisini (2008) studies how exogenous changes in government-to-bank loans aect the supply of credit,
Schnabl (2012) investigates how bank-to-bank loans aect a variety of loan characteristics, while Khwaja and
Mian (2008), Bustos et al. (2016) and Gilje et al. (2016) study how changes in the level of deposits aect credit,
exploiting a variety of alternative identication strategies. Refer also to Iyer and Peydro (2011), Banerjee and
Duo (2014), Garicano and Steinwender (forthcoming).
3Refer to Iyer and Puri (2012), Iyer et al. (2016)
4For empirical references, for the former refer to Allen and Gale (2004), Allen et al. (2009), while for the
latter to Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Kashyap and Stein (2000), Jimenez et al.
(2012).
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checks and placebo. Section 4 oers some remarks about the policy implications of our research
and elements of external validity. Finally, we present conclusions in Section 5.
2 Theoretical and Empirical Framework
2.1 Theoretical Framework
We propose a three-period model with three agents: a household supplying short-term deposits
to the bank, heterogeneous rms investing in short- and long-term projects, and a bank inter-
mediating short-term deposits with short- and long-term loans. Short-term loans are given in
period one and repay in period two, while long-term loans are given at one and repay at three.
All prices are given, there is perfect competition and common knowledge.
Two forces are key. First, depositors withdraw a stochastic amount before the long-term
loans are back and after the short-term loans are repaid. Second, the bank faces a non-convex
cost of accessing the central bank facility for alternative liquidity: if the withdrawal is small,
the bank covers it with its liquidity, and the additional cost is zero; if the withdrawal is large, it
needs to borrow from the central bank at a positive rate, rCB. This allows the second moment
of the deposit withdrawal to have an impact, even in a risk-neutral model. The main result
of this model is that the long-term lending rate increases with the volatility of bank deposits
and the discount rate. The interaction of these two parameters is key: the higher the volatility
in periods of high discount rate, the higher is the expected additional cost of funding, which
pushes up the long-term lending rate. This encourages the marginal rm to give up a long-term
project and a long-term loan, to reallocate toward a short-term project and loan, which lowers
output.
In the interest of tractability, our model only presents two maturities (short and long), while
in a more general model there would exist a continuum. The literature has shown, that with
a multi-period environment and a more general setting, similar results are achieved if deposit
volatility is persistent over time, for example Cox et al. (1985). We present the key elements
of the model below and report in Appendix A its solution and details.
Household A representative household supplies unit deposits to the bank between periods
1 and 2 and periods 2 and 3, hence D1;2 = D2;3 = 1. In the morning of t = 2, the household
collects the interests on the old deposits, rD1;2. In the evening, it observes a realization of a
shock " and can consume more or withdraw some deposits, depending on whether " is positive
or negative. The second period deposits are described by fD2;3 = 1+", with " being independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) through a uniform, "  U [ v; v]. The parameter v embeds
the standard deviation of deposits, which we henceforth refer to as deposit volatility.
Firms There exists a unit continuum of rms, and each solves an investment allocation prob-
lem. Because of indivisibility, each rm i chooses to invest in either a short- or a long-term
project. Both are ex ante observable: the short-term investment delivers a net return p < 1,
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and the long-term project delivers a heterogeneous return i, uniformly distributed between
0 and 1, i  U [0; 1]. Both are deterministic and known at the moment of the investment
decision. Intuitively, i can be thought of as a draw of technology: some rms are endowed
with a comparatively more productive technology in the long-term than in the short-term (their
i > p), whereas others are endowed with a less productive long-term technology. Because of
observability, the rm faces a dierentiated market for borrowing. The short-term project can
be funded with only a short-term loan L1;2, taken out in period 1 and repaid in period 2 at
a lending rate rL1;2, and the long-term loan L1;3 is repaid in period 3 at rate rL1;3.
5 Each
rms solves this problem and the aggregate demands for short and long-term lending emerge
by aggregating over the continuum.
Bank At t = 1, the bank receives deposits, D1;2, and allocates these into assets: short- and
long-term loans L1;2, L1;3 and a liquid and safe asset A1;2. In the morning of t = 2, the bank
earns returns from short-term activities, hence rL1;2L1;2 and rAA1;2, and pays the household
interests rD1;2D1;2, which are withdrawn. New deposits are supplied, D2;3, and allocated into
safe assets, A2;3, and fund the long-term loans previously issued, L1;3. In the nal period t = 3,
the bank's assets pay back rL1;3L1;3 and rAA2;3, respectively, and it reimburses the deposits and
interests.
However, second-period deposits D2;3 are subject to a shock " after they are allocated into
assets. If the shock is negative, then a withdrawal takes place. For a suciently small negative
shock, the bank covers this with its liquidity, A2;3; otherwise it accesses a renance facility
through the central bank and borrows the dierence between the shock and A2;3 at rCB > 0,
which is the premium on the cost of liquidity - the dierence between the discount rate and the
deposit rate. Therefore, in period 2 the bank is exposed to a liquidity constraint, D2;3 L1;3 > ",
as in Prisman et al. (1986).
The loan supply and deposit demand for each period of the bank emerge by solving
max
D1;2;D2;3;L1;2;L1;3
(rL1;2L1;2 + rAA1;2   rD1;2D1;2) +  (rL1;3L1;3 + rAA2;3   rD2;3D2;3)+
+rCB
v
D2;3 L1;3
(D2;3   L1;3   ")f(")d"
in which  2 (0; 1] is the discount rate, and a balance sheet constraint applies in each period:
respectively L1;2 + L1;3 + A1;2 = D1;2 and L1;3 + A2;3 = D2;3. These state that all liabilities of
the bank (in this case only deposits) must equal the sum of the assets.
The rst two terms of the maximand represent the prots in period 2 and 3, while the
last term embeds the expected cost of borrowing from the central bank, simplied through the
uniform distribution, [v (D2;3 L1;3)]
2
4v
. If alternative liquidity is costless, so that the discount rate
equals the deposit rate, rCB = 0; then deposit volatility does not aect any rate.
5We explicitly leave out the possibility of rms nancing a long-term project with a series of short-term
loans, this is a reduced-form result of Hart and Moore (1994) and Milbradt and Oehmke (2015).
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The equilibrium lending and deposit rates emerge through market clearing, by equating
deposit and lending demands and supplies. Appendix A presents more details on each part of
the model and the clearing; while Appendix B explores a few extensions.
Proposition There exists a region for v and rCB, such that an increase in deposit volatility,
v, generates:
* a change in loan characteristics, corresponding to: an increase in the long-term lending
rate and a decrease in the average maturity of loans;
* a change in the investment prole of rms, including: a decline in the long-term lending
and investment share, and an increase in the short-term lending and investment share;
* a resulting decline in overall output.
All these eects on the role of deposit volatility increase with the discount rate. However, if
the premium on the cost of liquidity is zero, so that rCB = 0, then deposit volatility does not
generate any eect on maturities or rates.
2.2 Empirical Framework
2.2.1 Exogenous Variation in Deposit Volatility
Zakat and Deposits Zakat is a poor-giving religious obligation and formalized in Sharia law.
At the beginning of every Ramadan, individuals are expected to give a donate to the poorest
to regenerate their own wealth. In most countries the Zakat payment is left to individual
contributions, while in Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, the state directly collects and
distributes such resources.
Pakistan presents the ideal setting for our study because of a unique collection system. In
1981 the Pakistani government introduced a mandatory Zakat payment to the state6 and im-
plemented it through a Sharia-compliant obligation in the form of a 2.5% levy on bank deposits
that exceed a wealth threshold (Nisab-i-Zakat). This threshold, emanating from interpreta-
tions of the Sharia law, is calculated using the international price of silver and corresponds to
the value of 612.32 grams (52 tolas). One central characteristic relative to the timing of this
obligation plays a pivotal role: the threshold is announced by the State Bank of Pakistan and
the Ministry of Religious Aairs only 2{3 days before the collection and management, and the
obligation applies on only those deposits held in banks during the rst day of Ramadan. The
design of the levy creates a notch, because once a depositor lies above the threshold of 1 Rupee,
the 2.5% applies to the whole deposit amount, implying a locally innite marginal levy.
Despite the good cause, most Pakistanis avoid this altogether and give individual donations.7
In fact, there is ample anecdotal evidence from newspapers that individuals rush to \withdraw
and redeposit", so that bank deposits are substantially depleted in the weeks preceding the rst
6Refer to the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980, available at http://www.zakat.gop.pk/system/files/
zakatushr1980.pdf. For a historical review, refer to Nasr (2004).
7Refer to the work of the Charities Aid Foundation, World Giving Index 2015.
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day of Ramadan and then more or less quickly return.8 Sharia law directly links the threshold
to the current price of silver, and in Appendix C we show a scatter plot between the threshold
and the international price of silver per ounce in USD on the day of the announcement, which
correlate 0.998.
In addition, four facts regarding the Zakat contribution in Pakistan are particularly useful
for our research, because they facilitate our identication. First, Zakat is a mass phenomenon,
and the threshold above which Zakat applies is low: the average amount of Nisab-i-Zakat over
the 2002{2010 period corresponds to 25,856 Pakistani rupees (PKR), converted approximately
into 250 USD. This is particularly low, given that in the same period the average GDP per
capita lies at 2,595 USD, the average Pakistani deposit account contains 868 USD and on
average 65% of deposit accounts exceed the threshold (see Appendix C). Second, silver price can
be taken as exogenously determined to Pakistan, given that this country is among neither the
world's top 20 producers nor the world's top 20 consumers of silver and that its rst commodity
trading platform begun oering silver futures only in mid 2011 (after the period in analysis in
this paper).9 Furthermore, as shown in Appendix C, the correlation between silver price and
Pakistani GDP per capita growth as a measure of economic activity is low, negative and not
statistically dierent from zero. Third, silver price is a particularly volatile commodity and
Appendix C reports a few further descriptive statistics showing that: 1) silver is more volatile
than gold, given that its market is much less liquid (result from the commodity literature);
2) there is no correlation between the mean price of silver and its volatility at quarter{year
level and 3) silver price volatility increases with gold price volatility and declines with the
volatility of economic variables (e.g. ination, Fed funds rate, industrial production). Fourth,
because Ramadan is based on a lunar calendar, its rst day changes yearly and is progressively
anticipated year by year from November 2002 to August 2010, as shown in Appendix C. This
permits us to net out seasonality eects.
Zakat, the Price of Silver and Deposit Volatility Newspaper anecdotes suggest the
existence of a withdrawal phenomenon prior to Ramadan and redeposit after the Zakat payment.
This implies only a temporary depletion of the deposit stock in the six months around Zakat. In
this section, we complement the previous elements with a statistical analysis to verify whether
the following three hypothesis are met in the data:
1. the overall level of deposits does not change, there occurs only a temporary dip;
8In 2006 the Dawn newspaper had the headline \Heavy withdrawal to avoid Zakat cut" (available at
http://www.dawn.com/news/211676/heavy-withdrawal-to-avoid-zakat-cut); in 2012 it had the head-
line \During Ramazan, Pakistanis dodge tax collectors" (available at http://www.dawn.com/news/742885/
during-ramazan-pakistanis-dodge-tax-collectors) and in 2013 it had the headline \Clients rush to banks
to avoid Zakat deduction" (available at http://www.dawn.com/news/1024075).
9See the statistics on silver for 2012{2014 provided by the United States Geological Survey, published
by the United States Department of the Interior, available at http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/
commodity/silver/mcs-2014-silve.pdf, and the World Silver Survey, 2015, issued by the Silver Institute,
available at https://www.silverinstitute.org/site/publications/. Regarding the trading, the Pakistan
Mercantile Exchange Limited is the rst and only future commodity market in Pakistan, operating in Karachi.
It begun activities 11 May 2007 and oered the rst silver future contracts on the 31st May 2011, read more at
http://www.pmex.com.pk/broker/documents/20-2011_-Listing_of_Silver_100_Ounces-3005-2011.pdf.
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2. liquidity injections by the State Bank of Pakistan increase;
3. the volatility of deposits in the period before Zakat changes with the silver price volatility.
Unfortunately, we do not have access to high-frequency deposit data at bank-level: the
highest available frequency is quarterly, which does not permit to study the rich within-quarter
changes in temporary deposits. For this reason, in the interest of higher frequency, we inves-
tigate the previous points using aggregate country-level data in Pakistan and use data on the
weekly amount of bank deposits and liquidity injections. These are only available for the years
2007-2014 and, therefore, in this section we restrict on this period. We dene a variable, called
Zakat 6-months, which takes unit value for the three months before and three months after
payment of the Zakat. Table 1 indicates that, although the level of deposits does not change
over the whole period, in column (1), banks acquire substantial liquidity injections by the State
Bank of Pakistan, which increase by approximately 37%, in column (2). While it is possible
that banks adjust also through other margins (e.g. holding more cash), this table shows that
the liquidity oered by the central bank in this period is extensively used by banks.10
We further dissect the deposit behaviour in the following two ways. First, we show that
deposits exhibit a temporary drop of  1:8% in the month of the payment of Zakat in column
(3) of Table 1. Furthermore, column (4) highlights that this drop is lower when the price
of silver is higher, a one standard deviation higher silver price, corresponds to a decline in
the drop by 0:4% (as the threshold increases and less people are eligible to pay the levy).
Furthermore, column (4) highlights that the second moment of silver does not aect the level
of deposit withdrawals. Second, we study the deposit behaviour in every month within the
Zakat period. For this purpose, instead of one dummy variable taking unit value across all
periods, we replace every single month before and after with a set of separate dummy variables
(hence six dummies and an omitted one). Figure 3 shows the average level of deposits when
yearly trends and seasonality are netted out. Leaving out the fourth month before Zakat as the
omitted category, we can see that around three months before Zakat a mild decline in deposits
occurs, not statistically dierent from zero. This further drops two months before Ramadan
and further drops to around  1:8% in the month of the Zakat payment. After this payment,
there is a slow return of deposits back to trend, taking generally two to three months before the
gap closes fully. Overall we can see that at Zakat, Pakistani banks lose roughly 1.8% of their
deposits. Such magnitude should be considered as relevant, particularly because local banks
rely mainly on deposits, which account on average for 75{80% of bank liabilities, as shown in
Appendix D, and especially because the cost of this shortfall can be high, given that the central
bank liquidity in this period is relatively expensive.
It is important to discuss the extent of the deposit drop. A 2.5% levy on a stock, such as
deposits, should have been expected to generate much larger deposit-and-withdrawals. From
anecdotal evidence, and Figure 3, we may infer the eect being mostly inframarginal, with a
10In order to understand the quantitative relevance of the Central Bank to address this liquidity need, we
propose a simple calculation. Deposits decline on average by 1.8% for these months, this implies a shortfall of
79.5 Billion PKRs. In the same period, central bank injections go up by 37%, introducing 43.5 Billion PKRs.
As a result, on average, the central bank covers 54.7% of the deposit shortfall.
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large number of relatively middle-income customers activating this phenomenon through small
withdrawals around the threshold given the notch. To put things into perspective, in Appendix
D we report data on the evolution of Zakat proceedings over time and nd that Zakat collections
are sizeable, comparable to 0.4% of Pakistan's tax revenues.
Table 1: Deposits, Liquidity and Zakat
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Bank SBP Liquidity Bank Bank
Deposit Injections Deposit Deposit
Ln(PKRs) Ln(PKRs) Ln(PKRs) Ln(PKRs)
Zakat 6-months -0.00254 0.369**
(0.00297) (0.158)
Zakat 1-month -0.0184*** -0.0188***
(0.00277) (0.00282)
Zakat 1-month 0.004***
 Silver t (0.002)
Zakat 1-month 0.0005
 Silver t (0.002)
Silver t 0.028
(0.033)
Silver t 0.022
(0.061)
Observations 392 392 392 392
Adj. R sq. 0.943 0.411 0.919 0.920
FE q, y Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean Dep. Var. 15.30 11 15.30 15.30
S.D. Dep. Var. 0.0797 1.353 0.0797 0.0797
Notes: This table presents ordinary least-squares (OLS) estimates, where the unit of observation is weekly, and showing year
and quarter xed eects. The years analysed are 2007{2014. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variables
are the natural logarithm of the real bank deposits in billion of Pakistani rupees (PKR), in columns (1), (3) and (4) and the natural
logarithm of the real liquidity injections by the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) in million of PKR, in column (2). The Zakat 6-month
is a dummy that takes unit value for the three months before and after payment of Zakat, for a total of six consecutive months.
The Zakat 1-month take unit value for the month before the payment of the Zakat levy. The Silver t and t are respectively the
standardized mean price of silver and volatility of silver over the whole period. Silver volatility is dened as the variation coecient
of the detrended silver price. The row \Adj. R sq." shows the adjusted R2 of these regressions, and the next two rows show the
mean and standard deviation (S.D.) of each dependent variable, respectively. ***, ** and * indicate signicance at the 1%, 5% and
10% level, respectively.
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Figure 3: Deposit Withdrawal and the Price of Silver
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Notes: This gure reports a plot of OLS coecients from a regression in which the natural logarithm of real deposits is
regressed over a dummy for each month in the six-month period around Zakat, three months before and three months after. These
results are obtained by interacting these dummies with the average price of silver over the whole Zakat periods in analysis. The
fourth month before Zakat is the omitted category. Because Zakat payment changes every year according to the lunar calendar,
the same regression also includes year and quarter xed eects to net out year-specic trends and seasonality. The data are weekly
between 2007 and 2014. Standard errors are robust and reported through the condence interval of the coecients.
Table 2: Deposit Volatility, Zakat and Silver
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Deposit Deposit Deposit
Volatility Volatility Volatility
Zakat - 3-months 0.546 0.760* 0.665
(0.396) (0.424) (0.423)
Zakat - 3-months 0.530** 0.581**
 Silver t (0.226) (0.229)
Silver t -0.0423 -0.109
(0.133) (0.134)
Zakat - 3-months 0.283
 Silver t (0.271)
Silver t -0.421
(0.276)
Observations 90 90 90
Adj. R sq. 0.013 0.061 0.068
FE q, y Yes Yes Yes
Mean Dep. Var. 0 0 0
S.D. Dep. Var. 1 1 1
Notes: This table presents OLS estimates, where the unit of observation is monthly, and showing year and quarter xed eects.
The years analysed are 2007{2014. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The variable Zakat 3-months is a dummy that takes
unit value only for the three months before the payment of Zakat, this is also interacted with the monthly volatility in silver price,
Silver t and its mean Silver t. The dependent variable represents deposit volatility, dened as the coecient of variation of
detrended monthly bank deposits. This has been standardized to take mean zero and unit standard deviation, the respective actual
mean is 0.007 and standard deviation is 0.005. Also the silver price volatility variable has been standardized in order to simplify
the interpretation of its coecient. The row \Adj. R sq." shows the adjusted R2 of these regressions, and the next two rows show
the mean and standard deviation (S.D.) of each dependent variable, respectively. ***, ** and * indicate signicance at the 1%, 5%
and 10* level, respectively.
Finally we focus on the volatility of bank deposits and show that the volatility in the price
of silver has an eect on the volatility of bank deposits in the period preceding Zakat. In order
to calculate a variable describing deposit volatility, we go from a weekly analysis on the level,
to a monthly analysis on the second moment. We calculate deposit volatility by detrending the
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real deposit series, calculating the standard deviation of the detrended deposits over a month
and dividing by the mean level of deposits in the corresponding month. This results in the
coecient of variation of deposits, which can be interpreted as the uctuations in deposits as
percentages of the mean.
We dene a new dummy, Zakat 3-months, which takes unit value only for those three
months. This is regressed over the volatility of bank deposits, including interactions both with
silver price volatility and mean. Table 2 shows that during the three months before Zakat there
is a general increase in volatility, by around half a standard deviation, and in particular this
grows in the interaction between the Zakat dummy and silver price volatility: a one standard
deviation increase in silver price volatility, during the three months before Zakat, generates an
additional half standard deviation increase in deposit volatility. On the contrary, we do not
nd a signicant eect for just the level of silver volatility outside Zakat or the level of silver in
general. Overall, this section shows that the Zakat period exhibits a special deposit behaviour,
with a temporary drop in deposits, a high usage of central bank liquidity and a deposit volatility
increasing in silver price volatility. All these features are key for our identication, which we
describe in detail in the next section.
2.2.2 Identication
In this section we provide more specics on our identication and present:
1. the time-series variation in silver-price volatility in the quarter before Zakat and the
discount rate;
2. the cross-sectional variation in bank exposure to Zakat, describing in detail the ATM
share and deposit ratio variables.
Figure 4: The Volatility of Silver Prices - 2002-2010
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Notes: This gure reports the volatility in silver price in the quarter before the threshold announcement between 2002 and
2010. Silver price volatility is dened as the coecient of variation, computed though the standard deviation of the detrended
silver price for the quarter before Zakat, divided by the average silver price over the corresponding period. The average silver price
volatility is 0.039, with a standard deviation of 0.021, a minimum of 0.019 and a maximum of 0.082. Figure C4 in Appendix C
reports the same picture for all quarters between 1968 and 2015.
Time-Series Variation
Silver Price Volatility
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In our identication, we exploit the volatility in the international price of silver as a source
of exogenous variation for deposit volatility and Figure 4 reports the volatility in silver price
in the quarter before the announcement. This shows that on average the volatility is relatively
high, as uctuations average 4% of the mean price, in a range between 2% and 8%. As discussed
in Appendix C and D, silver price is highly volatile (more than gold, oil and copper), mainly
because it is traded mostly for industrial use rather than store of value. As a result, the spikes
in Figure 4 are mostly due to low-liquidity on international markets or periods of volatile silver
demand. The sudden swings in this variable generate useful variation for our identication.
Figure 5: Discount Rate and Zakat
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Notes: This gure reports the evolution of the discount rate set quarterly by the State Bank of Pakistan between 2002 and
2010. The vertical lines describe the quarters in which the payment of Zakat take place. The average discount rate in this period
is 10.07 percent, with standard deviation 2.43, a minimum of 7.5 and a maximum of 15 percent.
Discount Rate and State Bank of Pakistan
Replacing deposits with central bank liquidity can be expensive in Pakistan. As shown
in Figure 5, the average discount rate between 2002 and 2010 was 10%, between 7.5% and
15%. This generated a 5% average premium on liquidity, between 2.5 and 10 points above the
deposit rate (5%, shown in Appendix R). The State Bank of Pakistan, as the local central bank,
is responsible for the conduct of the monetary policy and denes the discount rate through its
policy meetings, which in general take place at quarterly frequency. As highlighted by our
model, this is a key variable because in combination with deposit volatility, it changes the
intertemporal allocation of lending by commercial banks. As previously reported, there is
ample evidence showing that the State Bank of Pakistan intervenes strongly to support banks'
liquidity during Zakat. This is achieved through liquidity injections, which can be considered a
quantity-response. However, the price-responses could be equally important, and indeed, how
this rate is determined can impact our identication. We take into account this point in two
ways. First, in line with Jimenez et al. (2012), we can claim that within a bank{borrower
relationship, the discount rate can be considered to be a predetermined variable, particularly
because we will absorb all other common shocks through time xed eects and only exploit its
interaction with a bank-specic deposit volatility measure. Second, the relatively small extent
of the Zakat withdrawals are not enough to generate changes in monetary policy and, in fact,
we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no discount rate adjustment during the Zakat period.
In this respect, Figure 5 shows the evolution of the discount rate over the sample period,
between the rst quarter of 2002 and the fourth quarter of 2010 and reports a vertical line for
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the quarter that includes Zakat. It is dicult to verify the presence of a policy rate response to
Zakat, and in Appendix E, Table E1, we regress the discount rate (that varies at quarter-year
level) over a Zakat quarter dummy and cannot reject the null hypothesis of no rate change, even
accounting for quarter or year xed eects. Note that as Zakat changes quarters over time, due
to the lunar calendar, we can control for seasonality and other recurring factors. The Zakat
coecient is not only insignicantly dierent from zero but also very small in magnitude.
Among several reasons behind this lack of rate adjustment, SBP may face a classical Tinber-
gen rule problem with one policy tool and too many objectives (Tinbergen (1952)). Consistently
with this, in September 2009, the central bank explicitly mentioned this case in the minutes of
its meetings:11
liquidity tightness [...] is mostly due to the month of Ramadan and Eid festival. Likely
reversal of these phenomena [...] is expected to improve the market liquidity in the coming
months. [...] Uncertainty regarding the outcome of ongoing scal consolidation, resolution
of electricity problem, and timing of ocial foreign inows call for prudence at this point.
Therefore, there will be no change in the SBPs [State Bank of Pakistan's] policy rate, which
will remain at 13 percent. These issues are likely to determine SBPs policy trajectory in the
coming months.
It is particularly interesting to analyse this statement for two reasons. First, there is explicit
recognition of the liquidity tightness as Ramadan approaches and the Zakat payment is due.
This may be because 2009 was a particularly sensitive year for this problem: the discount
rate was almost 1.5 standard deviations above the 10% mean, and the volatility in the price
of silver was at its peak. Second, the statement directly reports the variables that are likely
to be considered in its setting: ination, output gap, scal consolidation, supply constraints
(electricity) and foreign inows. These are useful because they all point toward a multitude of
objectives to be covered and, possibly, therefore to the fact that the monetary policy rate does
not change because of the Zakat obligation.
Cross-Sectional Variation
The extent to which the Zakat contribution aects banks depends on how much banks are
exposed to the withdrawal-and-redeposit. We measure this cross-sectional variation through
the following two indicators: ATM Share, as the share of ATMs in Sunni-majority areas by
each bank; Deposit Ratio, as the distance between the average bank deposits and the wealth
threshold.
ATM Share
Pakistan is an Islamic republic, with 95% of its population professing Muslim faith and the
remainder composed mostly of Christians, Hindus, Buddhists and Animists.12 The majority of
11See page 2 of the Monetary Policy Statement, available at http://www.sbp.org.pk/m_policy/
MPD-29-Sep-09(English).pdf
12Refer to the 1998 Census collected by the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, aggregate information available at
http://www.pbs.gov.pk/sites/default/les//tables/POPULATION%20BY%20RELIGION.pdf .
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Muslim Pakistanis adhere to the Sunni school (76%), with the remaining 19% belonging to the
Shia.13
This distinction plays an important role in our identication because the rules of Zakat
payment are dierentially applied to Sunni and Shia followers. Although both are subject to
the Zakat principle, Sunni Pakistanis are obliged by law to pay through their bank accounts,14
whereas Shia Pakistanis have been allowed to contribute their Zakat individually since the mid
1980s.15 As a result, banks that are more exposed through their ATMs and branch network to
Sunni-majority areas are also more exposed to the deposit drop. We focus on ATMs because
they are generally present in larger bank branches, which are likely to be more involved in the
management of large cash amounts.
For this reason, we mapped the number of ATM per city by every bank in each year between
2002 and 2010. This map has been superimposed onto the religious map of Pakistan pro-
duced by Dr M. Izady and the Columbia University Gulf/2000 project.16 To measure the
exposure to Sunni-majority areas by bank b in year y, we construct the index Exposureby =PNby
c=1 wcnumbcy=
PNby
c=1 numcby in which we calculate a weighted sum of all ATMs in the numerator,
where cities are given a dierent value depending on their religious composition, divided by the
total number of ATMs. The weight assigned to each city, wc, is coded from the religious map
of Pakistan: Sunni-majority areas are assigned 1, Sunni{Shia or Sunni{Hindu mixed areas 0.5
and other areas 0 (mostly with Shia, Hindu or Christian majorities). This results in an index
of exposure that varies at bank{year level for the 30 banks operating in Pakistan. Unfortu-
nately, only the cross-sectional variation of this index is used, because the time-series change
in this indicator is negligible (as shown in Appendix D). For this reason, rather than using a
bank{year-level index, we take a bank average of this exposure over 2002{2014 and dene it as
Exposureb.
Deposit Ratio
In this part we exploit another feature that changes the exposure of a bank to Zakat: the
average amount deposited in the bank. Ex ante, banks with deposit accounts containing higher
amounts are more exposed to Zakat because they will experience a greater outow of funds. In
fact, as depositors engage in withdrawal-and-redeposit operations to bunch below the Nisab-
i-Zakat, banks with a higher average deposit amount will experience a larger withdrawal of
funds.
13Derived from the map produced by Dr M. Izady and the Columbia University Gulf/2000 project. Refer to
http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/images/maps/Pakistan_Religion_lg.png.
14The 1980 ordinance allows individuals of any qh (sub-practice within the Sunni and Shia traditions) to ll
an exemption module. In principle, it would be possible also for Sunni Pakistanis to seek a Zakat exemption.
However, this is rare, in some cases because of social stigma and lack of transparency from some banks. For
example refer to Dawn, http://www.dawn.com/news/647723/zakat-exemption-limit-doubled.
15This exemption was discussed between 1982 and 1988 and implemented in the nal correction of the law in
1989. Refer to Nasr (2004) for a historical and political account of these episodes.
16This map is available from http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/images/maps/Pakistan_Religion_lg.png
and is based on a combination of historical data, census information and online documentation. To cross-
validate the content of the map, we compared the aggregate numbers with the 1998 Census data collected by
the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics and found that these sources are aligned. For more on this, refer to PBS.
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For this reason, we exploit a feature of the Monetary Survey of Pakistani banks, collected
by the State Bank of Pakistan, which requests all banks to state the amount contained in
their average deposit account, and we dene the following index of exposure Exposureby =
Avg:Depositby=Nisab i Zakaty, in which the exposure of bank b to Zakat in year y is higher when the
average amount deposited relative to the Nisab-i-Zakat threshold in year y is higher. Therefore,
for a given year y and threshold, banks with a higher deposit amount are modelled to be
more exposed to this phenomenon. This indicator has advantages and disadvantages. One
advantage is its simplicity, based on one moment of the deposit account distribution and ease
of interpretation. Another advantage is that it varies both across banks and within banks over
time: this is not due to changes in the average deposit amount, which is time-invariant (see
Appendix D), but to time-series changes in the threshold. A disadvantage is that it is based
on only one moment of the distribution, and therefore, for extremely unequal distributions in
deposit accounts, the indicator could be a poor measure of the intensity of this phenomenon.
A further disadvantage is its availability, because it was measured between only 2005 and 2009.
2.3 Empirical Model
2.3.1 Loan Characteristics
We exploit the Zakat payment as a source of exogenous variation in the time-varying deposit
volatility for bank b at time t, given the heterogeneous exposure of banks. Therefore we model
Zakat as Zakatbt = Exposureb  Silver t, in which Exposureb measures the exposure of
bank b to Zakat, which depends on the margin, and Silver t is the variation coecient of the
detrended international silver price during the quarter before the beginning of Ramadan, which
is our reduced-form measure of deposit volatility.
Thus, equation (1) permits us to study how the characteristics of a loan given by bank b to
rm f at time t change with respect to volatility. The term xbft describes three characteristics
for each loan: the maturity as natural logarithm of days, the interest rate on the loan (lending
rate) and the natural logarithm of the amount in real 2010 PKR:
xbft = 1Zakatbt + 2Zakatbt Ratet + 3X1bt + b + bf + ft + ubft (1)
such characteristics are regressed over the Zakat variable and its interaction with the dis-
count rate at time t, Ratet. The time dimension, denoted by t, is the quarter of a year. Controls
are included at bank-time level, X1bt, specically: 1) the capital-to-asset ratio, as a measure of
risk taking; 2) the return on asset, after tax, as a measure of bank protability; 3) the ratio of
government securities to total assets, to account for exposure to the Pakistani government and
their possible liquidity eect; 4) the deposit share of liabilities, to measure the degree of reliance
on deposit as a source of funding, and 5) the natural logarithm of the total assets in real PKR,
as a measure of bank size. We also include a variety of xed eects: 1) at bank level to remove
bank time-invariant unobservable components; 2) a bank{rm xed eect to account for the
matching between borrowers and lenders; 3) a rm{year eect to remove rm{year-varying
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shocks (e.g. changes in loan demand) and common shocks; 4) a bank{quarter xed eect to
remove seasonality on the conditions of loans oered by bank b in quarter q.
Equation (1) can be interpreted as a dierence-in-dierence estimation, in which the exper-
iment takes place within a rm and across the banks interacting with the rm. This model
exploits variation within the same rm obtaining loans in a given year by dierent banks,
which are dierentially exposed to the Zakat phenomenon. In so doing, we net out time shocks
across all rm{bank matches, rm loan demand through rm{year shocks and seasonality at
bank{quarter level, which leave available only the bank{quarter{year specic variation in loan
supply. To simplify the interpretation of the coecients in equation (1), we standardize the two
main regressors (Exposureb, Silver ty), subtract from the discount rate its minimum value
and divide by the standard deviation. As a result, 1 can be interpreted as the change in the
characteristic xbft of a loan received by rm f from bank b in response to a one standard devi-
ation increase in silver price volatility for a bank one standard deviation more exposed to Zakat,
given that the discount rate is at its minimum value (7.5% in our sample). Correspondingly,
2 adds to this the role of a one standard deviation increase in the discount rate.
Given that our treatment varies at bank{quarter{year level, we allow the residual of loan
characteristics to be correlated within banks and quarter{year and cluster accordingly.
2.3.2 Investment Prole
Regarding the investment prole of rm f , only the yearly subscript y is used because the rm-
level investment survey is dened at annual frequency. By matching for every rm all loans by
all banks in every year, we are able to construct a measure of rm exposure to Zakat as follows:
1. We dene Loan Sharefbt =
PQf1y
q=1 lfbt=
PNb
b=1
PQbfy
q=1 lfbt as an index of exposure of rm f to
bank b by dening the fraction of loans received by rm f from bank b in time t (year y in this
case) over the sum of all loans lfbt received by rm f from bank b at time t divided by the sum
of all loans received by all banks in the same year.
2. We dene Zakatft =
PNb
b=1 LoanSharefbtZakatbt as the index of exposure of rm f to
Zakat as the sum across all banks Nb connected to rm f of the product between the exposure
of the rm to the bank, Loan Sharefbt, multiplied by the exposure of the main bank used by
rm f to Zakat, Zakatbt.
As a result, we can employ the index of rm exposure to Zakat. This studies how the
investment prole of rm f in sector s in year y responds to volatility, in which kfsy describes
the overall rate of investment, the investment in xed capital and working capital. Equation
(2) is key to our estimation:
kfsy = 1Zakatfsy + 2Zakatfsy Ratey + f + s + sy + b + bs + by + fsy (2)
where the rst two elements test the proposition. Because we are interested in removing possible
demand-side eects, in this formulation we include in addition to rm and year xed eects,
sector and sector{year xed eects. At the same time, because it may be possible that rms
with a dierent number of banks experience dierent shocks, we also introduce a xed eect
for the number of banks, interacted with the year and the sector.
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Note that this exercise, although being tied to the theoretical model, is not the ideal exper-
iment. To perform the ideal exercise, we would need data about each single investment project
considered by each rm at any point in time, which should be linked to the loan characteristics
received, so that we could: 1) disentangle investment demand from nance supply and 2) verify
that when nancial products present worse conditions for the long term, rms either reduce
or abandon long-term projects. Our test only provides an aggregate picture, which although
imperfect is parallels to ideal experiment.
3 Data and Results
3.1 Data and Sample
Beyond the exogenous variation in deposit volatility, Pakistan presents high-quality statist-
ical documentation that allows the investigation of our main hypothesis. We use a variety of
databases to map the empirical analogues of our theoretical model, listed as follows.
1. The Corporate Credit Information Report and information on xbft. This dataset contains
the population of loans, which is part of the Electronic Credit Information Bureau held at the
State Bank of Pakistan, and provides information on all loans given by all nancial institutions
to any corporate entities. This dataset includes specic information on the amount of each loan,
the associated interest rate, the loan initial and end dates, information on collateralization, the
sector of the borrowing rm, the nature of the facility and the type of nancial product used
by the bank. This information is available between 2002 and 2010.
2. Pakistan ATM Bank-Wise Network and information on Exposureb. We build a map
for every bank operating in Pakistan, which includes the ATM location in each city for every
year. This information is collected by the State Bank of Pakistan in its annual statistical
publication.17 We digitize this information and construct a map that includes 467 cities all
over Pakistan. We double-check the total number of ATMs per bank{year obtained from our
map against the total number of ATMs as declared by each bank in their annual reports;
the correlation between these numbers is 0.996, and Appendix D shows a scatter plot of the
numbers.
3. The London Bullion Market Association silver price database and information on Silvert.
This contains daily prices for silver, and we focus on the variable \Silver Price per Ounce" in
USD between 2002 and 2010 (1 ounce corresponds to 28.3495 grams). This is the resulting
price of the auction that takes place every day at 12:00 noon London time.
4. State Bank of Pakistan Statistics and Monetary Surveys and information on rCBt, X1bt
and Exposureb. From the statistical archive of the Pakistan central bank, we extract three
central pieces of information. First, the consumer price index at monthly frequency, which we
use to make real and intertemporally comparable all variables in PKR. Second, the discount
17Reported in the publication under \Appedix-VII [sic] Bank Wise ATMs Location". For 2014, this can
be found at http://www.sbp.org.pk/publications/anu_stats/2014/Appendices/APPendix-VII.pdf. Ad-
ditional years can be accessed through the statistical web page of the Pakistan central bank.
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rate, which is the rate at which the State Bank of Pakistan provides liquidity to banks. Third,
the balance sheet of all banks at quarterly frequency, which we use to control for bank{time-
varying characteristics and to obtain the measure of average deposits, used to calculate bank
exposure to Zakat.
5. Investment Survey of Non-Financial Sector Firms. This is a statistical publication of
the State Bank of Pakistan reporting information on xed capital, working capital and total
investment for more than 230 very large rms in 15 sectors between 2005 and 2010. These
record average sales of 121 million USD and have access to alternative nancial products (stocks,
bonds). We are able to match this database with the loan-level data from banks and verify the
investment prole predictions of the proposition. This exercise presents both a disadvantage
and an advantage. On the one hand, having few rms is not ideal, because this limits the
tests that we can produce. On the other hand, nding an eect on large rms, implies that we
are underestimating the eect on the average rm. In fact, while rms in our sample enjoy a
variety of alternatives to bank funding (internal capital market, stock issuance, bonds), which
should conne this eect to zero; small rms have a restricted access to alternative funding and
therefore are likely to bear this liquidity risk.
Sample from the Credit Information Bureau Data The Corporate Credit Information
Report contains information on more than three million loans between 2002 and 2010 given to
over 90,000 borrowers. Unfortunately, because of the inappropriate entry of some information
by nancial institutions, not all of these loans are available for our analysis. Specically, we
restrict our sample to those loans with no missing values or spelling mistakes for the loan
maturity, the lending rate and the amount of the loan. This leads to a sample of 1,060,137
loans over the nine years 2002{2010 from 30 banks to 24,972 rms.18
As Table 3 shows, the average loan exhibits a maturity of 6.36 log points (corresponding
to 578 days), an amount of 15.59 log real PKR (corresponding to 5.9 million PKR and 56,872
USD) and a lending rate of 13.43 points. In the next sections, we discuss the issue of sample
selection and verify that the probability of belonging to our sample is uncorrelated with the
Zakat variables. On average a rm receives 42.5 loans over the whole period and 4.7 loans per
year. Several rms borrow from multiple banks, with 14.57% of all loans originated by a rm
that borrows from at least two banks in the same quarter of the same year.
Concerning the cross-sectional variation of the Zakat variable, Panel B of Table 3 reports
the two denitions of banks' exposure to Zakat: 1) the ATM share, which is time invariant and
hence we have only one observation per bank, and 2) the Deposit Ratio, which varies per bank
18Choudhary and Jain (2014) provide rich and exhaustive details on the credit registry and the availability
of data. In principle the universe contains 97,449 borrowers, composed by 11,395 classied as \corporates" and
86,053 classied as\consumers and sole proprietors", which they exploit almost entirely given their focus on loan
size. Because our predictions require a sample in which three variables are available (maturity, lending rate and
amount), this leads to a smaller sample containing only 25.62% of overall borrowers. These include all 11,395
classied as \corporates" and 13,577 classied as \consumers and sole proprietors". In particular within this
last group are mostly included individual liability rms, \sole proprietors", given that on average they receive
large and frequent loans. In discussing the results of our estimates, we verify that the inclusion of a loan in our
sample is not correlated with our Zakat variable.
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over time and we observe it for six years, which provides 175 data points. Panel C reports time-
series information on the variables used in our estimation: the discount rate and silver prices,
reporting summary statistics both over its volatility and mean price. Both of these variables
vary at quarter-year level. Panel D reports the summary statistics for the bank-level controls.
Finally, Panel E reports summary statistics on the outcome for the rm-level analysis (total
investment, xed assets and working capital), with all these variables dened as the growth in
rm assets (respectively, total, xed and working capital) net of depreciation. The sales variable
expresses the size of these rms: these are big rms, with average sales of 121 million USD,
with large cross-sectional heterogeneity. For example, oil and mining companies are among the
largest rms (e.g. Pakistan State Oil Company and Shell Pakistan).
Table 3: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables Observations Mean St. Deviation Minimum Maximum
Panel A - Corporate Credit Information Report
Loan Maturity in Ln Days 1,060,137 6.36 0.87 3.33 9.07
Lending Rate 1,060,137 13.43 3.95 5 45
Loan Amount in Ln PKR 1,060,137 15.59 2.26 4.26 24.06
Panel B - Bank Exposure to Zakat
ATM Share 30 0.41 0.20 0 0.54
Deposit Ratio 175 4.24 6.54 0 36.2
Panel C - Discount Rate and Silver
Rate 36 10.07 2.43 7.5 15
Silver Price  36 0.039 0.019 0.016 0.090
Silver Price  36 10.86 5.40 4.47 26.41
Panel D - Bank-Level Controls
Capital to Assets 1,080 0.106 0.747 0.037 4.205
ROA 1,080 0.004 0.028 -0.160 0.102
GVT Bonds to Assets 1,080 0.173 0.127 0.038 0.665
Deposit to Liabilities 1,080 0.727 0.236 0.004 0.971
Ln Tot. Assets 1,080 10.70 1.75 6.64 13.68
Panel E - Firm-Level Outcome and Sales
Total Investment 642 -0.013 0.189 -0.427 0.917
Fixed Capital 642 0.002 0.245 -0.580 1.336
Working Capital 642 -0.042 0.285 -0.838 0.872
Log of Sales 642 0.319 1.088 0.1 15.511
Notes: This table reports the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values for the main
variables in this analysis from the most important databases. Panel A shows information from the Corporate Credit Information
Report on: the maturity of loans in the natural logarithm of days (the mean corresponds to 578 days), the lending rate and
the amount of the real loan in the natural logarithm of 2010 PKR. Panel B shows information on the bank exposures to Zakat
as dened in Section 3.3.1. The ATM share summarizes the share of ATMs held in Sunni-majority areas. The second index of
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exposure is given by Deposit Ratio, measured as the ratio between the average deposit of a bank and the Nisab-i-Zakat. Panel C
shows summary statistics for the discount rate, as dened by the quarterly meeting of the Pakistan central bank and silver price.
The rst row reports the coecient of variation of silver and the mean of silver and the unit of observation is the quarter of a
year. The coecient of variation is calculated by dividing the standard deviation of the detrended silver price at quarter-year level
by the average silver price in the same quarter-year cell. Panel D shows summary statistics from the monetary surveys, reporting
bank-level variables on the 30 banks analysed for every quarter of every of the nine years between 2002 and 2010. Capital to assets
measures the ratio between the bank equity and size of the balance sheet, ROA is the after-tax return on assets, GVT Bonds to
Assets is the exposure to government bonds through a ratio of the federal government securities holding over total assets, Deposit to
Liabilities is the share of liabilities funded through deposits and Total Assets is the size of a bank's balance sheet. Panel E reports
the summary statistics on the outcome variables and the sales variable for 237 rms belonging to the sample. Total investment is
dened as the growth rate in rm assets net of depreciation, xed investment as the growth rate in xed assets net of depreciation
and working capital as the growth rate in working capital. The sales variable is expressed through the natural logarithm of its real
2010 thousand PKR value.
3.2 Main Results
3.2.1 Loan Characteristics
The main results of this section are listed in Table 4, we report the bank exposure through the
ATM share in columns 1-3, while through the deposit ratio in columns 4-6 . The rst term
in the table represents the eect of a one standard deviation increase in silver price volatility,
for banks with a one standard deviation higher exposure, when the discount rate lies at its
minimum rate (7.5%). The second term adds on the previous the eect of a one standard
deviation increase in the discount rate.
The rst term highlights that even when the discount rate is low, banks pass the expected
cost of deposit volatility on creditors. The row Zakatbt shows that in these cases creditors keep
the same maturity for their loan, but accept the higher lending rate (30 basis points in column
2 and 70 basis point in 5) without changing loan sizes.
However, when central bank liquidity is more expensive, the equilibrium loan changes along
both the average maturity and size. Column 1 and 2 indicates that banks that are one standard
deviation more exposed through the ATM share, in presence of a one standard deviation higher
silver volatility and discount rate, give loans with maturities shorter by 2% (approximately 12
days) and with lower rates 13 basis points. Analogously, columns 4 and 5 indicate a decline in
maturities of 14.4% (corresponding to 83 days) and lending rate by 70 basis points. In both
cases the amounts borrowed do not change.
Both the ATM share and deposit ratio show that the discount rate is a key variable in
this context. For this reason we unpack the eects presented in Table 4, by reporting two
sets of pictures in Appendix F, which show the evolution of the elasticity of loan maturities,
lending rates and loan amounts to the discount rate. Figure F1 reports these for the ATM share
exposure, Figure F2 reports these for the deposit ratio and both report the linear predictions
of the eect, as emerging from Table 4. In Appendix G, we show the same picture, but replace
the discount rate variable with a dummy for every quartile of the discount rate to catch non-
linearities. In both cases, the results are close in terms of magnitudes and implications: a
large part of the eects observed in Table 4 takes place in the presence of a high discount rate,
with the rate ranging between 12% and 15% (recorded during 25% of the sample). For lower
values of this rate, the eects are not statistically dierent from zero. This is consistent with
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our theoretical model: if the premium on liquidity is zero, rCB, then deposit volatility has no
eects on lending.
Table 4: Zakat and Loan Characteristics - Bank Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Maturity Lending Loan Maturity Lending Loan
Ln(Days) Rate Ln(PKRs) Ln(Days) Rate Ln(PKRs)
Zakatbt 0.034 0.296** -0.008 0.090 0.711** -0.138
(0.022) (0.121) (0.027) (0.069) (0.305) (0.243)
Zakatbt  Ratet -0.023** -0.132** -0.001 -0.144** -0.692** -0.020
(0.010) (0.052) (0.013) (0.055) (0.313) (0.185)
Exposure ATM ATM ATM Deposit Deposit Deposit
Share Share Share Ratio Ratio Ratio
Observations 1,060,137 1,060,137 1,060,137 662,744 662,744 662,744
Adj. R sq. 0.784 0.708 0.889 0.734 0.688 0.890
Mean Dep. Var. 6.363 13.43 15.64 6.363 13.43 15.64
S.D. Dep. Var. 0.868 3.956 2.260 0.868 3.956 2.260
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates of equation (1); the unit of observation is a loan received by rm f by bank b at time
t (quarter q of year y). Fixed eects are included for rm, rm{year, bank{rm, bank{quarter and quarter{year, as reported in the
third-last row FE. Standard errors are clustered at bank{time level; the number of clusters is 816 in Panel A and 383 in Panel B.
Maturity in Days Ln measures the maturity of a loan through the natural logarithm of its number of days between the origination
of the loan and the contracted end date. Lending Rate reports the interest rate applied by the bank to the rm on the loan. Real
Loan Amount Ln measures the natural logarithm of the amount of the loan in real 2010 PKR. These variables are regressed on
the following: 1) Zakatbt is a variable composed by the interaction of the standardized exposure of bank b and the standardized
variation coecient of silver price in the three months preceding the rst day of Ramadan; 2) the interaction between Zakatbt and
Ratet, multiplies the Zakatbt variable with the discount rate as applied by the central bank on liquidity loans to private banks.
Such policy rate is modied as follows: we subtract the minimum value, 7.5%, and divide by the standard deviation 2.43%. In
this way, the coecient on Zakatbt can be interpreted as the eect of a one standard deviation increase in silver price volatility
for banks that are one standard deviation more exposed to Zakat, in the minimum rate (7.5%). The interaction can be interpreted
as the additional eect on the previous eect of a one standard deviation increase in the discount rate. Panel A reports the bank
exposure to Zakat through the ATM Share using the standardized share of branches in Sunni-majority cities. Panel B reports the
bank exposure to Zakat through the deposit ratio using the standardized ratio between the average deposit account for bank b
divided by the wealth threshold, Nisab-i-Zakat, for the year. The bank-level controls reported here vary at the t level and are the
Capital to Assets ratio, the ROA (return on assets), the government bonds to total assets ratio, the deposit share of liabilities,
and the natural logarithm of total real assets. The number of Observations and Adjusted R2 (Adj. R sq.) of each regression is
reported in each panel. For the ATM share exposure, we can use the full sample with 1,060,137; for the deposit ratio, we observe
this variable between only 2005 and 2009, which includes only 662,744 loans. The Mean and Standard Deviation (S.D.) of the
dependent variables are reported in the last two rows of the table, respectively. ***, ** and * indicate signicance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level, respectively.
The two sources of cross-sectional variation deliver conceptually similar results, with large
quantitative dierences. This is due to a Local Average Treatment Eect, LATE, interpretation,
given the dierent margins exploited by each identication. In fact, the exposure to Zakat
through ATM share compares banks heterogeneously exposed to Sunni versus non-Sunni. In
this case the control group is composed by banks with a low exposure to individuals with a
positive probability of withdrawal. Conversely, the deposit ratio exposure provides a measure
on the intensity of the withdrawals around the wealth threshold. In principle this control
group may not necessarily coincide with one described by the ATM share, which explains the
dierence in our estimates. Given the nature of the Zakat phenomenon, it is plausible to expect
the deposit ratio to be larger than the ATM share, considering that 76% of Pakistanis belong
to the Sunni branch and are subject to the Zakat regulation: in the case of the ATM share
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we cannot distinguish between compliers (Sunni who withdraw) and non-compliers (Sunni who
do not withdraw), while through the deposit ratio variable we have a more rened measure of
compliers (but fewer observations).
A variety of concerns could aect our estimates, and in the appendices we carefully address
these. First, in the current setting we introduce only bank{time controls, whereas in Appendix
H we complement the results of Table 4 by oering alternative combinations of controls: exclud-
ing all controls; introducing loan-level controls; focusing on bank{time per se and interacted
with the discount rate; and nally introducing loan-level, bank-level and interactions with the
discount rate. This does not aect our results. Second, the Zakat payment can have both an
eect on banks uncertainty over a very high deposit withdrawal (the core of this paper), but
also through the temporary decline in deposits (level eect). We address this in the following
three ways: rst, we always control for the level of deposits measured at quarterly frequency
in the regressions (normalized by the share of assets); second, we take care of the expected
deposit decline using bank-quarter xed eects and third, in Appendix I, we add to the main
specications a control for the interaction between the exposure to Zakat and the mean price
of silver in the three months before Zakat and their interaction with the discount rate. As
shown in Tables 1 and 2, because the rst moment of silver has an eect on the rst moment of
deposits, while the second moment of silver has an eect on the second moment of deposits, we
can use our reduced-form also to account for the level eect. Third, because it may be argued
that silver price volatility could correlate with a variety of macroeconomic factors, in Appendix
J we replicate the results of Table 4 and add to the main specication an alternative in which
we multiply the bank exposures to Zakat (and also its term with the discount rate) with the
following macroeconomic controls: 1) GDP per capita; 2) GDP per capita growth; 3) Ination;
4) Exchange Rate; 5) Foreign Direct Investment capital inows (FDI) and 6) all the previous
controls together. Although some changes in the point estimates are observed, the results are
qualitatively unchanged. Fourth, our sample includes the recent nancial crisis, during which
global assets and commodities experienced important uctuations. In Appendix K, we replicate
the results of Table 4 by excluding the months from December 2007 to June 2009, described as
recession months by the Business Cycle Dating Committee of the National Bureau of Economic
Research. Because this period generated extensive uctuations in global stocks, bonds and
commodities, we show that our results do not rely exclusively on this phenomenon. Fifth, in
Appendix L we discuss the results of Bertrand et al. (2004) and Cameron et al. (2012) within
our empirical framework and oer a variety of alternative computations of our standard errors;
although in some cases some results become signicant around 10%, the main ndings are un-
aected. Sixth, in Appendix M we replicate the results of Table 4 by adopting two alternative
measures of silver price volatility: 1) we dene volatility as the standard deviation of the daily
growth rate in silver price during the quarter before Zakat and 2) we derive measures of ex-
pected silver price volatility from option prices, using the Black{Scholes model, for the quarter
before Zakat. Despite the alternative methods of calculating volatility, the results are in line
with Table 4, given that these measures are highly correlated as shown in Table M1. Seventh, in
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Appendix N we extend our results to a two-month window and a four-month window, showing
that our ndings are mostly unaected. Eighth, as claried in Section 4.1, we extract from the
universe of Pakistani corporate lending (roughly three million loans) a sub-sample containing
loans that record a maturity in days, a lending rate and a size in PKR. Because of reporting
mistakes by banks, some loans are unable to be used: from missing one or more key variables,
to reporting no borrower or bank code, to obvious typing errors (i.e. maturities with missing
or invalid numbers). In Appendix O we show that this measurement error is uncorrelated with
our Zakat variables: this is achieved by regressing a dummy variable taking unit value when
a loan is included in our sample and zero otherwise on the Zakat variables. We nd that the
probability of belonging to the sample does not correlate with Zakat.
Finally, in Appendix P we oer some further test showing that the results of our mechanism
are heterogeneous across dierent rms. In Table Q1 we show that rms with a larger lending
volume tend to be less aected, though the magnitudes are quite small: only rms that are
between 5 and 10 standard deviations above the mean are immune to volatility. On the con-
trary we see that rms taking more loans, but not necessarily larger loans, are not dierentially
aected. In Table Q2, we show that rms with a higher share of collateralization are compar-
atively less aected, but once again with small magnitudes; while the presence of a rating does
not heterogeneously aect the results.
3.2.2 Additional Evidence
In this section we provide evidence on three additional predictions of the model. First, we
explore the reaction of the agreed lending rates at dierent maturities in presence of deposit
volatility and a high discount rate. We verify that the lending rates on longer-term loans (with
a maturity exceeding 4 and 5 years) increase more than those with a short maturity and the
share of such loans declines in presence of higher volatility and cost of liquidity. Second, we
show that also among loans with short-maturities (less than one year), there is a reallocation
toward loans with a maturity of three months or less and loans that are given and repaid before
Zakat. Third, consistently with the model, we cannot reject a positive, yet imprecise, eect of
Zakat on deposit rates.
For the rst point, we present two tests:
1. A replication of equation (1), in which we run the same regression with the following
changes: a) replace the discount rate with one dummy per quartile; b) introduce a dummy for
each maturity class of loans (one year or less, two years, three years, four years, or ve years
or more) and interact these with our Zakat variables.
2. An equation at bank level, in which we observe at every t the share of loans given by
each bank in every maturity class, which are regressed on the variables as in equation (1).
We use these results to quantify the output eect of Zakat in Section 5.
Figure 6 shows that the lending rates of loans with a maturity of one year or less and two
years do not respond to an increase in deposit volatility and bank exposure for any value of the
discount rate, which is in line with our theoretical model. However, the lending rates of loans
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with a maturity of three, four, or ve years or more all increase by around 2.5 points in presence
of a one standard deviation in silver price volatility and bank exposure to Zakat. Nonetheless,
such increases are registered for a discount rate only in the fourth quartile, which corresponds
to a rate between 13 and 15 percentage points. The left panel of Figure 6 reports a similar
exercise, in which we aggregate the loans at bank{quarter level to verify how the distribution
of disbursed loans reacts to changes in deposit volatility and discount rate. Analogously to the
previous picture, we can see two key results: 1) at the fourth quartile of the discount rate there
is a disappearance of loans with a maturity of ve years or more and 2) there is a corresponding
increase in loans given at maturity of one year or less and two years. Therefore, this bank-level
characteristic conrms our ndings. This is not a fully comprehensive test: in this section we
can see how agreed long-term rates respond to deposit volatility and a high discount rate and
we are aware that selection could take place in either direction. However, we believe that these
results are consistent with our mechanism.
Figure 6: Zakat, Lending Rate and Loan Shares
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Notes: This gure reports estimates of the eect of dierent quartiles of the discount rate on the lending rate of loans of
dierent maturities (left panel) and the share of loans given by banks (right panel). In the left panel each box reports a maturity
class: the top-left corner reports loans with a maturity of one year or less, the top-centre reports loans with a maturity of two
years, top-right reports those of three years, bottom-left reports those of four years and bottom-centre reports those of ve years
or more. Within each box the rst column reports the eect of the rst quartile of the discount rate, the second the eect of the
second, and so on. A signicant dierence in lending rates takes place only when the discount rate is in its fourth quartile, in that
case both loans with a maturity of three, four and ve years see a signicant increase in their lending rate. The right panel reports
an analogous picture, but with data at bank level, showing the distribution of loan share across loan maturities. Note that in
presence of a discount rate in the fourth quartile, loans with a maturity of ve years or more disappear and there is a corresponding
statistically signicant increase in loans with a maturity of two years and one year or less.
Second, we verify the behaviour of very short-term loans by looking at the changes of
maturities for loans that are shorter than one year. For this reason two variables are dened:
\Maturity 3 Months or Less" takes unit value if a loan has a maturity of less than 90 days
and \Loan Given and Repaid before Zakat" taking unit value if a loan is originated and repaid
before the Zakat period. These are a small fractions of overall loans 3.8% and 0.4% respectively
and for this reason we cannot exploit the same level of variation applied in equation (1).
Therefore while we still employ the Zakat variation, along the ATM share and deposit ratio
exposures, we only introduce bank, rm and time xed eects. The results, presented in Table
5 are consistent with the hypothesis of a reallocation of toward very short-term loans. A one
standard deviation increase in silver price volatility and discount rate leads banks one standard
deviation more exposed to give loans with a maturity of 3 months or less by 0.23%, along the
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ATM share exposure, and 4.05%, along the deposit ratio one. Finally, there occurs also an
increase in the probability of loans given and repaid before Zakat: a one standard deviation
increase in silver volatility, leads more exposed banks to increase the probability of giving such
short loans by 0.42% under the ATM share exposure and 0.62% under the deposit ratio. These
eects are increasing when the discount rate increases, but are not precisely estimated. Finally,
in Appendix P we show through a time-series analysis of the average monthly deposit rate in
Pakistan, that during Zakat there seems to be positive eect on deposit rate, as predicted by
the theoretical model and highlighted in Appendix A. Though the point estimate is positive,
we are unable to reject an hypothesis that this change is not statistically dierent from zero.
Table 5: Zakat and Short-Term Loans
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Maturity Loan Given Maturity Loan Given
3 Months and Repaid 3 Months and Repaid
or Less before Zakat or Less before Zakat
Zakatbt 0.0006 0.0042* 0.0139 0.0062**
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0240) (0.0025)
Zakatbt  Ratet 0.0023* 0.0020 0.0405* 0.0033
(0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0211) (0.0024)
Exposure ATM ATM Deposit Deposit
Share Share Ratio Ratio
Observations 1,060,137 1,060,137 662,744 662,744
Adj. R sq. 0.369 0.317 0.398 0.277
FE b, f , t Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean Dep. Var. 0.038 0.004 0.038 0.004
S.D. Dep. Var. 0.191 0.064 0.191 0.064
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates; the unit of observation at loan level and reports the characteristics of a loan received
by rm f by bank b at time t (quarter q of year y). Fixed eects are included for rm, bank and quarter{year, as reported in the
third-last row FE. Standard errors are clustered at bank{time level; the number of clusters is 816 in Panel A and 383 in Panel B.
"Maturity 3 Months or Less" reports a dummy variable taking unit value for all loans with a maturity lower than 3 months, while
"Loan Given and Repaid before Zakat" takes unit value for all loans that are given and repaid before the payment of the Zakat
obligation.These variables are regressed on the following: 1) Zakatbt is a variable composed by the interaction of the standardized
exposure of bank b and the standardized variation coecient of silver price in the three months preceding the rst day of Ramadan;
2) the interaction between Zakatbt and Ratet, multiplies the Zakatbt variable with the discount rate as applied by the central bank
on liquidity loans to private banks. Such policy rate is modied as follows: we subtract the minimum value, 7.5%, and divide by
the standard deviation 2.43%. In this way, the coecient on Zakatbt can be interpreted as the eect of a one standard deviation
increase in silver price volatility for banks that are one standard deviation more exposed to Zakat, in the minimum rate (7.5%).
The interaction can be interpreted as the additional eect on the previous eect of a one standard deviation increase in the discount
rate. Columns (1) and (2) report the ATM share exposure to Zakat using the standardized share of branches in Sunni-majority
cities. Columns (3) and (4) report the deposit ratio exposure to Zakat using the standardized ratio between the average deposit
account for bank b divided by the wealth threshold, Nisab-i-Zakat, for the year. The bank-level controls reported here vary at the t
level and are the Capital to Assets ratio, the ROA (return on assets), the government bonds to total assets ratio, the deposit share
of liabilities, and the natural logarithm of total real assets. The number of Observations and Adjusted R2 (Adj. R sq.) of each
regression is reported in each panel. For the ATM share, we can use the full sample with 1,060,137; for the deposit ratio exposure,
we observe this variable between only 2005 and 2009, which includes only 662,744 loans. The Mean and Standard Deviation (S.D.)
of the dependent variables are reported in the last two rows of the table, respectively. ***, ** and * indicate signicance at the
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 6: Zakat and Firm Investment - Firm Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Fixed Working Total Fixed Working Total
Assets Capital Investment Assets Capital Investment
Zakatft 0.010 -0.004 0.001 0.020 -0.082 -0.037
(0.015) (0.013) (0.007) (0.077) (0.105) (0.068)
Zakatft  Ratet -0.020 0.015 -0.006 -0.085** 0.111* 0.012
(0.040) (0.049) (0.023) (0.040) (0.063) (0.039)
Eect in S.D. 19.1% 19.2%
Exposure ATM ATM ATM Deposit Deposit Deposit
Share Share Share Ratio Ratio Ratio
Observations 642 642 642 642 642 642
Adj. R sq. 0.211 0.076 0.211 0.214 0.076 0.166
FE f , fs, sy, b, bs, by Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean Dep. Var. 0.002 -0.042 -0.013 0.002 -0.042 -0.013
S.D. Dep. Var. 0.245 0.285 0.189 0.245 0.285 0.189
Notes: This table reports OLS estimates of equation (2); the unit of observation is the rm f at time t (in this case year).
Fixed eects are included for rm, year, number of banks, sector{year, number of banks{year and number of banks{sector, as
reported in the third-last row FE. Standard errors are clustered at rm level; the number of clusters is 237. Fixed Assets measures
the investment in xed assets calculated as the growth of xed capital assets minus depreciation, Working Capital measures the
spending in working capital as the growth of working capital, and Total Investment measures the overall investment of the rm as
the growth in its overall assets net of depreciation. These variables are regressed on the following: 1) Zakatft is the standardized
exposure of rm f to Zakat, obtained through the average exposure of each bank with which rm f interacted, weighted by the
relative size of lending of rm f from this bank; 2) the interaction between Zakatft and Ratet, multiplies the Zakatft variable
with the discount rate as applied by the central bank on liquidity loans to private banks. Such policy rate is modied as follows:
we subtract the minimum value, 7.5%, and divide by the standard deviation 2.43%. In this way, the coecient on Zakatft can
be interpreted as the eect of a one standard deviation increase in silver price volatility for banks that are one standard deviation
more exposed to Zakat, in the minimum rate. The interaction can be interpreted as the additional eect on the previous eect of
a one standard deviation increase in the discount rate. The bank exposures to Zakat are reported in the row titled \Exposure".
Columns (1), (2) and (3) report estimates using the ATM share; Columns (4), (5) and (6) report estimates using the deposit ratio.
The rm-level controls reported here vary at the t level and are the natural logarithm of real prot as a measure of protability,
the real administrative cost as a measure of cost eectiveness, sales as a measure of size, rm equity as a measure of safety, and the
liquidity ratio dened as the acid test. The number of Observations and Adjusted R2 (Adj. R sq.) of each regression is reported
in each panel. The Mean and Standard Deviation (S.D.) of the dependent variables are reported in the last two rows of the table,
respectively. ***, ** and * indicate signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
3.2.3 Investment Prole
In this section, we verify whether a change in the nancial conditions of lending aects the
investment prole of rms. Table 6 shows the results of equation (2), by constructing for every
rm an indicator (Zakatfy) that expresses how much a rm is exposed to Zakat, through the
exposure of its bank. The left-hand variables are the growth in xed capital assets, in working
capital and total assets, all net of depreciation. The theoretical model predicts that in the
presence of an increase in long-term lending, a rm would switch to short-term lending and
correspondingly short-term investment.
The results in Table 6 are in line with this prediction. In both columns (1) to (3) and (4) to
(6) of Table 6, in presence of Zakat and a high discount rate, there appears to be a redirection
of investment from xed capital assets to working capital, with no overall change in the level
of investment. Because of the small eect of Zakat as caught by the ATM share exposure, the
results of columns (1) to (3) are qualitatively in line with the predictions, but too small to be
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precisely estimated. Conversely, because the deposit ratio exposure to Zakat generates larger
eects on maturities and rates, we can verify that there is such a redirection of investment from
xed capital to working capital, in columns (4) to (6). The magnitudes are generally small,
with a one standard deviation increase in silver price volatility and discount rate leading to a
decline in capital assets growth of 0.08 points for rms with a one standard deviation higher
bank exposure (19% of a standard deviation) and to an increase in working capital of 0.11 points
(19% of a standard deviation). Appendix R reports two additional specications of Table 6: 1)
excluding all rm-level controls and 2) including both rm and bank-level controls. Finally in
Appendix S we include the lagged Zakat variables to account for mean reversion and nd no
evidence of rms reverting to a higher xed asset investment after a higher of low xed asset
investment.
3.3 Identifying Assumption and Robustness
Our identifying assumption relies on the interaction between silver price volatility and the
discount rate aecting the loan choice between long- and short-term only through the reaction
in their corresponding rates. However, there could be a variety of alternative hypotheses that
may provide observationally equivalent results to those in Table 4 and Table 6. In this section,
we explore the robustness of our identifying assumption to a few alternative hypotheses, by
explaining the challenge, and point to the relevant appendix detailing each test.
Placebo { Eid Adha Celebrations It may be argued that silver price volatility has an
impact on local banks regardless of deposit volatility: it could aect a specic asset tied to
religious features to which Pakistani banks' exposure correlates with their depositors' exposure.
Alternatively, silver price volatility may aect loan demand heterogeneously per bank because
of bank specialization (Paravisini et al. (2015)) and we are only capturing an eect due to this
channel. As a result, any exercise exploiting silver price volatility at any point in time would
result in eects analogous to those found in Table 4 and Table 6.
To address this claim, we oer a placebo test to show that the interaction between silver
price volatility and the discount rate aects loan characteristics only around Zakat time and
that the risk of deposit withdrawal is the driver behind our results. For this purpose we replicate
the same exercise for a dierent Islamic celebration: Eid al-Adha. This is a holy celebration,
also based on the lunar calendar and taking place every year (see Table U1). It is dedicated to
the First Testament event during which Abraham showed his willingness to submit to God and
to kill his only son, Isaac, but was blocked at the last moment by the angel Gabriel (Jibra'il in
the Islamic tradition, also meaning Holy Spirit). During this celebration there are important
festivals and family gatherings; in particular there is a substantial deposit withdrawal toward
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the purchases of gifts, particularly fresh bank notes to children and relatives,19 and consumption
of meat and other goods.20
The most relevant factors behind this placebo are: 1) there are large deposit withdrawals
(1.2% as shown in Table T2) and 2) these withdrawals are not linked to the price of silver and
there is no uncertainty over their size (there is neither a religiously-mandated threshold nor a
levy). As a result, the Adha celebration is a tting placebo for our purposes. In Appendix T
we report further evidence on this and we produce a similar test to the one shown in Table 4,
the dierence being that, instead of calculating the volatility of silver price and analyzing loans
given in the three months preceding the rst day of Ramadan, we focus on the three months
preceding Eid al-Adha and standardize the measure as previously described. Table T3 shows
that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no eect on lending characteristics.
Alternative Hypothesis on Selection into the Timing of Lending Table 4 and Table 6
could express a story of selection. Instead of charging all customers a higher rate for long-term
loans, which generates a shortening of loan maturities, banks could simply delay loans to some
customers, either in their number or volume, and lend during the period before Zakat to only
a selected sample of borrowers. As a result, there would emerge a case of selection into the
timing of loans during the months before Zakat. For example, \higher value" customers may be
led to wait until the end of Zakat and \lower value" customers oered a loan: hence the change
in loan characteristics would be simply due to a change in the applicant pool. In such a case,
because some rms are \selected out" of the Zakat treatment, then we are simply observing how
the average conditions of loans to some specic rms change in response to the discount rate.
If the previous argument applies, then we should observe an abnormal decline (or increase)
in banks' overall operations during the quarter which immediately precedes Zakat. As a result,
we collapse the data at bank{time (quarter{year) level and verify two key indicators: 1) the
loan number share, dened as the number of loans given in that quarter over the total number
given in the year, and 2) the loan volume share, dened as the total volume of loans in PKR
divided by the overall volume of loans given in the year. Appendix U, Table U1, shows the
results both in the case of the ATM share in Panel A and deposit ratio in Panel B, in which
there does not emerge any movement in the overall activities of banks. Therefore, we can claim
that, even if there may be selection in the timing of loans during the Zakat period, it does not
appear either to be statistically detectable.
An alternative margin along which banks may adjust to Zakat, may emerge from another
dimension of \selection into the timing of lending": the end-date of the loan. In order to
limit the withdrawal of funds from the central bank at expensive rates, banks may time the
19There exists a common tradition of providing gifts to children through fresh bank notes on Eid al-Adha. For
example, refer to http://www.dawn.com/news/1194767. In fact, during this period the State Bank of Pakistan
issues an exceptional amount of currency to satisfy individual demand for notes; see http://www.dawn.com/
news/983109/fresh-currency-notes-for-eid.
20See Gulf Base, 2015: \The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) on Tuesday injected Rs61.90 billion into
the money market through its open market operation (OMO) to help ease liquidity shortfall stemming
from Eid-related cash withdrawals from the banking system" (available at http://www.gulfbase.com/news/
pakistan-injects-rs61-9b-into-money-market/283154).
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repayment of their loans to occur before the deposit withdrawal coinciding with Zakat. In
Figure U1, we provide descriptive evidence consistent with such behaviour, with banks timing
a substantially higher share of loans to expire between two and three months before Zakat.
Interestingly, the same expiration takes place before the Eid Adha celebration, presented in the
previous paragraph.
Alternative Explanation on the Quality of Lending A competing argument to our
mechanism could state that, in periods of higher cost of funding, the pool of rms applying for
a loan could change, as Jimenez et al. (2014) show. As a result, the eects found in Table 4
are simply due to the selection of worse/better borrowers. To verify whether this is the case,
we obtain additional information on the loans given by banks over this period and collapse it
at bank{time level. Specically, to measure the \quality" of lending given by banks, we use
all available information and focus on three indicators: 1) the share of loans that are secured
and hence present a collateral against the value of the loan; 2) the share of loans in which
customers have some sort of rating (by the bank or by third-party agencies/rms) and 3) the
share of loans with customers presenting a rating previously given by the bank. In Appendix
V we can observe that, regardless which identication we use, there is no movement along any
direction. Hence the quality of lending, either as measured by the\safety"of customers, proxied
by whether a loan is secured, or as measured by the \information" on customers, proxied by the
presence of a rating, does not respond to deposit volatility for any level of the discount rate.
Alternative Eect through Bank Competition One possible warning against the main
results may relate to the role of bank competition. Because banks are heterogeneously exposed
to deposit volatility, interpreted as a change in their marginal cost of lending, then rms could
move from more aected banks (which raise the long-term rate more) to less aected ones
(which may increase this less or not at all). Although this is plausible, this phenomenon is a
limited one for four main reasons: 1) Pakistani rms tend to be credit constrained, in line with
other South Asian economies as reported by Banerjee and Duo (2014) in India; 2) rms and
banks tend to establish long-term relations, so that it may be cheaper to stay with the current
bank and switch maturity rather than reallocate lending across banks (as shown theoretically
in subsection \Bank Competition and Deposit Volatility" of Appendix B), 3) consistently with
this, we do not observe a reallocation of loan amounts across banks (which goes against the
previous argument) and 4) large rms also register this maturity-shortening eect, despite being
the ones who could exploit this credit/maturity reallocation the most (as shown in Table 6).
However, in order to analyze more deeply this concern, Appendix W extends the result of
Table 4 by removing rm-time xed eects. This broadens the scope of the analysis by using
variation also from rms having access to only one bank, hence a within-bank and within-rm
analysis. These regressions show that even in this case, the main results still apply, with smaller
magnitudes observed for the ATM share case. We also provide two empirical tests to discuss
this possibility further in Appendix X:
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1) we show that the relative composition of maturities does not change, by showing that
the share of \maturity days" that rm f receives from bank b at time t does not correlate with
the Zakat variables.
2) we replicate the results of Table 4, controlling for an Herndahl Index of loan maturity
composition at rm level, both as a control and interacted with the rm xed eect, which does
not alter our main ndings.
4 Policy Implications and External Validity
In the next two subsections, we evaluate a policy response to the deposit volatility generated
by Zakat and discuss the external validity of this work.
4.1 Quantifying the Eect of a Targeted Liquidity Program
In this section, we combine the results of the theoretical model to quantify the output gains of
a targeted liquidity program aimed at neutralizing the uncertainty eect of Zakat, by providing
banks with liquidity at temporarily lower rates. Our theoretical model predicts this rate to
equal the deposit rates, which averaged 5% in Pakistan between 2002 and 2010 (see Appendix
Q).
Exploiting the assumptions made in the theoretical section and carefully discussed in Ap-
pendix A, we can quantify the output eects of Zakat, by using only information from the
credit registry. This presents an obvious data advantage because we can use information that
summarizes more than one million loans over almost a decade and with a credible identication.
In Appendix Y, we show that starting from the denition of output in the theoretical model,
and through a few transformations, we can reach the following expressions
@Y
@v
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
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5X
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@rL1;m
@v
< 0
which respectively quantify how the output in the economy, Y , and the average maturity, M ,
change in presence of deposit volatility, v, for a given discount rate rCB. In this expressions,
the subscript m reports the maturity class of a loan (1 year or less, 2, 3, 4 or 5 or more) as
introduced earlier. The output expression states that this eect is the sum across all maturity
classes of the product of three elements: 1) the share of loans with a given maturity m, sm,
which is observable; 2) the interest rate spread between the average loan with a maturity m
and the 1 year loan, which is also observable; 3) the increase in the lending rate of a loan with
maturitym with volatility, which was estimated in 3.2.2. Similarly the expression for maturities
is the sum of the product between the loan share and the rate response.
Table 6 reports the main results of this section given the average silver price volatility and
combining both the ATM share exposure and the deposit ratio one. Two key results emerge.
First, the average gain of output generated by Zakat is 0.042% under the ATM share and
0.205% under the deposit ratio. Second, this program would lead to an average increase in
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loan maturities: 4.71% under the ATM share exposure and 22.79% under the deposit ratio
one. Interestingly, although these results are obtained using information from only the credit
registry, they are in line with those of previous studies of the eect of maturity structure on
productivity. For example, Schiantarelli and Srivastava (1997) and Schiantarelli and Sembenelli
(1997) nd through a production function estimation using panels of rms that longer-term
nance is associated with productivity gains of a similar magnitude. Analogously Terry (2015)
nds that quarterly reports lower rms output by 0.1%, within the interval of our estimates,
by generating a reallocation away from R&D (long-term investment) to alternative short-term
activities. Although these studies start from dierent conceptual frameworks, they also conclude
that the reallocation from long- to short-term investment tends to play the most important role
in such a productivity eect.
One important implication of our ndings is that the maturity and the timing of rm
investment matters; indeed, phenomena that may be considered \temporary", such as a period
of high uncertainty on banks, may then be reected on rms through higher long-term lending
rates. This may consequently redirect investment toward the short term and, possibly, leave
rms in a low-productivity horizon. With this respect, an intervention by the central bank
to temporarily contain liquidity costs because of the uncertainty experienced by banks, can
both stabilize the banking system and generate real eects by lowering the long-term lending
rate. This is in line with the role played by the Y2K options, introduced by the New York Fed
in anticipation of an expected aggregate liquidity shortage generated by the millennium date
change (Sundaresan and Wang (2009)).
Note that our results pertain to a specic type of deposit volatility, generated by uctuations
in silver price, and counterfactual liquidity program to address this narrowly dened problem.
At the same time, although our methodology allows to use exclusively information from the
credit registry, this comes at the cost of accepting the specic assumptions of the model (i.e.
functional forms of rms' productivity and shock, perfect competition in production and n-
ance), which may limit the generality of the current exercise. Finally, we are not accounting
for the possible side eects of this policy (e.g. ination, moral hazard), which may depend on
the execution of the liquidity program.
Table 6: Output Gains of a Targeted Liquidity Program
(1) (2) (3)
Variable ATM Share Deposit Ratio
Output Gains 0.042% 0.205%
Maturity Increase 4.71% 22.79%
Notes: This table presents a quantication of the output gains and maturity increases generated by a targeted liquidity
program to address Zakat by providing banks with temporarily cheaper liquidity. These are calculated through the expressions
reported in the text, given the average silver price volatility, the average discount rate and the average exposures through the ATM
share and deposit ratio.
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Figure 7: Deposit Volatility, Interbank Markets and GDP per Capita
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4.2 External Validity and Policy Implications
Although the existence of our mechanism does not depend on the income level of a country, it
is likely to be more relevant in low-income countries. For any given level of deposit volatility
and liquidity cost this would be the case because LICs tend to exhibit nancial systems mostly
bank-based, with their banks being on average more deposit-funded. Appendix Z provides
cross-country evidence on these points, which are likely to exacerbate the real eects of any
bank-related nancial distortion.
However, in addition to this, low-income countries also present both a higher volatility of
bank deposits and interbank markets that are very small or often non-existent. Whereas the
rst result is consistent with the volatility and development literature,21 the second element has
seldom been discussed in preventing banks to smooth deposit shocks eectively. The combin-
ation of these two elements would give rise to a strong eect of our mechanism on shortening
loan maturities, as originally shown in Figure 1. This is in line with the recent orientation of
policy makers, who acknowledge the lack of long-term nance as a supply problem and banks
as responsible for this. In this respect, the Global Financial Development report by the World
Bank (2015) presents a survey of nancial development among nancial sector practitioners
(bankers, central bankers, regulators, academics), and two important messages emerge from
this survey: 1) access to long-term nance is a supply problem (75% of respondents agree) and
2) domestic banks play the most important role in access to long-term nance (61% agree).
Our analysis shows that one reason behind this supply problem in long-term nance may
be the lack of a steady, predictable and accessible ow of liquidity to commercial banks. In
fact, most banks in low-income countries beyond not having access to a local interbank market,
21As discussed in Koren and Tenreyro (2007), low-income countries present a higher volatility of income
both because of a stronger exposure to more volatile sectors (e.g. agriculture) and informality. In a standard
intertemporal model, such income volatility generates savings dispersion because of consumption smoothing,
and within the formal banking system this leads to deposit volatility.
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cannot use international capital markets either because of local regulation or international
reputation. At the same time, most central banks in LICs are either unable or unwilling to
provide liquidity on a predictable basis. In Appendix Z (Table Z1) we present data on the status
of discount window facilities for all countries in Africa, as described by local or IMF/World Bank
documentation, and nd that more than 50% of central banks are not actively engaged in these
operations. Linking this back to our theoretical model, in absence of alternative liquidity for
commercial banks, then the implicit cost of liquidity tends to innity, rCB ! 1. This makes
long-term nance innitely costly for banks and generates extensive redirection toward the
short term.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a mechanism through which the interaction between bank deposit
volatility and liquidity cost can alter banks' funding costs. The higher the cost of accessing
alternative liquidity to replace volatile deposits, the higher the tendency of banks to pass this
cost onto long-term rates, which consequently promotes a shortening of loan maturities, leading
to less long-term investment and output.
Our empirical analysis focuses on Pakistan because we can combine the universe of corporate
loans between 2002 and 2010 to a unique natural experiment in deposit volatility. For this
purpose, we exploit the payment of a Sharia levy on bank deposits, Zakat, which is linked to
the international price of silver and generates exogenous variation in deposit volatility linked
to silver price volatility. Combining this with bank-level cross-sectional exposure to Zakat
withdrawals (ATM share and deposit ratio), we nd that a higher silver price volatility and
discount rate lead more-exposed banks to shorten loan maturities, reduce the lending rate and
not change loan amounts. We also nd an increase in agreed long-term lending rates, a decline
in the share of long-term loans and an increase in very short-term loans, which is consistent
with the nancing redirection. At the same time, rms connected to more-exposed banks leave
the total investment level constant, but change its composition by reducing xed assets and
increasing working capital.
In the last section of the paper, we quantify the output gains of a policy counterfactual in
which the State Bank of Pakistan could provide targeted liquidity to banks, at special rates,
during the Zakat period. In order to evaluate this program, we combine the theoretical and
empirical results using information from only the credit registry. Our results point toward an
output gain of 0.042%, under the ATM share exposure, and 0.205%, under the deposit ratio one.
We discussed that such mechanism may be more extensive in African countries, which present
a high deposit volatility with small or non-existent liquidity markets. Therefore, we propose
that, among several institutional reasons for the lack of long-term nance and investment, the
lack of functioning liquidity markets and central bank institutions may be key. Further research
in the eld of banking and development will allow to expand these results and provide further
guidance toward optimal policy.
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Chapter 2 - Bank Deposits and Liquidity Regulation:
Evidence from Ethiopia
Nicola Limodioy Francesco Strobbez
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Introduction
Deposits are a major source of bank funding. Beyond being a key element in nancing the
quantity of bank credit, they can also directly shape its quality through various channels:
forcing liquidation (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983), monitoring risk (Calomiris and Kahn, 1991)
and aecting the optimal capital structure of banks (Allen, Carletti and Marquez, 2015), among
others. In this paper, we study how deposits respond to the regulation of bank liquidity,
dened as the mandatory holding of safe assets (cash, government bonds, other liquid assets).
Our banking model highlights how liquidity regulation can aect depositors' behaviour and we
exploit a unique policy change in an emerging market to assess empirically this mechanism.
In particular, we restrict our attention to liquidity regulation in the absence of deposit
insurance and banks' ability to commit on holding safe assets. We do this for two reasons. First,
because there exists a consensus on the role of nancial regulation when deposit insurance is in
place (Beck, Carletti and Goldstein, 2016), while fewer contributions explore theoretically and
empirically how banking changes when such regulation is introduced and deposit insurance is
absent. Second, because this became particularly relevant after the 2009 global nancial crisis
and the 2010-2012 European debt crisis, which demonstrated that systemic shocks can aect
both the stability of banks and the scal capacity of governments. In such cases, liquidity
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regulation can be particularly important given that: 1) deposit insurance may be perceived as
not credible; 2) banks' safety and solvency may be questioned by depositors.
To pursue this question, our paper focuses on a specic regulatory episode in an emerging
market (Ethiopia), which oers the ideal environment for three reasons: 1) it does not present
deposit insurance; 2) it exhibits an unexpected policy change that increased the bank liquidity
holding by 25% in one quarter of 2011; 3) its local banks are risky and enjoy a limited credibility
by depositors on their liquidity (because of underdeveloped payment systems, historical cases
of default, their relatively novel establishment). These factors make both banks not credible in
their commitment to safety and local depositors very cautious in response (Bachas et al, 2017).
Our mechanism shows that if there is no deposit insurance and banks are unable to commit
to safe assets, then limited liability pushes banks to choose risky projects over safe ones, as
prots are appropriated in the good state and losses are passed on depositors in the bad state.
In response, depositors anticipate this scenario and ex-ante lower their optimal deposit level.
However, if the central bank imposes a liquidity requirement, through a minimum level of safe
asset holding in every state of the world, this moderates both prots and losses. It consequently
increases depositor repayment, stimulating deposits. In cases of severely risky nancial systems,
we show that liquidity regulation can even lead to higher bank prots, if deposit growth exceeds
the decline in the intermediation margin and loan provision. As a result, branch installation
(as a proxy for nancial development) also rises, as higher protability leads to more branch
opening and provision of additional loans. In our model, liquidity regulation is valuable because
of the timing assumption: banks are unable to convince depositors of their safe asset holding
because of limited liability. Therefore, liquidity regulation is needed to create a commitment
in holding safe assets. Our paper is conceptually related to the work of Calomiris, Heider and
Herova (2015), who develop a theory of bank liquidity requirements, showing both the eect
on deposits and credit allocation in a more complete theoretical model. At the same time,
these results are also in line with the literature showing the liquidity benet of holding public
bonds (Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012), Gennaioli,
Martin, and Rossi (2014)).
We are the rst to show empirically that liquidity regulation can promote the inow of bank
deposits, prots, branch-installation and that enhanced bank safety is the channel through
which this takes place. Such policies have been implemented in several countries over the
past century (Edey and Hviding, 1995). However, this issue has been dicult to study for
a variety of reasons. To begin with, data availability on the banking industry, particularly in
emerging markets, is a severe limit: except for a few, yet incomplete, sources (i.e., the Bankscope
database), most banks are reluctant to publish any documentation that goes beyond the mere
legal obligations. However, even when sources are available, they are { unsurprisingly { of low
quality, generally incomplete, and only focused on a few key nancial variables, with limited
details on branching and geographical outreach. In addition to this, the power of the test is
generally a sizable problem: most liquidity regulation policies are announced quarters/years
before the implementation and only gradually brought into operations. This makes it hard to
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track any behavioural change or, in any case, changes with enough statistical power to study
depositors' reactions. Finally, as our model shows, liquidity regulation has a stronger eect
on depositors in risky nancial systems, with few countries presenting the simultaneous strong
variation in the size of regulation combined with a risk-prone banking industry.
For this reason, we investigate a unique case study that addresses the previous concerns.
In mid-March 2011, the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) approved a directive on liquidity
requirements, obliging all private commercial banks to start purchasing 0.27 government bonds
for every unit of private sector lending by April 2011. While it could be questioned whether
this is a liquidity regulation, as these bonds may be far from liquid and risk-free; we believe
this is not the case for two reasons. First, such bills can be exchanged with liquidity by the
central bank (article 7 of the directive). Second, given the lack of an interbank market, these
bills have de-facto recreated an interbank system by allowing banks to transfer liquidity claims.
The identication of the policy eects is achieved by combining the large and unexpected
time-series change generated by the regulation with cross-sectional variation in bank sizes (big
versus small banks). This emerges from the theoretical model that prescribes a heterogeneous
eect of the treatment, given by a supermodularity between bank safety and size. To address
the data limitations previously mentioned for the Ethiopian case study, we have constructed a
variety of unique databases through which we can track the whole nancial system. Through
condential contacts with the NBE, we had access to the regulation documents and could
interview senior executives for all private sector banks, which provided substantial insights on
how this regulation aected their business. Regarding the available datasets, we track three
key indicators of bank behaviour:
1) bank balance sheets with monthly frequency, which allow to observe the key modelling
variables (safe assets, deposits, loans);
2) a new map covering over 90% of bank branches opened in Ethiopia between 2000 and
2015, including their city and region, telephone numbers and other information;
3) a digitization of all annual reports in the ve years around the policy change.
Our results indicate the existence of a deposit inow as banks amass more liquid assets in re-
sponse to the regulation. This also leads to more lending and an increase in branch-installation.
While the eects on protability enjoy a lower power because of yearly observations, in general
we observe a slow down in prot growth (statistically dierent from zero at 10%), but not a
negative eect.
This paper participates to the literature on the relation between deposits and nancial reg-
ulation. From a theoretical standpoint, Diamond and Dybvig (1983) were the rst to associate
depositor behaviour to nancial institutions and regulation. Calomiris and Kahn (1991) and
Diamond and Rajan (2000) highlight the discipline role of deposits and how this can change
when nancial regulation is introduced. Allen, Carletti and Marquez (2015) discuss how -
nancial regulation can aect deposit behaviour and consequently bank capital structure, while
Allen, Carletti and Marquez (2011) look at asset-side monitoring and how that aects capital
choice and depositor remuneration. The empirical literature on these topics is relatively limited
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and our contribution is mostly directed to ll this gap. Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001, 2004)
show that countries that with more restrictive regulatory regimes are more exposed to banking
crisis, but do not present necessarily poorly functioning banks. While through a cross-country
and cross-bank analysis, Laeven and Levine (2009) show that the eects of nancial regulation,
both on liabilities and assets, depend remarkably on governance indicators and nd a large
heterogeneity in this respect. Our paper also contributes to a literature on depositors response
to exogenous changes. For example, Bustos, Garber and Ponticelli (2016) and Gilje, Loutskina
and Strahan (2016) study how exogenous shocks, respectively to technology and wealth, aect
the level of deposits and how this translates into credit. Another growing literature studies
depositors' responses to changes in deposit insurance. Iyer et al (2016) study a run on Danish
banks that limited deposit insurance coverage and nd a dierential reallocation of deposits
across-banks. Iyer, Puri and Ryan (2016) investigate the relation between depositors' response
and solvency risk in India, by dissecting the behaviour of dierent depositor classes to these
events. Ippolito et al (2015) nd the emergence of double-bank runs (both from borrowers and
depositors) in the wake of the European interbank market freeze registered in 2007. Iyer and
Puri (2012) show that uninsured depositors are the most sensitive to bank runs and that net-
works and depositor-bank relations can mitigate runs. Finally, Ioannidou and de Dreu (2006)
were among the rst to study the impact of explicit deposit insurance on market discipline in
a natural experiment in Bolivia.
In Section 1, we present the theoretical framework, describing rst the economic environment
and then investigating the bank decision problem. In Section 2, we discuss empirical evidence
from the policy change in Ethiopia and a variety of robustness checks. In Section 3, we present
some concluding remarks.
1 Theory
1.1 Economic Environment
The economy comprises a continuum of locations on the unit line, and each point is populated
by a household engaging in a saving decision. The bank decides how many branches to open,
 2 [0; 1], which is costly but allows it to reach a new locus and to interact with agents. If
 = 1, then all locations are reached, while with  = 0, no branches are opened. Once a branch
is installed, the bank interacts with a depositor, who chooses how much to deposit, d  0, given
a remuneration RD  1. These liabilities are collected and allocated in two assets: a share in
risky loans, l 2 [0; 1], and the remainder in a liquid asset, s = 1   l. There exist two states
 2 fG;Bg: in the good state,  = G, which occurs with probability p 2 (p; 1), the bank
earns on risky loans a gross rate RG > 1, while in the bad state,  = B, which occurs with
probability 1   p, the bank earns RB 2 [0; 1). In contrast, the return on the liquid asset is
positive, deterministic, higher than the deposit rate, and lower than the expected loan return,
RS 2 [RD; pRG + (1  p)RB]. Prices are given and therefore if G occurs, the bank earns RS on
liquid assets, RG on the remainder, and pays RD to depositors. Given the assumptions on the
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rates, the good state is always protable and the bank always repays. However, if B occurs,
given the liquid asset choice s and limited liability, the bank pays
RDB = minfRD; sRS + (1  s)RBg
the minimum between the deposit rate RD  1 and the return on the liquidated assets, com-
posed by the sum of the gross return on liquid assets, sRS, and the return on the risky assets,
(1  s)RB.
This economy presents the following four stages:
1. the bank invests in nancial development, deciding on the number of branches, ;
2. households reached by a branch decide how much to deposit, d;
3. the bank decides on the amount of liquid assets, s;
4. the state  is realized, the bank receives loan reimbursement, repays deposits, and collects
prots, and the household consumes the repaid deposits.
The timing of the game claries a key intuition for the role of liquidity regulation: given the
structure of returns, the bank is not keen to hold any safe assets. Limited liability allows it to
keep the prots in the good state G, and to liquidate depositors with all that is collected in the
bad state B. Depositors anticipate this and, given the constant rates, limit their deposits in
the banking system. If the bank could commit to hold an amount of safe assets always securing
RD, then deposits would be higher, and prots as well. However, in a single shot game, such
commitment is not credible and we delegate to liquidity regulation to solve this problem by
imposing the amount of liquid and safe assets. Throughout this model, we shall switch o
the possibility that prices change in response to agents' decisions: this can be interpreted as a
price-taking assumption or introduced in order to be in line with the case studies we present in
Section 2, in which prices are not the mechanism through which the policy aects the economy.
The game can be solved by backward induction. In terms of notation, capital letters refer
to aggregate quantities at bank level, while lower-case letters refer to branch-specic quantities:
l is the loan given in each branch and L = l is the aggregate number of loans given by the
bank (analogously S = s and D = d).
1.2 Bank and Liquid Assets
The prots of the bank are composed by an intermediation margin, (s), which emerges as
the dierence between payments on liabilities and income on assets, times the extensive margin
given by the number of branches, , and the intensive component being the amount of collected
deposits in each branch, d.
At the last stage of the game, given that the extensive and intensive margins  and d are
xed, the bank can only aect prots by changing the intermediation margin and choosing the
share of liquid assets to hold. The intermediation margin can be described by
(s) = p[sRS + (1  s)RG  RD] + (1  p)[sRS + (1  s)RB  RDB]:
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In the good state, which happens with probability p, the bank earns returns RS on the share
of liquid assets s, RG on the remainder 1  s, and pays the deposit rate RD; in the bad state, it
earns RB and pays a deposit rate RDB. In the good state, bank prots are always positive and
therefore the market deposit rate, RD, is always repaid. However, in the bad state, this is not
necessarily the case and the bank may default. Because of limited liability, the corresponding
deposit rate can be described through the previously introduced RDB = minfRD; sRS + (1  
s)RBg. Therefore, if the bank collects enough prots in the bad state, it repays depositors
with the market rate RD and keeps the positive prots sRS + (1   s)RB   RD > 0; however,
in the opposite case, the bank passes its losses on to depositors and repays them with all the
recovered assets, RDB = sRS + (1   s)RB. Dene es as the liquid asset level such that the
bank is indierent between repaying the market deposit rate, RD, and liquidating its assets,es = (RD  RB)=(RS  RB), as RS > RD > RB, which bounds es 2 (0; 1). As a consequence,
the following holds true:
RDB =
8<:RD if s  es;sRS + (1  s)RB if s < es:
The deposit rate in the bad state, RDB, equals the market deposit rate, RD, if the liquid asset
share exceeds the strictly positive threshold, s  es; otherwise, it is given by the liquidated
assets.
Liquidity Regulation In the absence of regulation, the bank simply maximizes the inter-
mediation margin with respect to the share of liquid assets s, in the absence of any constraint
max
s
(s) = p[sRS + (1  s)RH  RD] + (1  p)[sRS + (1  s)RB  RDB];
which leads to a trivial solution of s = 0, given that p 2 (p; 1) with p = (RS  RB)=(RG  RB),
and passes all losses on to depositors in the bad state, RDB = RB. The timing of the game
makes this intuition trivial, because in the last stage, depositors cannot punish the bank for
this decision. The regulation we study forces the bank to hold a level of safe assets  > 0,
which adds to the previous problem the binding constraint sR = . Because the unregulated
liquid assets equal zero, the regulation necessarily raises the deposit rate in the bad state (from
RDB = RB to RDB = RS + (1  )RB if  < es or RDB = RD if   es).
In the absence of a repeated game setting or other externalities, the bank has no private
incentives to keep any liquid asset. Therefore, the post-regulation margin is dened as (),
decreasing in the liquidity regulation parameter .
1.3 Depositor Problem
In each branched location, given , a representative household faces a two-period problem, by
deciding on consumption in period 1 (i.e., the present) and in period 2 (i.e., the future), given a
vector of prices fRD; RB; RSg, states  2 fG;Bg with probabilities p and 1  p and the choice
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of the bank's liquid assets s. The household is endowed with income y only in the rst period
and faces nancial market imperfections, which do not allow state-contingent transfers. Hence,
consumption in period 2 is dependent on the state, which may be good G, with savings being
remunerated RD, or bad B, with remuneration RDB(). The solution is a vector fc1; c2G; c2Bg,
where each subscript number refers to the period, and G and B refer to the states of the future;
such a consumption vector fully describes the deposit behavior d. We are implicitly assuming
that when branched, a household always uses the banking system to deposit its savings, and
several arguments in this respect have been raised in the literature. In the following problem,
we adopt an additive and separable CRRA utility function:
max
c1;c2G;c2B
c1 + [pc

2G + (1  p)c2B]
s:t: c1 +
c2G
RD
= y
c1 +
c2B
RDB()
= y:
Here,  2 (0; 1) indicates the discount rate,  2 (0; 1) indicates the relative risk aversion param-
eter, and p is the probability of the good state, while the state-dependent budget constraints
are standard except that in the good state the discount rate is RD and in the bad state it is
RDB(). The following saving/deposit function in locations reached by branches  emerges,
d() = y   c1 = 
1=(1 )[pRD + (1  p)RDB()]1=(1 )
1 + 1=(1 )[pRD + (1  p)RDB()]1=(1 )
y;
which is always positive and increasing in RDB(), and hence in . The full solution to the
problem can be found in Appendix A.
1.4 Financial Development and Regulation
In the rst period, the bank decides how many branches to install, given the intermediation
margin in each location () (which depends negatively on the liquidity regulation parameter
), the deposit level d() (which depends positively on ), and some convex cost of branch
opening c(). Its convexity can be justied by the fact that branch coordination costs can be
larger the further a branch is from the headquarters (the locus in zero).
This nancial development problem can be written as
max
0
 = ()d()   
2
2
;
note that in this setting we introduce a new parameter : this is a branch-opening technology
parameter aecting both the average and marginal cost of branch opening. As clear from
the solution of the branch-maximization exercises, this technological parameter maps into the
overall size of a bank, in terms of installed branches. In fact, given that the marginal branch
protability is ()d(), then this leads to the solution  = [()d()]=, with the overall
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prots being  = [()d()]2=2, loan volume L = [()=]d()(1   ), liquid asset holdings
S = [()=]d() and deposits D = [()=]d(). As a result, it can be noted that a bank
with a higher  parameter installs less branches, hence collects less deposits and gives less loans.
From this point onward we refer to  as a technology-induced parameter of bank size.
Liquidity Regulation as Safe Asset Purchase What happens to loan volume and branch
installation when a positive shock to  occurs? Can such liquidity regulation policy promote loan
volumes and branch expansion? The liquidity regulation parameter, , imposes a mandatory
share of liquid and safe assets s, given that sR = . It is clear that loan volume can increase in
the nancial regulation parameter, if and only if
@L
@
> 0! d >  + l
the elasticity of deposit mobilization exceeds the sum of the elasticity of the intermediation
margin and loan share with respect to the regulation parameter . As shown in Appendix B,
the previous expression simplies to the following

1  yA() >

1   +
1
1  [(RG  RS)=(RG  RD)]
with the expression on the left-hand side embedding the deposit component, with A() decreas-
ing in  because of concavity; in contrast, the right-hand side reports the prot component and
is increasing in . For given parameter values, it is possible to show that loan volume responds
to the regulation parameter with the following eect,
@L
@
=
8<: 0   e;< 0  > e;
it increases if liquidity regulation does not exceed a threshold e = e(p) and decreases if it does.
Such threshold is increasing in the probability of bad state, 1  p. This result is intuitive: the
deposit response to the regulation is higher, the safer the nancial system becomes because of
the regulation. Hence, it follows that a risky nancial system (with a high 1   p) experiences
a stronger deposit response to liquidity regulation. This result is key to our empirical analysis
and is the driver of the eects highlighted in Section 2. Note that given the denition of L and
, conditions for an increase in loans are sucient for an increase in branches.1
The upper panel of Figure 2 shows the right- and left-hand side expressions, with the shaded
area indicating the region in which higher liquidity regulation promotes lending. In the lower
panel, we show that such a region increases in the probability of a bad state. In the main
scenario, we set 1   p to be 10% (solid line), which implies a threshold of e ' 0:33. In the
1It is also important to highlight that in the case that the nancial system already presents a level of safe
assets higher than or equal to es, which guarantees depositor repayment in any state, then imposing  > es leads to
the opposite eect, as deposits do not increase given that there is no repayment increase, but the intermediation
margin declines and this leads to lower prots, loans, and number of branches.
49
scenario in which this probability is brought to 15%, such a threshold correspondingly increases
to e ' 0:5, while if such a probability is reduced to 5%, the threshold follows to e ' 0:18. In
Appendix C, we report additional comparative statics with respect to both the probability of a
bad state and other model parameters; however, this essential comparative statics on p shows
how important the riskiness of the nancial sector is for detecting a statistically signicant
eect.
These results can be summed up in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 There exists a threshold in the mandatory share of liquid assets, e(p), such that
in the presence of unbranched locations,  < 1, 8  e(p) the total loan volume L = d(1  s),
the number of branches , deposits per branch d, total deposits D = d, and liquid assets S
increase in the liquidity regulation parameter . Such a threshold is increasing in the probability
of a bad state, and hence decreasing in p.
1.5 From Theory to Empirics
In the absence of an experimental setting for the application of this policy, we rely on a key
modeling feature to identify the eect of nancial regulation. Recalling the rst-order condition
 = (=)d, both the equilibrium number of branches  and the response to the liquidity
regulation policy @=@ > 0 depend on the technology-induced parameter of bank size (i.e., ).
This is a sucient statistic for bank size, because it characterizes both a level eect (i.e., the
number of branches before the policy) and an impact eect (i.e., the response to the policy),
and we carefully combine this cross-sectional analysis to the time-series analysis. Proposition
2 updates Proposition 1 and guides it to the data.
Proposition 2 The parameter of bank size , measuring the technological endowment of the
bank in terms of branch cost, aects negatively the optimal number of branches and the branch-
installation response of the bank to liquidity regulation. If a set of banks is endowed with H and
another set with L, with H > L, then the banks exhibiting L: 1) install more branches than
the bank with H , (L)
 > (H)); 2) respond to the liquidity regulation policy by opening
more branches than the bank with H , @(L)
=@ > @(H)=@).
Therefore, all the predictions of Proposition 1 are dierentially stronger for more ecient
banks. This result is intuitive and is claried in Figure 3. The more ecient bank makes more
prots in every branch, because it has lower branch installation costs, and therefore it opens
more branches because more are protable (level eect), (L) > (H). This prediction stays
true also after the policy shock: both banks want to open more branches, but the more ecient
bank opens more because it makes more prots in each single branch,
@(L)
@
>
@(H)
@
:
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Figure 1: Loan Volume Increases in Liquid Assets
Note: This gure plots the conditions under which loan volume increases in the regulated share of liquid assets.
The x-axis reports the values of the liquid asset share parameter , and the y-axis reports the values of the right-
and left-hand side variables. As is clear from the inequality, the left-hand side is decreasing in the parameter
(reported in blue), while the right-hand side is increasing (in red). This gure assumes that the bank rates are
in line with the model and calibrated with the Ethiopian economy, as from NBE (2011), and that the other
parameters are in line with the literature: RG = 5=4; RS = 21=20; RB = 0; RD = 1;  = 0:9,  = 1=2; p = 0:9;
y = 20. The shaded area reports the regions in which the regulation determines an increase in loan volume.
The upper panel reports the main picture with p = 0:9. The lower panel reports three cases: p = 0:9 (solid
line), p = 0:85 (dashed line), and p = 0:95 (dotted line).
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The results of Proposition 2 can be described through the encompassing empirical model
vit = i + t + b  i  t + it
in which the variable of interest vit for bank i at time t (ie., branches, deposits, loans...) is
regressed over a bank and time xed eects, i and t, and an interaction between the techno-
logical bank-specic parameter, i, and the liquidity regulation parameter, t. Proposition 2
predicts that such interaction is negative, because banks with a higher branch cost parameter
grow less after the policy.
Such model can be further generalized to test for the presence of parallel trends before the
policy, leading to
vit = i + t +
X
t
ct  i  t + uit; (1)
in which the variable of interest vit for bank i at time t is regressed over bank and time xed
eects, i and t, and an interaction of time xed eects with the bank-specic technological
endowment for every period t, i t. Equation (1) is the empirical model that we extensively use
in this paper. A particularly attractive feature is given by the interaction, ct, which allows us
to test whether banks with dierent technological endowments are on parallel trends before the
policy, by verifying that ct are not statistically dierent from zero 8t < et, with et representing
the time period in which the liquidity regulation change takes place.
2 Empirics
2.1 Evidence from Ethiopia
In this section, we present empirical evidence on Ethiopia and the behavior of local private
banks, exploiting the introduction of a new liquidity regulation measure announced in mid-
March 2011 and introduced at the beginning of April. On this date, the NBE issued a directive
requiring all commercial banks to hold 27% of new loan disbursements in NBE bills.
The relevant aspect of studying the so-called \27% rule" is given by the unique nature of
this shock: 1) it was unexpected and announced less than a month before implementation;
2) it caused a large accumulation of safe-assets by banks in one quarter. The asset share of
safe-assets held by local banks passed from 25% to 30%, as shown in the next subsection, which
corresponds to a 25% increase.
From a theoretical standpoint, this policy can be mapped as a positive shock to the sR,
which combined with the above conditions 1) and 2) make it ideal for our analysis.2 It is
2The theoretical model predicts a stronger eect of regulation in the presence of a low initial level of regulation
(low ) and high riskiness of the nancial system (high 1  p). We believe that given the level of nancial risk
in this economy, the Ethiopian banking system meets the criterion, given the absence of any deposit insurance
scheme and the simultaneous presence of a remarkable asset and liability volatility. The variation coecients of
deposits and private sector loans, which can be interpreted as an index of dispersion of such variables, stands at
14% and 18%, respectively. This indicates that roughly 15% of a bank balance sheet is withdrawn and deposited
back in a year. This is extraordinarily high compared to the 2{5% recorded in the Euro Area (Deutsche Bank
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Figure 2: Heterogeneity and Identication
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Note: This gure graphically depicts the identication in this empirical exercise. In the upper panel, we present
the two banks assumed to be lying on two separate unit lines. One is bigger in equilibrium because it enjoys a
low branch cost parameter L (i.e., Big Bank); the other is smaller because it enjoys a high parameter H (i.e.,
Small Bank). Here, there is a level eect in their respective branch number , caused by the cost parameter. In
the lower panel, our identication becomes clear: the time-series shock s occurs at the same time for all banks,
but because of the cost parameter  it aects the Big Bank dierentially more.
also important to highlight that the NBE Bills are not a protable asset, as they pay a xed
remuneration of 3% per year, lower than the minimum deposit rate, 5%, or the average lending
interest, 12% (National Bank of Ethiopia 2012)3.
2012) or the USA (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2011). This concern was expressed also by the banks themselves.
Indeed, during our interviews with local bank executives, we found that this is a core problem of local banks
and we found supporting evidence for our \maturity mismatch" risk assumption going through the theoretical
model.
3Therefore this policy as well as mandating liquid assets, also lowers the return on private sector lending, as
banks are forced to purchase government bonds with a negative remuneration for every loan. As a consequence,
this piece of nancial regulation also includes a lending tax, which would generate an eect against the one
we highlight here. The lending tax would lower lending, while the "liquidity eect" should boost lending by
attracting new deposits. In this context, the liquidity eect is stronger than the tax eect, which is very small.
In fact, before the policy a unit loan would deliver an average net 7% return (12% average lending rate minus
5% deposit rate), while after the policy it would deliver the same gross return, minus the net remuneration
of this bills  2% times the amount of the purchased bills 0:27, hence 7%   0:27  2%, this result in a 0:54%
decline on lending returns. The small tax element was also conrmed during our extensive consultations with
Ethiopian central bank executives and private bankers.
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In order to test the implications of Propositions 1 and 2, we collect condential data on
the monthly balance sheet of all Ethiopian private banks between 2010 and 2013, on publicly
available Annual Reports data on prots between 2008 and 2013, and we build a unique city-
level map of Ethiopian branches, where for every bank we know in which cities all new branches
have been opened, with respective month and year between 2000 and 2015.
Propositions 1 and 2 provide two fundamental elements to test the model: a shock to sR
promotes deposit growth; and cross-sectional variation in  characterizes a dierential impact
to the shock. Ethiopia is an exceptional context in which to test this model because as well as a
large time-series variation in sR, we nd a large cross-sectional variation in some characteristics
associated with . Figure 4 presents the total assets of the 14 Ethiopian banks on March 2011,
before the policy implementation, and there emerges a natural distinction between big and
small banks. Indeed, there is a large discontinuity between the sixth bank, Bank of Abyssinia
(BOA), with assets close to eight billion birr, and the seventh bank, Construction and Business
Bank of Ethiopia (CBB), with assets below four billion birr.
Therefore, we set the hypothesis that large banks are also endowed with a better technology
(lower unit cost) than smaller banks: thus, larger banks match the L case and smaller banks
match the H case. For this reason, given that the largest six banks are more than twice as large
as the remaining eight, we classify these banks as \more ecient" (hence presenting a lower cost
of branch opening, L) and we dene a dummy variable \Big Bank" taking unit value for all of
these. The remaining are categorized as \less ecient" (embedding the parameter H).
4
Once both the time-series and cross-sectional variation is clear, we present the following
tests of our proposition.
A. Main Results. In this section we verify the predictions of Proposition 1 and 2 on the
following databases.
1. Balance sheet data. Using monthly data, we verify that liquid asset purchases increase
after the policy, that new deposits are collected in old branches, and loan volume also
increases (Section 2.2.1).
2. Branch map. Using monthly data, we give evidence that branch installation increases
more markedly after the policy and more cities see their rst branch installed after the
policy (Section 2.2.2).
3. Annual reports. Using yearly data, we show that bank protability does not decline in
absolute value and actually increases for larger banks. We also show that the number of
employees grows much more after the policy, as banks start to expand further (Section
2.2.3).
4In Appendix D, we provide a direct test of our hypothesis and show that \big banks" are not just larger,
but also present 40% lower administrative costs over assets and 45% lower administrative costs over personnel.
This result, though not a comprehensive test of a variation due to , provides some evidence to support our
identication.
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B. Robustness Checks. In Section 2.3 we explore a variety of factors which might confound
our estimates and verify the soundness of our results.
Figure 3: Bank Assets


	


$
$
%$


"!

##





	



$
$
%$


"!

##






(
&
!!


#
!

 
!

"!











!
%



)
'
$


$

!
$
$
%$


"!

##




Note: This gure reports a bar chart reporting the total assets of all Ethiopian private banks in March 2011, one
month before the introduction of the policy. There is an evident existence of a substantial discontinuity between
the third largest bank, Wegagen Bank (denoted by Wega..), and the sixth largest Ethiopian bank (BOA), and
also between the sixth and seventh largest banks, BOA and CBB. The six largest banks are shown in red and
are those that we classify as big banks in Sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.4. In Section 2.1.3, because of limited data on
the long-run branch installation, we focus within the big banks and compare Awash and Dashen as big banks
with BOA, CBB, NIB, and United.
2.2 Main Results
2.2.1 Balance Sheet Evidence
The policy change creates a large exogenous variation in the aggregate sR, and from the point
of view of the theoretical model, this leads to more liquid assets, which stimulate deposits and
consequently lending. Because private banks are equally aected by the policy, but respond
dierentially based on their parameter , we can produce a variety of tests to study Propositions
1 and 2 empirically. The following two are performed and presented.
1. Within-Year Compliance. We verify that NBE bills were indeed purchased as the policy
prescribes and that the policy was not applied dierently between big and small banks.
Appendix E reports the test and results.
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2. Quarter Variation. We report the quarter evolution of the main aggregates, removing
bank-specic eects and seasonal uctuations, showing the presence of a discontinuity at
the policy change introduction, dierentially stronger for larger banks.
All of these tests provide empirical support for the balance sheet predictions, and oer quanti-
tative evidence in favor of our model.
Quarterly Variation
In presenting this test, we explore all available time-series information, rather than simply
presenting a pre{post estimation, as claried in equation (1). For this reason, we verify how
the average deposits, lending, NBE bills, and liquid assets move during all the available quarters,
and whether a dierential trend is registered for big banks. To tighten the empirical exercise
with the theoretical model, we regress the logarithm of real deposits and loans, while we reports
the the NBE bills and safe assets as shares of the total assets of the bank. In fact, the variable
sR in the model is the share of assets held in safe assets, hence the policy change aects this
variable, rather than just the log ow of safe assets.
The theoretical model predicts a discontinuity around the introduction of the policy, stronger
for large banks, and a long-term eect following the discontinuity. For this reason we estimate
the following model
viqy = a+
13X
qy=1
bqy  dqy +
13X
qy=1
cqy  dqy Big Banki + i + iq + iqy; (2)
where the variable viqy is regressed on a dummy variable dqy, which takes unit value for each
quarter qy of the 13 available, an interaction of this dummy with the Big Bank dummy vari-
able, a bank xed eect i, and a bank-quarter xed eect iq to account for seasonality. The
coecients cqy are the core of this estimation and report the average dierential evolution of the
variable viqy for big banks. Note that while in equation (1) the sign of the interaction term was
negative, because the theoretical model measured , here the interactions are expected to be
positive, because the big bank dummy measures the inverse of . Such dierence stays across
all empirical exercises.
In Table 1, we present the coecients cqy across the available quarters, it is clear to see that
until the introduction of the policy change, in Quarter 5, the coecients on deposits, loans,
NBE bills, and liquid assets are not statistically dierent from zero for big banks, leading us
not rejecting the parallel trend hypothesis. However, Quarter 5 establishes the change in three
important factors. First, NBE bills start getting purchased by all banks, who pass from holding
zero of these assets to roughly 15% of their assets in these bonds, as shown in the upper panel
of Figure 5. Secondly, overall liquid assets increase as well, both for big and small rms, by
roughly 5%, as the bottom panel of Figure 5 highlights. These two information combined reveal
that banks increased their overall liquid asset and switched composition from some type of safe
assets toward the new NBE bills. Third, deposits react almost simultaneously and begin a
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Table 1: Regulation and Banks: Quarter Variation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Deposits Lending NBE bills Liquid assets
Ln Mill. Birr Ln Mill. Birr Asset Share Asset Share
Small Banks
Quarter 2 0.0333 -0.0266 -0.00803 -0.0230
(0.0207) (0.0314) (0.00722) (0.0175)
Quarter 3 0.0759** 0.0802** -0.00676 -0.0228*
(0.0291) (0.0370) (0.00725) (0.0129)
Quarter 4 0.0644** 0.112** 0.000106 -0.0248
(0.0278) (0.0428) (0.00917) (0.0166)
Small Banks and Post-Policy
Quarter 5 0.125*** 0.128*** 0.0846*** 0.0778***
(0.0250) (0.0355) (0.0104) (0.0147)
Quarter 6 0.159*** 0.163*** 0.0954*** 0.0708***
(0.0300) (0.0522) (0.0100) (0.0197)
Quarter 7 0.153*** 0.322*** 0.119*** 0.0442**
(0.0355) (0.0585) (0.0114) (0.0185)
Quarter 8 0.143*** 0.418*** 0.143*** 0.0253
(0.0254) (0.0441) (0.00910) (0.0166)
Quarter 9 0.156*** 0.402*** 0.150*** 0.0530***
(0.0232) (0.0354) (0.00688) (0.0138)
Quarter 10 0.196*** 0.380*** 0.147*** 0.0292
(0.0283) (0.0503) (0.00943) (0.0205)
Quarter 11 0.208*** 0.472*** 0.162*** 0.0494***
(0.0310) (0.0592) (0.0106) (0.0175)
Quarter 12 0.245*** 0.565*** 0.181*** 0.0609***
(0.0259) (0.0448) (0.0106) (0.0180)
Big Banks
Big Bank  Quarter 2 0.105 0.213 0.0143 0.0341
(0.109) (0.173) (0.0146) (0.0356)
Big Bank  Quarter 3 0.0644 0.0104 0.0123 0.0288
(0.170) (0.302) (0.0182) (0.0348)
Big Bank  Quarter 4 0.0836 -0.0683 0.00168 0.0570
(0.258) (0.363) (0.0331) (0.0530)
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Table 1: (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Deposits Lending NBE bills Safe assets
Ln Mill. Birr Ln Mill. Birr Asset Share Asset Share
Big Banks and Post-Policy
Big Bank  Quarter 5 0.230 0.205 -0.0136 0.000138
(0.169) (0.165) (0.0218) (0.0271)
Big Bank  Quarter 6 0.367** 0.362 -0.00237 0.0377
(0.183) (0.225) (0.0220) (0.0487)
Big Bank  Quarter 7 0.445** 0.386 -0.00522 0.00537
(0.181) (0.258) (0.0239) (0.0379)
Big Bank  Quarter 8 0.507** 0.379 -0.00972 -0.0266
(0.219) (0.289) (0.0282) (0.0481)
Big Bank  Quarter 9 0.598*** 0.430*** -0.00843 -0.00187
(0.156) (0.155) (0.0186) (0.0256)
Big Bank  Quarter 10 0.665*** 0.586** -0.00542 0.0375
(0.186) (0.248) (0.0233) (0.0428)
Big Bank  Quarter 11 0.706*** 0.601** -0.0134 -0.0143
(0.192) (0.284) (0.0250) (0.0385)
Big Bank  Quarter 12 0.759*** 0.573* -0.0323 -0.0423
(0.228) (0.303) (0.0304) (0.0473)
Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank  Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 512 512 512 512
Adj. R sq. 0.951 0.875 0.893 0.384
Mean Dep. Var. 7.751 7.295 0.0940 0.252
S.D. Dep. Var. 1.574 1.150 0.0736 0.0703
Note: This table reports OLS estimates; the unit of observation is bank level and bank and bank  quarter
xed eects are included. Standard errors are clustered at Bank  Year. Total deposits is a variable aggregating
demand, saving, and time deposits at bank level; it is continuous and measured in million birr. Private lending
embodies lending to the private (no nancial sector, no public sector, regions, cooperatives) at bank level; it
is continuous and measured in million birr. NBE bills is the amount of bills issued by the NBE at bank level;
it is continuous and measured as a share of total bank assets. All liquid assets is the amount of liquid assets
held by banks in cash, bank-to-bank deposits, and reserves at the NBE and NBE bills; it is continuous and as a
share of bank assets. The variables are made intertemporally comparable using the core ination gures from
National Bank of Ethiopia (2012, 2013, 2014) and all gures are in real million birr, constant at 2010 prices.
The means and standard deviations of these variables are reported in the last tow rows of the table. All of these
variables are regressed over 13 quarter dummy variables, which span all the months in our data. The policy
change occurs in Quarter 5 (April, May, and June 2011). These regressions measure the quarterly evolution,
and an interaction of these dummies with the big bank dummy, to verify whether bigger banks are dierentially
aected by the policy, as Proposition 2 states. The reported coecients show that the interaction between the
big bank dummy and the period dummy cannot be rejected to be dierent from zero before the policy, while it
is rejected afterward. Figures 5 and 6 plot all the coecients over time. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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steady growth, which dierentially aects more big banks. The same reaction is also exhibited
by private sector lending, however this becomes statistically dierent from the small bank trend
only after 2-3 quarters, as shown by Table 1.
Therefore, consistently with the theoretical model, an increase in safe asset holding by all
banks generates a dierential expansion in deposits and loans, stronger for larger banks.
2.2.2 Evidence from a Branch Map of Ethiopia
In this section, we present further evidence on a key feature of Propositions 1 and 2, where
we show that the 27% rule is associated with greater branch expansion. In order to test this
hypothesis, we construct a map of all branches in Ethiopia, where for each bank we know all the
branches installed, their region and city of introduction with the month and year of opening.
Our map covers 2,023 branches, installed by all 14 banks registered until 2013 and opened
between 2000 and 2015. The Annual Report by the NBE in 2014 counts 2,208, and therefore
our map considers more than 90% of existing branches.
In this analysis, we want to verify two features: 1) the overall number of branches increases
as the liquidity eect kicks in, as the model predicts; 2) new branches are more \rural". We
dene a branch as "rural" if it the rst to be opened in a town, which previously had no bank
branches - considering this as a proxy of expansion into rural areas. Because our map explores
all geographical features, we can see how many branches are opened in previously unbanked
areas and therefore we can rely on this as the most reliably measure of bank ruralization.
For this reason, we run two tests, collapsing our branch-level database to a panel at bank
level with months and year. The rst test is a typical dierence in dierence regression
vity = a+ b  Policyty Big Banki + i + ty + iy; (3)
where the number of branches and the number of branches in previously unbranched areas,
vity, are regressed over bank and month-year xed eects and the interaction between a policy
dummy taking unit value after April 2011, the introduction of the 27% rule, and the big bank
dummy variable.
With the second test, we run the same variables over a series of yearly dummies, y, which
describe the branch accumulation trend for small banks
viy = a+
X
y
by  y +
X
y
cy  y Big Banki + i + im + y + iy; (4)
and an interaction of these with the big bank dummy, which describe the dierential branch
expansion of big banks. Table 2 reports that in line with our expectation, after the policy
each big bank opened 10 branches more than the other banks, and they also accelerated rural
branching, as big banks opened 2.5 additional branches over small banks in previously unbanked
areas. Comparing these values with the mean dependent variable row, these magnitudes are
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Figure 4: Policy Change and Trends: Deposits and Loans
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Note: This gure plots the coecients of the overall trend exhibited by small and larger banks for the asset share
of NBE bills (upper panel) and the asset share of overall liquid assets (lower panel) over all quarters available
in the data (NBE bills in black and safe assets in green). Big banks are reported using a solid line, while small
banks are reported with a dashed line. The policy is announced in mid-March 2011 and implemented in April
2011 (shown by the vertical red line). As is evident, there occurs an important discontinuity around the policy
introduction (Quarter 5) and all banks start purchasing a large amount of NBE bills, with a signicant increase
in the amount of overall safe assets. As is evident from Table 1, the pre-policy trends are not statistically
dierent from zero, while post-policy all of them are. It is notable that all banks, both big and small, become
safer in response to the policy. Appendix F reports the same picture with 95% condence intervals.
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Figure 5: Policy Change and Trends: Deposits and Loans
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Note: This gure plots the coecients of the overall trend exhibited by small and larger banks for deposits
(upper panel) and loans (lower panel) over all quarters available in the data (deposits in blue and loans in red).
Big banks are reported using a solid line, while small banks are reported with a dashed line. The policy is
announced in mid-March 2011 and implemented in April 2011 (shown by the vertical red line). As is evident,
there occurs an important discontinuity around the policy introduction (Quarter 5) and larger banks respond
substantially more than smaller banks by collecting more deposits and giving more loans. As is evident from
Table 1, the pre-policy trends are not statistically dierent from zero, while post-policy the deposit trend diers
almost immediately, while the loan trend only from Quarter 9 onwards. Appendix F reports the same picture
with 95% condence intervals.
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Table 2: Branches and New Towns: Branch Map of Ethiopia
(1) (2) (3)
Variables Number of Number of Cumulative Distance
Branches Rural Branches of New Branches from HQ
Policy  Big Banks 12.60*** 3.677** 1,533**
(2.604) (1.418) (622.2)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 379 379 379
Adjusted R2 0.943 0.925 0.886
Mean Dep. Var. 53.87 29.08 10,055
SD Dep. Var. 33.11 15.61 6,882
Note: This table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is bank level, and bank and month-year xed
eects are included. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The number of branches is dened as
the cumulative number of branches installed by a bank, while the number of rural branches is dened as the
cumulative number of branches opened in towns previously unbranched. Their means and standard deviations
are reported in the nal two rows. These variables are regressed over the interaction of a policy dummy taking
unit value after April 2011 and the Big Bank dummy previously dened. The adjusted R2 of these regressions
is also reported. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
substantial: branches grow for big banks 20% more than smaller banks and rural branches by
almost 50%.
Figure 7 further explores this and shows the coecients for big and small banks by describing
their trends. The upper panel reports the evolution of branch installation; it is clear that up
until 2012 the trends are indistinguishable, but they start to diverge after the introduction
of the policy. Analogously, the lower panel shows a similar story for new branches opened in
unbanked locations. Appendix F shows a test of the parallel trend hypothesis, showing that
the dierences between big and small banks were generally statistically dierent before the
introduction of the policy, while after the introduction of the policy they became in line with
the theoretical model.
2.2.3 Evidence from Annual Reports
In this section, we present some supporting evidence concerning the non-negative eect of a
shock to s on prots and its positive eect on the number of employees, as a proxy for size.
Because these aggregates are collected yearly by banks, we lack the rich within-year variation,
which has been exploited in the previous sections. Also, the number of observations becomes a
big limitation, because now we only face a panel with ve observations at most for each bank.
However, we present two tests. The rst is a simple dierence-in-dierence regression, where
we verify whether prots and the number of employees grow more for larger banks than for
smaller banks:
viy = a+ b  Policyy Big Banki + i + y + iy: (5)
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Figure 6: Policy Change and Trends: Branch Installation
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Note: This gure plots the coecients of the overall trend exhibited by small and larger banks in overall branches
and rural branches for big banks (blue) and small banks (red). The policy is implemented in April 2011 (shown
by the red vertical line). As is evident, while branch accumulation does not dier before the policy change,
afterwards big banks start to install more branches overall (upper panel) and more rural branches (lower panel).
Appendix F reports the same picture, showing the dierence with 95% condence intervals.
63
Here, as usual, viy is a variable under observation for bank i in year y (note that the subscript t
that refers to months is dropped as we deal with annual observations); this variable is regressed
over the interaction, Policyy Big Banki, which accounts for the dierential eect of the policy
dummy in big banks. The variable Policyy takes unit value for the scal years during which
the policy has been in place (i.e., 2012 and 2013), while Big Banki takes unit value for the big
banks, as presented in Figure 4. These results are reported in Table 3 and show that big banks'
prots grow more rapidly after the policy and the number of employees expands at a similar
faster rate.
However, because dierence-in-dierence regression may present severe limitations in ab-
sence of parallel trends, we take a requires a test of the parallel trend hypothesis before the
policy. For this reason, we present a second test by running the following regression,
viy = a+
X
y
by  y +
X
y
cy  y Big Banki + i + y + iy; (6)
where real prots and number of employees are run over a series of yearly dummy variables,
y, which describe the evolution of prots and number of employees for small banks through
the coecients by and the interaction of yearly dummies with the big bank dummy, describing
through the coecients cy their dierential trend. As highlighted in Figure 8, there seems
to occur a discontinuity at the introduction of the policy, both in real prots (upper panel)
and employee numbers, supporting the previously reported hypothesis. In the next section, we
clarify how these are in line with the evolution of branch installation.
2.3 Robustness Checks
In this section, we explore possible alternative explanations, which might be related to the
policy change and invalidate our inference. The most important feature, which has not been
previously addressed, is the destination of the funds collected by the NBE, through this new
bill. One powerful argument regarding the eects observed in Figure 6 on deposits and loans
could be the following. This liquidity regulation drained substantial resources from the banking
system and placed them in long-term investment in some geographical areas to which big banks
had a comparative advantage in access. In a sense, leaving aside the liquidity asset increase
veried in Figure 5, this hypothesis would identify the regulation policy as an indirect transfer
of resources from small to big banks. We believe this is implausible for two reasons. First,
the Ethiopian government heavily relies on its state-owned bank, CBE, which is the largest in
the country, not aected by the policy and protable { in 2011/12, it amassed eight billion
birr of prots, corresponding to roughly 400 million US dollars (USD). If there had to be a
redistribution of resources, then the two state-owned banks (CBE and the Development Bank
of Ethiopia, DBE) might have been the recipients, rather than private commercial banks.
Secondly, if the argument given above is true, we should observe a special increase in credit and
branches in those regions that were particularly targeted for long-term investment. The region
that has mostly been attractive to long-term investment projects is Benishangul-Gumuz, which
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Figure 7: Policy Change and Trends: Real Prots and Number of Employees
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Note: This gure plots the coecients of the overall trend exhibited by small and larger banks in real prots
and number of employees for big banks (blue) and small banks (red). The policy is implemented in April 2011
(shown by the red vertical line). As is evident, while both prots and number of employees do not dier before
the policy change, afterwards big banks start to earn more (upper panel) and to hire more employees (lower
panel). Appendix F reports the same picture, showing the dierence with 95% condence intervals.
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Figure 8: Regional Heterogeneity
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Note: This gure reports the monthly evolution of branch opening in the upper panel and the yearly total
employment by medium-scale enterprises in the lower panel for the region Benishangul-Gumuz (in blue) and the
other Ethiopian regions (in red). As is clear in both panels, there is no detectable dierence between the rest
of Ethiopia and Benishangul-Gumuz, which has been the center of substantial long-term investment in the last
years. The upper panel reports the number of branches, while the lower panel gives the number of employees
(in thousands). The red vertical line marks the month and year of the policy change (April 2011) in the upper
panel and the year of the policy change (2011) in the lower panel.
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Table 3: Prots, Branches and Regulation: Annual Reports
(1) (2)
Variables Real Prots Number of
(million birr) Employees
Policy  Big Bank 24.47* 393.3***
(14.86) (114.6)
Bank FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Observations 52 52
Adjusted R2 0.938 0.971
Mean Dep. Var. 126.2 1,461
SD Dep. Var. 96.42 976.7
Note: This table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is bank level, and bank and month xed eects
are included. Davidson and McKinnon (1993) robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, which for
this case are more conservative than bootstrapped bank-level clustered. Real Prots is the dierence between
the asset-generated income and liability-induced costs after taxes; it is continuous and measured in million birr.
The number of branches denotes the total number of branches as shown in banks' annual reports. The variables
are made inter-temporally comparable using the core ination gures from National Bank of Ethiopia (2012,
2013). Their means and standard deviations are reported in the nal two rows. These variables are regressed
over a Policy dummy, which takes unit value after the introduction of the regulation policy and a dummy for
Big Banks, taking unit value for the six banks classied as large in Figure 4. Bank and Year xed eects are
included. The adjusted R2 of these regressions is reported in the row \Adjusted R2". ***, **, and * indicate
signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
hosts the construction site of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). In Figure 9, we
can observe in the upper panel the branch installation and total employment by medium-scale
enterprises compared to the national average. As is evident, it is dicult to argue that such
a region has been the destination of most attention and, for this reason, we believe that our
claim concerning the mechanism through enhanced bank safety cannot be dismissed.
Another core element that has been omitted in the analysis is the price response of the policy.
The theoretical model took prices as given and was silent on ways in which the lending and
deposit rates could respond to a shock in sR. This might create alternative channels through
which the liquidity regulation shapes the economic problem. For example, if the lending rate
in the good state, RG, grew in response to the policy (or the deposit rate RD correspondingly
declined), then the branch expansion eect could be entirely due to an increased protability of
the banking system, with liquid assets being a negligible component of the story. We decided
to leave prices constant in the model because of anecdotal evidence from Ethiopian bankers on
the lack of a price response due to competitive pressure, which was then conrmed in our data
collection exercise. In fact, Figure 10 presents the mean lending and deposit rates with their
respective minimum and maximum rates as published by the National Bank of Ethiopia (2013).
Although some changes occurred in mid-2009, it is noticeable that over the period of the policy
(2011{2013), rates are generally constant, at least in the rst moment of their distributions and
the respective supports. This is in line with the theoretical model, in which market prices were
left constant over the policy change.
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Figure 9: Policy Change and Prices: Lending and Deposit Rates
5
10
15
20
%
 P
oi
nt
s
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
year
Mean Nom. Deposit Rate Min Nom. Deposit Rate
Max Nom. Deposit Rate Mean Nom. Lending Rate
Min Nom. Lending Rate Max Nom. Lending Rate
Note: This gure reports the monthly evolution of the average nominal deposit rate (blue) and lending rate
(red), with their respective minimum and maximum rates. The sources are the 2012, 2013, and 2014 Annual
Reports of the NBE. As described in the text, there is no detectable change in either rate in response to the
policy change.
Thirdly, climate might be considered problematic, if the policy change occurred over periods
of extensive temperature uctuations, which might aect the agricultural and/or industrial
productivity and hence nancial markets. Ethiopia is a country with an heterogeneous climate,
close to the equator and with diverse altitudes, all of these characteristics make it suitable for
important temperature uctuations, which might be related to our study. From an analysis of
average monthly temperatures for Ethiopia (blue) and Addis Ababa (red) between 2005 and
2013, as shown in Figure 11, we observe that while there is some substantial cyclical variation
in temperature, there does not seem to be an exceptional increase in either the level or the
volatility of temperatures over the period of the policy change.
In addition to this, natural disasters might lead to a change in the marginal value of pub-
lic/private infrastructure and aect nancial markets. The year of the policy change, 2011,
was indeed marked by one of the most severe droughts Eastern Africa has experienced in the
past 60 years,5 and this may be a reason for concern. As claried by Figure 12, this disaster
aected mostly Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia. However, this might be a limited concern for
this study because while Somalia was hit in the most densely populated region of the country
(around the capital city Modagishu), Ethiopia was hit in a low-density and predominantly rural
area, as claried by the lower panel of Figure 12. In particular, according to some controversial
relief statistics, the number of Ethiopians aected by this disaster was between a few hundred
5Refer to the BBC article \Horn of Africa sees `worst drought in 60 years' ", 28 June 2011, available at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13944550.
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Figure 10: Climate and Policy Change
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Note: This gure reports the monthly average temperature in Ethiopia (blue) and Addis Ababa (red)
between January 2005 and August 2013. The policy change occurs in April 2011, Time 75, and there
does not seem to be any response to weather changes. The data come from the Berkeley Earth project
(http://berkeleyearth.org/). Alternative measures of temperatures were used from the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) National Climatic Data Center (NCDC), which are highly correlated
with the current values (0.72 for Addis Ababa and 0.6 for Ethiopia) and highlight similar dierences.
and 700,000,6 which is a sizable number, but limited relative to the 2011 population of 89.39
million. In Table 4, we also report a list of the major disasters that have occurred in Ethiopia
since 1960, and verify that this drought does not qualify as a disaster in the Emergency Events
Database (EM-DAT) denition.7
Last but not least, alternative policy changes might have contemporaneously aected bank
behaviour. In this period, the introduction of interest-free banking (IFB)8 is the most important
regulation. This measure is meant to allow Muslim Ethiopians to have a deposit account, and
invest in other nancial products, complying with Islamic principles and not "making money
with money". Because by law all deposits in Ethiopia are remunerated at least an annual
5%, this prevented the use of banking services by almost 33% of Ethiopians, which profess
Muslim faith. As a result, this measure could have been a major confounder. For example,
the simultaneous increase in deposits we observe may be mostly due to new Muslim customers,
who might have been the driver of the eects. Even if this could be a fascinating hypothesis, we
6Refer to the Hungton Post article \Ethiopia: Hunger During Worst Drought In 60 Years", 17 August 2011,
available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/17/ethiopia-hunger-drought_n_928989.html.
7The EM-DAT is maintained by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) and
denes a disaster as an event satisfying at least one of these characteristics: \ Ten (10) or more people reported
killed.  Hundred (100) or more people reported aected.  Declaration of a state of emergency.  Call for
international assistance."
8For more information on this refer to the NBE directive available here http://www.nbe.gov.et/pdf/
directives/bankingbusiness/sbb-51-11.pdf.
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Figure 11: Drought and Population Density in Ethiopia in 2011
Note: The upper panel shows a picture of the 2011 Eastern African drought and the intensity at which countries
were aected. The picture is based on the Famine Early Warning System (FEWS) and is freely available
at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:FEWS_Eastern_Africa_July-September_projection.png. The
lower panel shows a map of the population density in Ethiopia constructed by the Central Statistical Agency
of Ethiopia (CSA). Comparing the two pictures, it emerges that the areas most aected by the drought were
low-population density areas, mostly in the Somali and Oromiya region.
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Table 4: Largest Disasters in Ethiopia
(1) (2)
Type Date Total Deaths
Flood 13 August 2006 364
Flood 5 August 2006 498
Epidemic September 1988 7,385
Drought June 1987 367
Epidemic January 1985 1,101
Drought May 1983 300,000
Epidemic January{December 1981 990
Drought December 1973 100,000
Epidemic January 1970 500
Drought July 1965 2,000
Note: This table reports the most important disasters in Ethiopia between 1960 and 2015, from the most recent
to the oldest. In recent years, Ethiopia has not experienced any disaster that could be related to the policy
introduction. The data source is EM-DAT (http://emdat.be).
exclude IFBs are eectively responsible for any of the eects we report. Despite 2011 marked
the legalization of IFB in Ethiopia, only one bank announced operations toward IFB at the
end of 2013, which is the last part of our sample. A few other banks ocially launched IFB
products only in 2014 and 20159. The reluctance behind this initiative is mainly given by the
higher costs of operating these nancial products, as the bank needs to directly purchase the
investment good on behalf of the rm, which then progressively repays back.
3 Conclusion
In this paper, we show that liquidity regulation can promote bank deposits by imposing safe
asset holding in the absence of deposit insurance and credible safe-asset commitment by banks.
This is true if the regulation does not exceed a threshold below which the elasticity of deposit
mobilization to liquidity regulation exceeds the elasticity of the prot margin and asset loan
share to the regulation. Such policy can promote also bank lending and prots, if the decline
in the prot margin is exceeded by the size of the balance sheet growth, caused by additional
deposits owing in as the nancial system becomes safer.
The mechanism we describe relies on a key feature of the banking problem: the existence of
a commitment problem between the bank and depositors. Depositors would like a liquid and
safe bank, which fully repays their deposits; however, because deposits are given before the
liquid asset allocation and the presence of limited liability, they anticipate low repayments in
9The rst bank to oer IFB was Oromia International Bank in September 2013, while the state-owned
Commercial Bank of Ethiopia announced operations at the end of October 2013. Successively, Wegagen
International Bank, United Bank and Abay Bank announced the oer of IFBs in 2014, while the other
banks are moving in this direction but have not yet implemented such products. For more information on
this refer to the issue of October 2013 and May 2014 of Addis Fortune, a major Ethiopian business maga-
zine: http://addisfortune.net/articles/commercial-bank-to-launch-interest-free-banking/ http:
//addisfortune.net/articles/interest-grows-in-interest-free-banking/
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a default and deposit less. Given these features, a regulation imposing the mandatory level of
liquid assets generates two eects on the total loan volume and branch numbers: 1) a negative
eect, which shrinks the prot margin in the branch, through the re-allocation from high yield
(loans) to low yield (safe) assets; 2)a positive eect, by promoting deposits by households
in existing branches, and hence expanding the assets of the bank. The positive eect can
dominate the negative eect, especially if the nancial sector is risky and does not present
deposit insurance, and hence there are large gains from a \stabilization policy" for depositors.
Given these theoretical results, we test the predictions of our model exploiting the intro-
duction of a new liquidity regulation in Ethiopia in April 2011. This case study oers a unique
feature, which is key to our identication: a large and unexpected policy change, which boosted
the liquid holdings by banks by 25% in one quarter. This is combined with four special features
that allow our analysis: balance sheets at monthly frequencies, which allow us to tightly track
the policy change; distinct cross-sectional variation in asset size across Ethiopian banks, which
contributes to a neat identication; a long-term branch map covering installations in the last 15
years; and annual report digitization for ve years around the policy. Combining the time-series
variation generated by the introduction of the policy, with cross-sectional variation in bank size,
we nd that banks exposed to this policy do not lose prots, accumulate more safe assets, and
increase their deposits and loans.
These results shed light on an alternative role of liquidity requirements which has not re-
ceived empirical consideration. Our ndings are particularly interesting for emerging markets,
which share many nancial institutions and characteristics in line with Ethiopia. At the same
time, this mechanism may also apply to nancial systems in high-income countries, which en-
counter temporary systemic shocks which simultaneously weaken the credibility of government
guarantees (i.e. deposit insurance) and the solvency of banks.
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Chapter 3 - Financial Regulation and Government
Revenue: The Eects of a Policy Change in Ethiopia
Nicola Limodioy Francesco Strobbez
April 2017
1 Introduction
Financial regulation policies which promote, or impose, the purchase of government bonds give
rise to a scal policy dimension. Reinhart and Rogo (2009) and Reinhart, Reinhart, and
Rogo (2012) nd historically that even if in principle \macroprudential regulation need not be
the same as nancial repression, [. . . ] one can often be a prelude to the other". In this paper we
investigate two core questions relating to these issues. (1) How much government revenue can
nancial regulation produce? (2) Through which channel does nancial regulation generate
government revenue? We show that the revenue gains can be moderate, using as a specic
piece of regulation in Ethiopia as an unexpected policy change, and highlight that government
revenue is created by transferring banks protability without negative consequences on overall
intermediation.
A sizable body of literature has calculated the government revenue gains from macropru-
dential regulation, or nancial repression, adopting a variety of methods: the most popular uses
a weighted spread between foreign and domestic interest rates (Giovannini and De Melo 1993),
while others consider the presence of large reserve requirements combined with an ination tax
(Fischer 1982; Brock 1989; Agenor and Montiel 2008). Such a line of research has provided
considerable insight into government intervention in nancial markets across countries and, im-
plicitly, into countries' nancial development. However, most of these estimates rely on a direct
link between government policies and the main aggregates (i.e., the foreign-domestic spread,
actual reserve requirements), which cannot be tested because of various identication concerns.
This makes the revenue gain calculation unclear, as the policy may not actually induce any
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Bank of Ethiopia for their technical insights and support. We are grateful to Tim Besley, Luis Garicano, Lars
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re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nomics, Department of Economics, 32 Lincoln's Inn Fields, WC2A 3PH, London.
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real change in the economy. For example, a country may impose large reserve requirements
because of budgetary pressures during an increase in systemic risk (i.e., an international debt
crisis, a recession). However, such requirements may not bind as banks might already have
been holding substantial reserves anyway. For this reason, assuming that reserve requirements
are policy-driven, then some revenue calculation is still feasible, while in practice these policies
have no direct eect on revenue. Analogously, the spread between foreign and domestic interest
rates can largely be attributed to household preferences for domestic investment, in line with
the Feldstein{Horioka puzzle (Feldstein and Horioka 1980), rather than regulation. Therefore,
while most of the literature relies on cross-country analysis and assumed linkages, we take a
more direct path.
We advance this literature and contribute to the calculation of government revenue gains
by tracking the micro-level evidence through which nancial regulation leads to government
revenue gains. We propose a direct calculation of such savings based on credible counterfactuals.
In this paper, we focus on a specic case study: the introduction of a nancial regulation policy
in April 2011 by the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) on all private banks. This regulation is
ideal for the purpose of our study for a variety of reasons. First, the policy was announced and
implemented with short notice (in mid-March 2011 and April 2011, respectively) and banks
were largely surprised by this. Second, the magnitude of the regulation was substantial, as
it imposed the purchase of 0.27 bonds issued by the central bank (NBE bills) for every unit
of loans extended to the private sector. Third, banks would not be willing to hold these bills
in absence of the regulation, because these present a xed nominal rate of 3% and deliver
an eective negative net return1. Therefore, both the regulated mandatory quantity of bond
purchase and their price are xed.
By having access to data on monthly balance sheets of all Ethiopian banks, to a disag-
gregated survey of branch installation costs, and to annual reports, we are able to verify how
the policy aects bank behavior and to calculate the government revenue gains induced by
the policy. This paper advances this body of literature through two fundamental innovations.
First, we provide a country-specic government revenue calculation based on a clear policy,
for which we can verify its eect on the regulated entity (banks and their balance sheets) and
calculate the revenue gains. Secondly, we benchmark this policy against three alternative and
credible ways of raising revenue through the banking system. Despite methodological changes,
our results are essentially in line with the literature2, however rather than a macroeconomic
approach we follow a micro-oriented calculation as suggested by Siegel (1981).
We nd that this policy creates a moderate revenue gain: depending on the counterfactual
scenarios, such gain lies between 1.5% and 2.6% of the total tax revenue (this corresponds to
20% of all Personal Income Tax revenue in Ethiopia). In addition, we track the mechanism
through which revenue is generated, and verify that diminished bank prots is the only aggregate
1In fact, while on the asset side each NBE Bill provides a 3% remuneration, the core liability of Ethiopian
banks (deposits) are remunerated, on average, at 5.5% and at least 5% by law. Therefore every NBE Bill
delivers to the bank a net negative return between 2% and 2.5%.
2In fact, in Appendix D we show that our results are consistent with the methodologically alternative
calculations of the nancial repression revenue introduced by Giovannini and De Melo (1993).
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aected, with an undetectable pass-through on borrowers or depositors3. At the same time,
we observe that banks comply with the policy by purchasing the NBE bills as prescribed and
increasing their overall safe asset holding. The quantitative eects on bank protability are
sizeable: bank prot growth declines from a 10% yearly rate pre-policy to a 2% post policy.4
Therefore, overall, while we do not take a clear stance in favor of or against the policy, our
results provide robust evidence on the relation between nancial regulation and government
revenue generation, showing that lowering bank prots is the channel through which this takes
place.
In Section 2, we present an essential review of the literature on this topic. In Sections 3 and
4, we introduce and discuss the Ethiopian nancial sector and the regulation policy. Finally, in
Section 5, we oer some concluding remarks.
2 Literature Review
The literature on nancial repression dates back to McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), who
coined the term \repression" for policies that distort the allocation of capital by draining nan-
cial resources toward the government. These authors were mostly describing the phenomena
behind nancial repression and relating them to liberalization, in a context in which central-
ized economies were the alternative economic system. Specically, nancial repression is dened
through policies that depress the deposit rate and, consequently, the aggregate amount of sav-
ings.
Giovannini and De Melo (1993) moved the attention of this literature from a descriptive ap-
proach to revenue calculation. They exploited the spread between foreign and domestic interest
rates in a sample of 24 countries to calculate the government revenue from nancial regulation
and showed that these can be sizable: on average, 2% of GDP or 9% of total government
revenue. Using as a comparison the work of Fischer (1982), who calculated the ination-led
seigniorage revenue from mandatory bank requirements, Giovannini and De Melo established
a parallel between the two and found these alternative revenue sources to be equivalent in
magnitude. An analogous exercise has been performed by Brock (1984, 1989), and recently
Agenor and Montiel (2008), who also focus on the gains generated by imposing large reserve
requirements and an ination tax. In terms of optimality of nancial repression and seigniorage
taxes, Bacchetta and Caminal (1992) analyze the eect of nancial integration for countries
relying on the taxation of their domestic nancial system. They relate nancial liberalization to
reserve ratios, ination rates, and government debt, and propose a model to explain the setting
of the optimal seigniorage tax. Their ndings show that liberalization can be detrimental for
welfare under some conditions and that reserve ratios can be increased prior to liberalization,
3In a companion paper (Limodio and Strobbe 2016), we have shown that, counterintuitively, deposit and
lending rates do not respond to the policy and the aggregate level of deposits and loans do not decline, while
banks start to expand because of the additional safety provided by the policy.
4The desirability of this result is ambiguous in terms of welfare, given that the Ethiopian banking sector
registers an exceptional protability: the local average returns on equity stand rmly at 55% (IMF 2013), above
the African (30%; IMF 2013) and Western (5%; Schildbach and Wenzel 2013) averages.
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this results recall the assessment of Sussman (1991). A similar conclusion is achieved by Mour-
mouras and Russell (1992), whom consider a the role of optimal reserve requirements rather
than a direct taxation of the banking system to nance government expenditure. On an anal-
ogous line, Espinosa-Vega (1995) shows that the introduction of a traditional multiple reserve
requirement be both welfare enhancing and ination minimizing compared to a single reserve
requirement regulation.
Two papers document the experience of two leading Asian countries { South Korea and
China { which implemented substantial nancial regulation policies in their key years of growth.
Demetriades and Luintel (2001) provide empirical evidence on the eects of nancial restraints
on South Korean nancial development. In an essential theoretical model, they show a positive
association between nancial development and the degree of state control over the banking
system, and a positive relation between nancial development and mild repression of lending
rates. These results are validated in their empirical analysis, in support of a role for nancial
regulation policies. Huang and Wang (2011) examine the impact of nancial repression on
economic growth during China's reform period. They document the existence of an inverse
U-shaped relation between nancial repression and growth in the Chinese experience: positive
for low levels and negative for higher levels.
On a ner historical basis, Reinhart and Sbrancia (2011) provide a comprehensive account of
the main nancial regulation tools and their application in the last century, focusing especially
on calculating the \nancial repression tax" in a case where the government both caps the
interest rates and creates a \captive" domestic audience for its debt. Reinhart, Kirkegaard,
and Sbrancia (2011) document the resurgence of nancial repression in the wake of the 2007{
2009 nancial crises and the accompanying surge in public debts in advanced economies. Their
conclusions point to nancial repression being particularly successful in liquidating debts when
accompanied by a steady dose of ination.
In exploring this policy, we participate in the debate on the tools for public debt reduction
and promote a moderate degree of nancial regulation as a viable solution. A body of recent
literature (e.g., Aizenman and Marion 2011; Cochrane 2011; Davig, Leeper, and Walker 2011)
supports the view that ination will emerge as a consequence of scal imbalances and will be
the long-term solution to lowering public debt. However, Hilscher, Raviv, and Reis (2015)
conclude that nancial regulation, or regulation coupled with ination, can be more eective
to lower the real value of public debt, in line with Reinhart, Kirkegaard, and Sbrancia (2011).
They nd that forcing banks to hold a special lower-yielding bond may be a solution, which is
analogous to the policy under study in this paper. Concerning this case study, we show that
the revenue gains of such policies can be moderate, while the costs on the banking sector may
be negligible in terms of protability and intermediation.
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3 Ethiopian Banks and Policy Change
In this section, we present the eects of a new nancial regulation on banks and verify their
behavioral response to the policy. As discussed in the introduction, this is key to establishing
a direct link between bond purchase and the regulation, which then permits us to calculate
the government revenue gains. We exploit the introduction of a signicant policy change in
the Ethiopian nancial sector that occurred in March 2011, when the NBE issued a directive
requiring all private commercial banks to hold 27% of new loan disbursements in negative-
yield NBE bills. This policy can be described as a typical macroprudential regulation measure
because it imposes safe asset purchase. At the same time, this also creates a \regulation tax"on
banks, given that the average deposit remuneration is 5.5% (National Bank of Ethiopia 2012),
with a legal minimum of 5%, which implies that on each NBE bill, banks lose a net 2{2.5%. In
essential terms, this policy regulates both the mandatory quantity of purchased bills (27% of
new loans) and their price.
The relevant aspect of studying the so-called 27% rule is given by the unique nature of this
shock, because it was unexpected, it was announced less than a month before implementation,
and it was large, with banks mobilizing a large part of their assets in response to the policy. In
another paper on the same policy, Limodio and Strobbe (2016) show that this safe-asset policy
leads to a substantial balance-sheet expansion and provides a clear theoretical underpinning
and identication of the eect.
In this section, we discuss three issues that are useful in our accounting exercise:
1. compliance { banks responded by purchasing NBE bills as prescribed by the regulation
(Table 1);
2. safety { overall safe asset purchase increased one-to-one with the NBE bill purchase (Table
2 and Figure 1);
3. protability { banks' prot growth slowed down, but did not turn negative (Table 3 and
Figure 2).
Compliance
In this subsection, we show that banks started to purchase this bond in proportion to lending
(0.27 : 1) as prescribed by the regulation. For this task, we use the monthly bank balance-
sheet information and present a simple xed eect regression, highlighting that the policy had
an actual eect on the behavior of private banks. For this reason, we use the volume of NBE
bills purchased by bank i in month m and year y,
NBE Billsimy = a+ b  Policymy  Lendingimy + i + m + y + imy; (1)
and regress it over a dummy variable taking unit value after April 2011, Policymy, interacted
with the monthly bank-specic volume of lending, Lendingimy, and bank, month, and year xed
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eects. The null hypothesis of this test is b = 0:27, given the 27% rule. In the presentation of
the main results, we exploit a variety of variations by including and excluding certain sets of
xed eects. Under no circumstances can we reject that banks start purchasing the government
bonds as prescribed by the regulation.
In Table 1, we report the results of regression (1) for the whole variation in column (1). We
exploit only within-bank variation by including only bank xed eects in column (2), and then
by removing year-specic shocks in column (3) and month-specic shocks in column (4). Finally,
we replace the last two with non-parametric eects for every month of every year in column
(5). Though the point estimates move slightly across these estimations, the null hypothesis
b = 0:27 can never be rejected and therefore it cannot be dismissed that compliance indeed
took place. In Appendix A, we also present two other estimations in which we slightly change
the main regression model, and the results are indeed unchanged. To verify also graphically
that compliance occurred, in Appendix B we provide a gure showing the average balance-sheet
composition across months and we verify the NBE bill purchase after April 2011.
Safety and Protability
In this short subsection, we show that the regulation had two consequences: 1) an increase in
the purchase of NBE bills; 2) an increase in the overall quantity of safe assets held by banks
(i.e., cash, other liquid assets, government bonds, bank-to-bank deposits, central bank reserves).
This is important, because unless banks change their actual asset allocation, then it may be
argued that this policy overall generates only a change in safe asset composition (i.e., less cash
and more government bonds). This, in turn, would classify this policy as a simple tax, rather
a regulation altering the safe asset holding of banks.
To verify this, we exploit all available time series information and regress the two main
variables (NBE Bills and Safe Assets) over all consecutive quarterly dummies (13 available)
and bank xed eects, as shown:
vit = +
X
t
tt +
X
i
ii + it: (2)
In equation (2), the variable vit (NBE Bills or Safe Assets) indicates the quantity of variable v
for bank i in quarter t, and is regressed over quarterly dummies, t, and bank xed eects, i.
The former eects describe the average evolution of these variables over time, while the latter
report the average quantity of specic assets held by a specic bank. The coecients t from
equation (2) are reported in Table 2 and plotted in Figure 1. By inspecting both, we can verify
that with the introduction of the policy, the amount of NBE bills (in black) went from zero to
roughly 500 million birr in April 2011 and kept growing steadily afterwards. At the same time,
safe assets (which include NBE bills) increased one-to-one with this variable. This shows that
the policy was successful in leading Ethiopian banks to become safer with the introduction of
the policy, and banks did not substitute away from one type of liquidity (bank-to-bank deposits,
cash, etc.) to NBE bills, but rather increased the overall aggregate.
80
Last but not least, we have referred to this policy as a macroprudential regulation as well
as a \nancial regulation tax". Indeed, we nd that bank protability suers in the aftermath
of this. For this purpose, we collect data from bank annual reports and run a similar regression
to equation (2):
viy =  +
X
y
yy +
X
ii + iy: (3)
The dierence is that while balance-sheet variables (NBE bills, safe assets) are measured
monthly, the prots are only measured yearly. Analogously to the previous subsection, we
report the coecients y of equation (3) in Table 3 and plot the yearly coecients in Figure
2. By inspecting both elements, it emerges that the growth of prots signicantly slowed as
the policy came into existence. Between 2009 and 2011, prots grew by 11% yearly and this
collapses to 2% between 2011 and 2013. Therefore, there is some evidence linking the policy to
a decline in prot accumulation, without turning this negative.
4 Government Revenue and Policy Change
The regulation implemented by the NBE has been successful in establishing a market for NBE
bills and in forcing the 14 local banks to comply with this new rule. In this section, we
calculate the revenue gains from this, in line with the nancial repression literature. At the end
of the 2012 scal year, treated banks amassed a total of 13.976,75 million birr of NBE bills,
corresponding to 702.43 million US dollars (USD). This number is in line with what media and
the IMF reported.5 How can we account for the revenue gains of this policy?
The objectives of the policy are twofold: to promote long-run investment and to enhance
bank safety. Both objectives seem to be extremely dicult to quantify and they expose us
to faulty predictions. Similarly, in a full welfare analysis, we would also need to account for
the benets and costs of this initiative: weighing the eect on rms and households, against
government gains and bank performance. However, at the current stage, this would require
considerable assumptions that we are not going to make. More modestly, we follow the gov-
ernment revenue literature and focus on accounting the savings on the interest rate relative to
other policies. For this purpose, we need to propose alternative scenarios of how these funds
could be raised and to establish their cost. The following three scenarios are considered.
1. Borrowing from international nancial markets. In this scenario, the Ethiopian govern-
ment sells its bonds at competitive international prices.
2. Diverting private lending from the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia (CBE). With this policy,
the Ethiopian government forces the largest bank, owned by the government, to replace
private lending with government bonds.
5See the article \Ethiopian Central-Bank Order May Mean More T-Bills, Less Lending" by William Davison,
Bloomberg, February 26, 2013, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-26/ethiopian-central-
bank-order-may-mean-more-t-bills-less-lending.html.
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3. Raising new deposits through the CBE. This would imply expanding the branch infras-
tructure and would dedicate all new resources to funding the government.
In the following subsections, we describe the three alternative revenue scenarios, and we
estimate their cost and the revenue gains. In general, we nd that imposing the NBE bill
purchase on private banks generates a moderate revenue for the government, around 11{19%
of the decit and 1.5{2.6% of tax revenue, considering their respective 2011 levels of 8.220,19
and 58.980,8 million birr (National Bank of Ethiopia 2012).
In order to oer a comparison with the literature, in Appendix D we propose a calculation
of the government revenue from nancial repression, following the methodology introduced by
Giovannini and De Melo (1993). Though their approach relies on national accounts, rather than
bank balance sheets, we nd that our results are consistent in terms of sign and magnitude.
Beyond being a useful check of our methodology, we nd this result to be useful in linking
the macro approach on government revenue with the richer micro approach we employ in this
paper.
4.1 Borrowing from International Financial Markets
Ethiopia stopped borrowing from international nancial markets after the 1991{1999 years
of debt restructuring and relief (Borensztein and Panizza 2008). After the recent decade of
exceptional growth and development, in December 2014 it issued its rst internationally traded
sovereign bonds, which were favorably received and priced at 6.625%.6 This is a comfortingly
low rate, provided that only in May 2014, Ethiopia was assigned its rst sovereign rating by
Moody's.7 and that this was a B1 rating, indicating it as a speculative trade with a high risk
of insolvency.
The rating and rst rate provide a useful benchmark for a counterfactual analysis, so that we
can provide a few scenarios on rates that Ethiopia needs to charge in order to replace the 27%
rule with international bonds. It is also useful to refer to the experience of its two neighboring
countries, Kenya and Uganda, who also enjoy a B1 valuation from Moody's and have been
successfully issuing sovereign debt bonds on international nancial markets over the last ve
years.
 Kenya remunerated its 91-days Treasury Bills between 8 and 20% in the last auctions,
held between June and July 2014, with an average of 9.5%.8
 Uganda, analogously, priced its 91-days Treasury bills at 9.5% in the auction of 25 June
6Refer to the Financial Times article \Investors pile into Ethiopia's $1bn debut debt sale,"
by Javier Blas, December 4, 2014 (http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0efe83f2-7bbb-11e4-a695-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3pUUOSsou).
7Refer to the Financial Times article \Ethiopia receives rst sovereign rating," by Javier
Blas and Katrina Manson, May 12, 2014 (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/cb3a02ee-d9c7-11e3-b3e3-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3Cl8WopSH).
8Refer to the Central Bank of Kenya Treasury Bills Average Rates at
https://www.centralbank.go.ke/index.php/treasury-bill/91-days.
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2014.9
Therefore, considering Ethiopia's rst bond price as a lower bound and the Kenya/Uganda
rates as a plausible counterfactual, we can infer that a likely rate for its alternative bond,
priced competitively on nancial markets, would be 9.5%, with the following range [5%,14%]
as observed by auctions for Kenya and Uganda. This provides a simple reference against which
to measure the revenue gains:
Gain = (RI  RG) G:
Here, RI = 9:5% (or 6% and 12% in the lower and upper bound cases, respectively) would be
the price charged on international markets, RG = 3% the current NBE bill remuneration, and
G the volume of NBE bills. Overall, this gain totals 908.49 million birr per year (43 million
USD), between 279.5 and 1537.4 depending on the possible interest rate range, which accounts
for 11% of the decit or 1.5% of tax revenue.
4.2 Diverting Private Lending from the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia
The CBE is the largest Ethiopian commercial bank and one of the largest in Africa. It has
more than 800 branches, seven million account holders, and 18,000 employees: its assets at
the end of the 2011 scal year amounted to 226.338 million birr, equivalent to 11.372 million
USD. It is owned by the Ministry of the Economy and is a grand contributor to government
public nances, its mission being to \realize stakeholders' needs through enhanced nancial
intermediation globally and supporting national development priorities".10 In fact, after the
NBE and the Development Bank of Ethiopia, it is the largest bank holding government bonds,
with 3% of the total; as a reference, all other banks combined hold less than 1% (Ministry of
Finance and Economic Development 2012).
From the CBE balance sheet for July 2012, we can see that the CBE holds no NBE bills,
but government bonds for 2.414,029 and private sector lending for 20.365,691 million birr,
with the remaining funds dispersed in other assets. In this subsection, we propose a simple
counterfactual exercise, in which we calculate the revenue of the CBE when some of its private
lending assets are redirected to the purchase of the 13.976,75 million birr of NBE bills imposed
on private banks.
From ocial documentation (Ministry of Finance and Economic Development 2012; Na-
tional Bank of Ethiopia 2012), we know the average interest rate on all assets reported in the
third column of Table 4. Therefore, we can simulate this alternative scenario. In so doing, we
are ignoring the cost of liquidating private lending and considering the cost of this measure to
be negligible for single rms and aggregate economy. In Panel A, we report the current partial
asset allocation between government bonds, private sector lending, and NBE bills. Regarding
the returns of this assets, while government bonds and NBE bills present a xed return of 1.5%
and 3% respectively, ocial authorities report the interest rate on private sector lending for its
9Refer to the Results of the Treasury Bills Auctions by the Bank of Uganda
https://www.bou.or.ug/bou/collateral/tbills forms/2014/Jun/resultstbill 922.html.
10Refer to the CBE web site for more information, http://www.combanketh.et/AboutUs/CompanyProle.aspx
83
average, for both upper and lower bounds. For this reason, we can also propose in this case
a range of estimates for the CBE revenue. In order to be rigorous, we dene the calculated
revenue as \partial", because we are focusing on a subset of CBE assets. In Panel B, we present
the experiment in which we fund the NBE bill amount with private sector lending and recal-
culate the partial revenue. Panel C presents the counterfactual prot dierence, which is not
partial as we are keeping all other objects constant: in the average interest case, forcing the
CBE to purchase NBE bills and give up private lending would impose 1.257,91 million birr of
losses per year (59.8 million USD), in the range between 628,96 and 1.851,92.
Considering losses on the CBE as missing yearly revenue on the Treasury, then we can see
that this policy would be, on average, more expensive than emitting competitive bonds on
nancial markets, which would cost 908.49 million birr per year. Specically, the gains from
this initiative correspond to 15% of the decit or 2% of tax revenue in 2011.
4.3 Raising New Deposits through the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia
In the previous subsection, we considered funding the purchase of 13.976,75 million birr of NBE
bills by moving CBE's assets away from private sector lending { hence an asset reallocation
measure. In this subsection, we study a liability expansion scenario, through which we simulate
the CBE costs of raising fresh 13.976,75 million birr of deposits, used to fund the NBE purchase.
By the end of the 2012 scal year (July), the additional total collected in deposits in
Ethiopian banks compared to 2011 amounted to 46,475.2 million birr, mobilized by 302 new
branches. Therefore, we consider the average deposit collection per new CBE branch as the
total average deposit collected per branch by the whole banking sector (i.e., 153.9 million birr).
This plausibly overestimates the amount of newly collected deposits per branch, for at least
two reasons. First, in the extensive margin of deposit mobilization (new branches) we are also
including the intensive margin (more deposits from existing branches). Secondly, branch alloca-
tion may begin from the deposit-rich areas and then be expanded to poorer areas. However, for
the purpose of this exercise, this implies an underestimation of the costs of deposit collection,
leading to a lower bound on our estimate. Given the average deposit collection per branch,
CBE would need to install 91 new branches to cover the new asset.
What is the cost of installing a new branch in Ethiopia? This gure clearly depends on a
variety of factors, and in order to obtain an average gure, we interviewed all Ethiopian private
sector banks and had access to data on their branch installation costs. In the course of this
discussion, there emerged an average gure of 300,000 birr per month (14,000 USD), ranging
between 100,000 and 500,000 birr depending on location, local labor market, services oered,
transport infrastructure, security expenses, and several other factors. However, 300,000 birr per
month is the closest empirical analogue to our reference because it catches all costs, including
rents, local wages, utility bills, equipment, and so on. As well as interviewing banks, we tested
the plausibility of this number by using the annual report data and inferred branch costs. In
Appendix C, we present a detailed exercise, which backs out the average cost of a branch from
the yearly operational expenses of the CBE between 2006 and 2012. In line with interviews
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with private sector banks, we obtain an average cost of a branch of 303,000 birr. Given that the
minimum business-lifecycle of a branch is ve years to collect the peak deposit from a location,
this makes the average total cost of branch 18 million birr (ranging between 6 and 30), and
equivalent to 900,000 USD. Therefore the total cost of opening 91 new branches is 1,638 million
birr (ranging between 546 and 2,730).
Similarly to the previous case, we can calculate the revenue gains on the Ethiopian Treasury,
by subtracting the NBE bill interest payment from this liability expansion measure. This overall
cost is composed of two components: a xed cost, the installation of 91 new branches, BI; and
a variable cost, which is the net loss incurred by the CBE on collecting 13.976,75 million birr
of deposits remunerated at an average rate of 5.4% and their use for NBE bill purchase, which
only give a 3% xed return. Therefore, the nal gain can be written as follows
Gain = BI + (RD  RG)G RGG = 1; 638 + 335:5  419:3;
which places the revenue gains of introducing the NBE bills at 1,554.2 million birr (between
462.2 and 2,646.2). Overall, this gain is 24% higher than the previous gain and makes the
savings of this measure 19% of the decit and 2.6% of tax revenue.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we show that the government revenue gains of a specic piece of nancial regula-
tion in Ethiopia (the 27% NBE bill regulation) are moderate and that lower bank prots are the
channel through which this revenue is created. In order to benchmark the government savings
of imposing safe asset purchase on banks, we rely on three credible counterfactuals: 1) issuing
a bond competitively priced on international capital markets; 2) raising revenue by diverting
resources from the state-owned bank; 3) forcing the state-owned bank to raise new deposits
and fund the same bond. Our calculations highlight that such savings lie between 1.5% and
2.6% of the tax revenue and between 11% and 19% of the primary decit. Dierently from
the previous macro-oriented literature, we are able to track the eect of the policy by having
access to monthly bank balance sheets and by verifying the bank mechanics behind the policy
change. Specically we observe that banks comply with the policy and start purchasing these
new bonds as prescribed. This leads to an increase in safe asset holding, enhancing the banking
system safety, and it also slows down year-on-year prot growth from 11% to 2%, in a context
where banks' return on equity lies at 55%.
We believe our results are important and encourage additional research on the linkages
between nancial regulation and government revenue, especially on a variety of issues that
are fundamental in several countries (i.e., optimality, welfare trade-os, implementation, etc.).
Indeed, we strongly believe there is generally insucient empirical evidence on which poli-
cies low-income countries should pursue to boost nancial systems and which trade-os are
encountered in their implementation.
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Table 1: Regulation and Compliance: Monthly Variation (Million Real Birr)
Variable NBE Bills (Real Birr)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Lending  Policy 0.263 0.274 0.251 0.248 0.254
(0.00752) (0.00689) (0.00868) (0.00902) (0.00976)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
Month FE Yes
Non-Param. Month FE Yes
Obs. 538 538 538 538 538
Number of banks 14 14 14 14 14
Adjusted R2 0.889 0.950 0.959 0.959 0.959
Mean Dep. Var. 501.9 501.9 501.9 501.9 501.9
SD Dep. Var. 616.6 616.6 616.6 616.6 616.6
Note: This table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is bank level. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. NBE Bills is the amount of bills issued by the NBE in million birr, and is a continuous variable.
Its mean and standard deviation are reported in the nal two rows. The quantity of NBE Bills is regressed on
\Lending  Policy", which is the interaction between Private Lending (in million birr) and a continuous variable,
and the Policy dummy, taking unit value from April 2011 onward. In Tables A1 and A2, we also include the
respective variables Lending and Policy as well as their interaction, without statistically detectable changes in
the coecient. The null hypothesis is that this coecient is 0.27, as prescribed by the NBE directive, and
we cannot reject this. In column (1) we exploit all variation. In column (2) we exploit only within-bank by
introducing bank xed eects. In columns (3) and (4) we also add year and month xed eects, respectively. In
column (5) we remove parametric month and year xed eects and replace them with non-parametric eects for
each month of each year (non-param. month FE). Appendix A reports an additional test of this null hypothesis
including more indicators. All quantities are in millions of real birr, at their 2010 value. The adjusted R2 of
these regressions is also reported.
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Figure 1: Regulation and Lending
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Note: This gure reports the average evolution of monthly NBE bills (in black) and safe assets (in green) for
all Ethiopian private banks between January 2010 and December 2013. The red vertical dashed line shows the
introduction of the nancial regulation policy, which forces banks to buy a negative yield government bond for
every unit of private lending. The lower panel reports also the 95% condence interval around these lines, using
dashed and dotted lines. All quantities are in millions of real birr, at their 2010 value.
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Figure 2: Regulation and Protability
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Note: This gure reports the evolution of yearly prots for all Ethiopian banks between 2009 and December
2013. The red vertical dashed line shows the introduction of the nancial regulation policy, which forces banks
to buy a negative yield government bond for every unit of private lending. The dashed and dotted lines indicate
the 95% condence intervals. All quantities are in millions of real birr, at their 2010 value.
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Table 2: Regulation and Safe Assets: Quarterly Variation (Million Real Birr)
(1) (2)
Variable NBE Bills Safe Assets
(Real Birr) (Real Birr)
Pre-Policy
Quarter 2 0.1 13.56
(120.9) (102.1)
Quarter 3 13.44 72.27
(110.1) (82.79)
Quarter 4 38.41 72.81
(109.4) (84.50)
Post-Policy
Quarter 5 438.4 517.0
(86.86) (78.39)
Quarter 6 528.8 627.1
(86.43) (83.19)
Quarter 7 640.9 519.6
(87.63) (80.38)
Quarter 8 722.1 361.7
(89.03) (70.95)
Quarter 9 775.2 485.5
(89.77) (70.64)
Quarter 10 807.8 540.9
(90.90) (74.51)
Quarter 11 882.6 602.3
(93.36) (70.02)
Quarter 12 961.8 671.1
(96.78) (73.13)
Quarter 13 1,017 613.9
(98.51) (71.19)
Bank FE Yes Yes
Observations 538 538
Adjusted R2 0.791 0.945
Mean Dep. Var. 501.9 1261
SD Dep. Var. 616.6 1062
Note: This table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is bank level and bank xed eects are
included. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. NBE Bills is the amount of bills issued by the NBE in
million birr, and it is a continuous variable. Safe Assets aggregate at bank level the following assets: liquid
cash, government bonds, NBE bills, bank-to-bank deposits, and voluntary reserves at the NBE. Their mean and
standard deviation are reported in the nal two rows. In columns (1) and (2), we regress the quantity of NBE
bills and Safe assets, respectively, over a series of quarterly dummies, which fully describe the sample. These
variables catch the average evolution of the accumulation of NBE bills and safe assets across the quarters. It
is clear that as the policy is introduced in April 2011, which falls in Quarter 5, both NBE bills and safe assets
start to markedly increase. As Figure 1 shows, this increase is close to being one-to-one. All quantities are in
million of real birr, at their 2010 value. The adjusted R2 of these regressions is also reported.
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Table 3: Regulation and Prots: Yearly Variation (Million Real Birr)
Variable Pre-Tax Bank Prots (Real Birr)
Pre-Policy
Year 2009 110.3 (35.68)
Year 2010 137.6 (32.98)
Year 2011 164.5 (36.15)
Post-Policy
Year 2012 172.2 (34.53)
Year 2013 179.5 (33.08)
Bank FE Yes
Observations 52
Adjusted R2 0.904
Mean Dep. Var. 126.2
SD Dep. Var. 96.42
Note: This table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is bank level and bank xed eects are
included. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Prots are extracted from banks' individual annual prots
and are reported in their before-tax expression in million birr; it is a continuous variable. The mean and
standard deviation are reported in the nal two rows. We regress over the available years to verify the average
prot evolution in the banking industry, which (as expected) markedly declines after 2011. All quantities are
in millions of real birr, at their 2010 value. The adjusted R2 of these regressions is also reported.
Table 4: A Cost{Benet Analysis of Diverting CBE Lending
Asset Million Birr Average Rate Upper Bound Lower Bound
Panel A: Current Partial Asset Allocation
(1) Government bonds 2.414,03 1.5%
(2) Private sector lending 20.365,69 12% 7.5% 16.25%
(3) NBE Bills 0 3%
(4) Partial revenue 2.480,09 1.563,63 3.345,63
Panel B: Counterfactual Partial Asset Allocation
(5) Government bonds 2.414,03 1.5%
(6) Private sector lending 6.388,94 12% 7.5% 16.25%
(7) NBE Bills 13.976,75 3%
(8) Partial revenue 1.222,18 934,67 1.493,71
Panel C: Counterfactual Revenue
(9) Revenue  1.257,91  628,96  1.851,92
Note: This table reports the cost{benet analysis of diverting private sector lending from the CBE to the
purchase of NBE bills. For simplicity, in all panels, we only report a partial balance sheet, which includes only
three assets: private sector lending, NBE bills, and Treasury bills. Panel A reports the current composition of
the balance sheet, Panel B shows the balance sheet under the assumption that CBE needs to buy all NBE bills
using private sector lending resources, and Panel C reports the counterfactual revenue of this exercise.
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Chapter 4 - Manager Assignment and Project Returns:
Evidence from the World Bank
Nicola Limodioy
April 2017
1 Introduction
There are two salient features of development lending that make this dierent from commercial
lending: a policy-reform objective and a nancial subsidy. As Besley et al. (2015) and Deaton
et al. (2006) discuss, the World Bank has been capable of generating a much stronger policy
impact than its actual nancial size and, in line with this view, Clemens and Kremer (2016)
show how small the nancial subsidy compares with the set of achieved reforms. Ultimately,
the World Bank's leadership in development lending and agenda inuence (Custer et al., 2015)
comes from pro-actively engaging with local governments and bundling nancial resources with
technical assistance in its projects (Ravallion, 2016).
However, given its small and shrinking relative size in international capital markets, the rai-
son d'etre of the World Bank resides in its informational functions (Rodrik, 1995) and knowledge
generation (Chioda, De La Torre, and Maloney, 2013), which are operationalized through its
technical assistance activities. These are organized and delivered by the project managers of
the World Bank (Task-Team Leaders, or TTL, in internal World Bank jargo), that have a vi-
tal role in adding value to projects through their human capital and, in so doing, inuencing
development outcomes. They are responsible for delivering innovative ideas through technical
assistance, setting up the loan specics, and make projects happen by negotiating both with
governments and the World Bank administration.
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The most relevant contribution in this respect is by Denizer, Kaufmann, and Kraay (2013),
who pioneered the study of the macro and micro correlates of World Bank projects and were
the rst to provide a valuable contribution in assessing the role of World Bank managers in
project success. One of their key conclusions encouraged the study of World Bank managers
and, in general, the process of resource allocation within development lenders. In this paper,
I advance their study and focus on whether, and to what extent, World Bank managers aect
project success by introducing an alternative empirical tecniques (the value-added method),
and I consider what determines the assignment of a high-performing manager to a specic
country. This is relevant because there is little evidence that the organization and resource
allocation of development lenders aects their performance; in contrast, there is a consensus
that the recipient countries' own institutions and country-level dierences aect results (Isham,
Kaufmann, and Pritchett, 1997; Isham and Kaufmann, 1999; Casey et al., 2012; Olken et al.,
2012). Project managers are the only resource I focus on: their ability and skills are probably
the most important inputs available to, and used by, the World Bank, which can assign a
manager to particular countries over certain periods through various means (promotions, lateral
moves, incentives). On the receiving end, countries have an intrinsic interest in high-performing
managers, both because they channel innovative ideas (Gavin and Rodrik, 1995) and, especially,
because this makes it more likely that a loan will pass the World Bank's internal checks and
will be approved. Conceptually, this paper links the literature on bureaucrats/political selection
(Besley, 2005, 2006; Dal Bo, Dal Bo, and Snyder, 2009; Galasso and Nannicini, 2011) with the
mounting evidence for the positive role of management (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Bloom and
Van Reenen, 2007, 2010).
In order to measure the performance of World Bank managers and to understand what de-
termines their assignment to a country, I regress an indicator of project success collected by the
World Bank1 on several covariates, including manager and country xed eects (FE). These are
then extracted to dene the vector of manager eects (MEs) and of country eects (CEs), which
are the core of this work and are methodologically borrowed from the teacher{pupil literature.2
Inquiring into these eects gives rise to a surprising element: the variance of MEs is higher than
that of CEs. This is surprising because while country performance is a given element of World
Bank operations, and having high- and low-performing countries is an unchangeable issue, man-
ager performance is ultimately a choice variable through hiring operations. An implication of
this result states that the World Bank presents manager performance with a gap analogous to
that existing between Somalia (among the lowest-performing countries) and Latvia (among the
highest-performing countries). In order to verify the plausible interpretation of MEs and CEs as
respective indices of performance in delivering successful projects, I note the relation between
1The key measure of project performance is available for most projects and for over more than 30 years {
it is called the \project outcome rating". It represents a qualitative evaluation of the success of each project
against its ex-ante stated objective. This is explained in greater detail in Section 3.
2In this work, I establish a parallel between \teachers aecting student outcome in certain schools" and
\managers aecting projects in certain countries". As a result, I apply the teacher{pupil framework to the
World Bank project setting.
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predetermined manager curricula and MEs3 and between countries' institutional variables and
CEs.4
After the positive analysis to measure MEs and CEs, I move to a normative part and
propose a reform to boost the World Bank's eectiveness in the spirit of Hanushek (2009): I
reassign managers who are among the 10% worst-performing to non-project bureaucratic tasks
and I replace them with average managers. Unlike some of the teacher literature, all economic
indicators are available for this exercise and, therefore, I can directly estimate that such a reform
leads to the creation of an additional 800 million US dollars (USD) of returns generated by the
World Bank over the sample in analysis, in a condence interval of [414, 1,189], corresponding
to a 3.7% increase. Furthermore, using World Bank documentation, I evaluate the viability of
this reform and conclude that this delivers net gains of 624 (426) million USD under a moderate
(extreme) cost scenario, with a wide range included between 38 and 1,011 million USD.
With reference to the rule through which managers are assigned to countries, I inquire
into this by correlating Manager with Country Eects. Conceptually this exercise parallels
the worker-rm wage-determination literature, following the study of Abowd, Kramarz and
Margolis (1999), and the management and organization eld, in line with Bandiera et al (2015).
A theoretical framework predicts that the World Bank's attitude to risk guides its assignment
rule of managers to countries. I also allow some countries to put pressure on the World Bank
to receive high-performing managers by sitting in its board, as the \value of the seat literature"
suggests (e.g., Kuziemko and Werker, 2006; Kaja and Werker, 2010). This model gives rise to a
proposition, which is brought to the data, and I verify that the empirical results are consistent
with the World Bank behaving as a risk-averse planner, assigning high-performing managers to
low-performing countries and with countries sitting on the World Bank board receiving higher-
performing managers during their board terms5. Because this last point might be a result of
reverse causality or third factors, exploit a unique feature of the World Bank's board elections
to provide some plausibly exogenous source of board access, which reinforces my results.
Among the possible settings in development economics in which to extend the teacher{pupil
work, the World Bank is ideal for at least three reasons. (1) The World Bank is one of the
largest and oldest development institutions, with methodologically consistent databases dating
back for more than 40 years. To exploit this feature, I join the World Bank Project Ratings
database with information on project managers and other nancial details and, in so doing, I
3As shown in a later section, the ME is correlated positively with managers holding a Master of Business
Administration (MBA), completing a degree in their own country, and the number of their publications, and
negatively with having work experience at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), experiencing a downgrading
(i.e., a demotion from a higher hierarchical position to a lower position), and having graduated in natural sciences
(i.e., medicine, mathematics, etc.). I also verify that MEs do not correlate with gender, experience, promotions,
and spoken languages. These regressions and others can be found in Appendix C.
4As shown in a later section, the CE is correlated positively with \good" institutional measures such as
parliamentary democracy, constraints on the executive, and an index of public infrastructure management, and
negatively with ethnic fractionalization, slave trade, and legal origins.
5The presence of a negative assortative matching between managers and countries diers substantially from
the results of the literature on the worker-rm wage determination, which nds evidence of positive assortative
matching between high-wage workers and high-wage rms using analogous xed-eects method (Abowd, Kra-
marz, and Margolis (1999), Andersson et al. (2012), Bagger, Sorensen, and Vejlin (2012)), Card, Heining and
Kline (2013).
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have access to 10,000 projects over a long span of time (from 1970 onward), comprising more
than 15 sectors, 140 countries, and 2,000 managers. (2) World Bank project managers can
be considered inputs to project success and in order to verify the plausibility of the manager
eects correlations, I collect their corresponding curriculum vitae (CVs) and information using
a variety of online sources (e.g., report biography, resume, LinkedIn prole). (3) Last, but not
least, the World Bank's institutional design and its governing board can be exploited to provide
some plausibly exogenous source of board access, as shown at a later stage.
This paper contributes to various debates. First, it advances the debate on the economics
and organization of not-for-prot and mission-oriented institutions (Besley and Ghatak, 2005;
Besley, 2006; Ashraf, Bandiera, and Lee, 2014), especially for what concerns development
lenders6 and the presence of political equilibria in resource allocation (Grossman and Helpman,
1994; Coate and Morris, 1995; Krishna, 1998; Besley, 2006; Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland, 2009).
In this respect, my work joins a sizable body of literature on World Bank projects, which has
already explored these data and provided useful insights into public policy and development
lending (Chauvet, Collier, and Duponchel, 2010; Kilby, 2013, 2015; Presbitero, 2016). As
previously mentioned, this paper advances the work of Denizer, Kaufmann, and Kraay (2013).
They carefully explore macro- and micro-determinants of project success, establishing that
within-country variation exceeds the between-country component, and they were the rst to
explore the role of project managers as the key to project success. In line with their initial
contribution, two additional papers have carefully replicated and extended their work, including
data also from the Asian Development Bank: Geli, Nobakht and Kraay (2014) and Bulman,
Kolkma and Kraay (2016).
Furthermore, these results contribute to the extensive body of research using the teacher
value-added framework (Hanushek, 1971; Gordon, Kane, and Staiger, 2006; Kane and Staiger,
2008; Chetty, Friedmand, and Rocko, 2013) and applying it to a management perspective.
Particularly, this work recalls the results on management and its performance-enhancing eects,
and is in line with the ndings of Bloom et al. (2013) in Indian rms, Bandiera, Barankay, and
Rasul (2013) for team incentives, and Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalez, and Wolfenzon (2012) for
chief executive ocers (CEOs). Last, but not least, this work adds to another body of literature
6Development lenders have been experiencing unprecedented growth and relevance in the aftermath of
the Great Recession, both multilaterally with the founding of new players (AIIB in 2015, and BRICS Bank
in 2012), and domestically as national development banks have stepped up in their asset growth. In the
UK, the Growth Report elaborated at the London School of Economics (LSE; Aghion et al., 2013) pro-
poses the creation of an Infrastructure Bank with all duties of a proper development bank to \to facilitate
the provision of stable, long-term, predictable, mostly private sector nance for infrastructure". However, in
emerging economies, development banks are on the rise: the China Development Bank (CDB), the Brazilian
Development Bank (BNDES), and the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) have all been grow-
ing rates exceeding 20% in the last few years. For Brazil, refer to the article \A ripple begets a ood",
The Economist, October 19, 2013, available at http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/
21588133-politically-inspired-surge-lending-weakening-state-owned-banks-latin; for China, refer
to the article \Massive Capital Injection to Chinese Banks is Credit Positive { Moody's", by M. North at Digi-
tal Finance Analytics Blog, August 24, 2015, available at http://www.digitalfinanceanalytics.com/blog/
massive-capital-injection-to-chinese-banks-is-credit-positive-moodys/; for South Africa, refer to
the DBSA's selection of publications, available at http://www.dbsa.org/EN/About-Us/Publications/Pages/
default.aspx.
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on the provision of public goods, the role of incentives, and selection of bureaucrats (Besley and
Ghatak, 2003; Besley, 2005; Cruz and Keefer, 2013; Keefer, 2013; Rasul and Rogger, 2016).
In the following section, I present the measurement of the MEs and CEs, including an
analysis of their main correlations and a few robustness checks. In Section 3, I present the
core results of this paper on MEs and CEs. In Section 4, I study the assignment of managers
to countries, illustrating with a theoretical model the problem faced by the World Bank as a
planner and the instrumental variables (IVs) used for the analysis. In Section 5, I oer some
concluding remarks.
2 Measurement and Data
2.1 Conceptual Framework
In this paper, I focus on deriving a xed measure of managerial performance, and I interpret
this as an input into project success. The idea of a ME is that there exists a set of individual-
specic abilities and acquired skills that contribute to the success of each project, regardless
of context-specic components. Because talents and skills are not observable, in the context of
my analysis I extract an index of managerial performance by regressing an indicator of project
success on manager xed eects. I can then extract such eects and \rate" each manager based
on how many \success points" they bring to a project. Statistically, I interpret this xed eect
as the conditional average performance of a manager, while conceptually the manager eect
embodies a richer set of ability and acquired skills.
Under the assumption that such inputs are time-invariant, or that their time-changes are
negligible, then the following framework, based on a general cumulative model of student
achievement used in labor economics (Todd and Wolpin, 2003), can be used. I indicate with
yimcst the success of project i, led by manager m, in country c, of sector s, at year t, and model
it through the following function
yimcst = yimcst[Mi(t); Ci(t); Si(t);	i; "imcst]:
Here, Mi(t), Ci(t), and Si(t) represent the entire histories of manager-, country-, and sector-
specic inputs into project i7, respectively, whereas 	i embeds time-invariant characteristics
of an individual project, and "imcst is an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) mean
zero error.
While this model is dicult to estimate because of the high-dimensionality problem, it can
be simplied and brought to a simpler expression through ve assumptions.
Assumption 1 The project success function is additive and separable in its arguments.
7A history of country and sector specic inputs may represent a variety of cumulative knowledge that has
built at country/sector level in generating a project (i.e. setting the appropriate quality controls, characterising
the group of suppliers, structuring the auction procedures).
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This leads to the following expression
yimcst = 1Mmt + 2Mmt 1 + : : :+ tMm1 + 1Cct + 2Cct 1 + : : :+ tCc1
+1Sst + 2Sst 1 + : : :+ tSs1 + 	i + "imcst;
where the success of project i depends not only on the contribution of manager m on i at
time t, but also on its past history, and a similar story applies to country and sector inputs.
This model could not be plausibly estimated unless information on past manager m inputs on
project i were available, which leads to the following assumption.
Assumption 2 Manager's inputs into the success of project i are constant over time and
captured by a manager-specic eect m.
This assumption is fundamental and shuts down any possibility of managers compensating
for poor country or sector inputs. Therefore, the project success model can now be rewritten
as
yimcst = m + 1Cct + 2Cct 1 + : : :+ tCc1
+1Sst + 2Sst 1 + : : :+ tSs1 + 	i + "imcst:
However, this model relies on as yet unavailable information, and therefore, in order to reach a
more compact expression, the following assumption is made.
Assumption 3 Past inputs of country c and sector s into the project i decay at a geometric
rate .
Such simplication permits us to summarize the model as follows:
yimcst = m + Cct + Cct 1 + : : :+ t 1Cc1
+1Sst + 2Sst 1 + : : :+ tSs1 + 	i + "imcst: (1)
At this stage, I can dene the success of a project j by manager n in country c in period t  1
as
yjncst 1 = n + Cct 1 + Cct 2 + : : :+ t 2Cc1
+Sst 1 + Sst 2 + : : :+ t 2Ss1 + 	j + "jncst 1;
and I describe the average project success in country c at time t  1 by summing over all Nt 1
projects j:X
j
yjmcst 1
Nt 1
=
X
j

Nt 1
X
h
nh

+ Cct 1 + Cct 2 + : : :+ t 2Cc1
+Sst 1 + Sst 2 + : : :+ t 2Ss1 +
X
j
1
Nt 1
(	j + "jmcst 1):
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This expression can be simplied by recalling that the project-specic characteristics average a
constant X
j
	j
Nt 1
= P;
while, relying on a weak law of large numbers, the previous period's error-term mean converges
to the population mean of zero X
j
"jmcst 1
Nt 1
= 0:
Finally, if the numbers of managers operating in country c at time t   1 are suciently large,
described via Nht 1, then we can normalize the average manager performance input to zero.
Therefore, if the country experienced a suciently high number of managers, then by the weak
law of large numbers X
h
nh
Nht 1
= 0:
Therefore, the previous period's average project success can be rewritten as
yct 1 = Cct 1 + Cct 2 + : : :+ 
t 2Cc1
+Sst 1 + Sst 2 + : : :+ t 2Ss1 +
X
j
1
Nt 1
(	j + "jmcst 1):
If we pre-multiply by  and subtract this expression from equation (1), then
yimcst = yct 1 + m + Cct + 1Sst + 	i + P + "imcst:
Assumption 4 Inputs by country c and sector s into the project i at time t can be expressed
through three additive components (i.e., a country-specic component, a sector-specic compo-
nent, and a time-varying component):
Cc + Ss = c + s + t:
All of these assumptions lead to the following empirical model:
yimcst = yct 1 + m + c + s + t + 	i0 + "imcst: (2)
This compact model oers two central advantages: it can be estimated using the available data,
and it presents an intuitive interpretation for most of its parameters. In line with Denizer,
Kaufmann, and Kraay (2013), we are also estimating an equation in which the project outcome
indicator is regressed over country and manager xed eects. However, a key modelling dier-
ence is given by the inclusion of the lagged average project indicator, which removes elements of
country-specic time-varying characteristics and therefore leads the estimated manager xed-
eects to be closer to the value-added interpretation.
On the contrary, the model presents also some disadvantages that need to be clearly high-
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lighted: its central assumptions require the application of laws of large numbers that may not
necessarily be realistic; the simultaneous presence of a lagged dependent variable and xed
eects may introduce some bias (which we are able to quantify later) and, nally, the elimi-
nation of the error terms through the law of large numbers is important to enable consistent
estimation of the equation. Unfortunately many of these problems are common to the value-
added literature and are subject to a usual disclaimer on the relation between the generality of
the model and the specicity of the empirical setting. While some elements can be discussed
subsequently (for example focus on few large countries that present longer panels or show that
the measurement error at manager level does not systematically vary), some elements are to be
taken as given (for example the short manager panel).
2.2 Data
Here, I describe the various datasets used for this analysis. First, I dene the indicator of
project success. This is measured by the \Project Outcome" indicator from the World Bank
Project Rating database (from the \IEG historical project evaluations"), which is a collection
of ratings assigned by World Bank evaluation teams to all nanced projects since the early
1970s. This is the key database used in this analysis, and represents the starting point of this
project. In order to characterize MEs and CEs, I have integrated each project in this database
with the respective nancial information and manager identity, by consulting all project archival
documentation. In particular, because World Bank projects are long-lived and several managers
can be in sequential charge of the project, I exploit the dierent available project documentation
to extract information on the manager that presents the project to the World Bank board. This
is typically the manager involved in the construction and preparation of the project and gives
three advantages. First, this allows to consistently compare managers in the same position
across dierent projects. Second, as highlighted by Kilby (2015), project preparation is among
the most important determinants of project success and therefore these manager xed eects
are implicitly measuring this component. Third, the phases before project approval are those
involving an intense technical analysis, discussion with governments, implementing agencies
and World Bank internal units and these are the characteristics of a manager that this paper
intends to highlight.
The project evaluations are organized by the corresponding World Bank regional oce,
which, in consultation with the project manager, appoints a team of evaluators. These work
with other internal World Bank units and local authorities (i.e., borrower, implementing agency,
etc.), all of whom provide comments and participate in shaping the evaluation. This results in
a document, the \Implementation Completion Report", which assesses the project and provides
the synthetic ratings in a six-scale measure ranging from highly satisfactory (6) to highly un-
satisfactory (1), which are used in this analysis.8 Project outcome is dened as \the extent to
8More information can be found in Denizer, Kaufmann, and Kraay (2013) or at the following web
site http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTOPMANUAL/0,,contentMDK:
23071941~menuPK:4564187~pagePK:64709096~piPK:64709108~theSitePK:502184,00.html.
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which the operation's major relevant objectives were achieved", a synthetic measure of project
success.9
The World Bank project evaluation procedure presents some merits and limits. On the
positive side, given the standardized process of data evaluation, there emerges a clear set of
indicators, which are inter-temporally comparable and present key project information. The
importance of the evaluation is another useful element: as well as the evaluations organized
by the regional oce, the World Bank has its own "evaluation watchdog", the Independent
Evaluation Group (IEG), which is responsible for monitoring the evaluations and supervising
the procedures and responsibilities. The incentives of this internal authority are dierent from
other parts of the World Bank, for example they do not report to the President (head of the
administrative component), but directly to the World Bank Board, which is supposed to align
the incentives toward a more neutral and objective system. However this process is far from
perfect and there are a variety of elements that could weaken both the information content of
such ratings and, in general, their use. In my econometric analysis I try to address a multitude
of these. For example the indicators are measured toward a "stated" development objective,
which could automatically adapt its measure to recipient characteristics: worse countries may
be assigned more lenient development outcomes, which would potentially lead to automatically
higher evaluations. With this respect, I address this by studying within-country variation
and also showing that country eects are lower for lower-income countries, which counter this
hypothesis. Another line of argument could claim that some managers may be to inuence
project outcomes, reducing the correlation with development outcomes. While this bias may
be very hard to detect, in Appendix F I provide a few tests in this direction and show that my
manager eect estimates are robust to the inclusion of a manager lag-project outcome variable,
which may contain some of that manager time-varying bias.10.
The following additional databases are also collected and used for various tasks.
1. Individual Manager Characteristics. This is a collection of manager characteristics, mostly
based on individual CVs, which were collected using all available online resources (i.e.,
individual's web sites, LinkedIn proles, book biographies, etc.). In this way, I can ob-
serve for 210 managers (among the 694 in analysis) a few predetermined characteristics
(nationality, gender, experience, joining year, number of promotions/downgradings, ad-
vanced degrees, previous work experience, spoken languages and country of study, number
of publications, discipline studied) and characteristics during their job at the World Bank
(number of country changes, sector changes, total number of projects, average size of a
project). This database allows me to verify the correlations between MEs and manager's
9According to the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) Guidelines for Project Evaluation (see http://ieg.
worldbank.org/Data/HarmonizeEvalCriteria.pdf), project outcome includes an assessment for the relevance
of the project to the mission of the World Bank and the need of the country, the eciency with which resources
are used for the realization of the project, and the ecacy of the project in achieving the stated objectives.
10The ratings used in this analysis, ICR, are highly correlated with the IEG independent ratings and, in
general, there are career concern arguments that would discourage the alteration of project successes. World
Bank managers are not promoted on the direct basis of their project outcome, while engaging in a ght with
IEG over how a project was assessed can be very expensive in terms of reputation. For example in Appendix
C, I show that higher performing managers are not promoted more often.
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individual characteristics.
2. Countries Institutional Measures. I group some of the most common variables, capturing
countries' institutional features: parliamentary democracy and constraints on the exec-
utive (Besley and Persson, 2011), ethnic fractionalization (Easterly and Levine, 1997;
Alesina et al., 2003), legal origins (Acemoglu et al., 2001), slave trade (Nunn, 2008), and
a public infrastructure management (PIM) index (Dabla-Norris et al., 2012). Using this
database, I can verify whether the CEs correlate with measures of institutions, which
would be a natural predictor of the high performance in public good delivery.
3. World Bank Board Composition. Using all World Bank annual reports since 1980, I
digitize the composition of the board for all years, and I verify the evolution of the
electoral groups voting for a board seat (constituency groups in World Bank jargon), the
number of countries belonging to each in each year, and how new countries are assigned
to constituencies. This database is used in Section 4 to study the assignment of managers
to countries.
2.3 Empirical Method
In terms of methodology, the most recent literature has proposed two alternatives: an empirical
Bayes procedure, following Kane and Staiger (2008) and Chetty, Friedman, and Rocko (2013),
and a xed eect estimation, in the spirit of Bertrand and Schoar (2003) and Gordon, Kane,
and Staiger (2006). Because of the relatively short manager panel, I estimate the MEs using a
xed eect model11 as described by equation (2).
The conceptual framework introduced in equation (2) can be brought to the data through
the following regression:
yimcst =  + m + c + s + t + 1yct 1 +X1imcst2 +X2ct3 + "imcst: (3)
Here, yimcst is the project outcome variable indicating the success of project i, led by manager
m, in country c, of sector s, at time t; m, c, s, and t are the xed eects of manager, country,
sector, and time, respectively, X1imcst and X2ct are project- and country-level controls, while
yct 1 is the average project success of country c in period t  1, and emerges from the project
success model as a catch-all term of country time-varying heterogeneity.
11The xed eect estimation is more tractable and has a clear interpretation. In addition to this, as I show in
Appendix A, where I provide estimates using the empirical Bayes approach, there is high correlation (0.63{0.76)
between the estimates of these two models when possible. Furthermore, as shown in the next section, by looking
at the standard errors of the MEs, there is no systematic evidence of good or bad managers presenting higher
variability. However employing this method has obvious drawbacks because I cannot remove the measurement
error component from the MEs. The empirical Bayes approach has the advantage of disentangling the estimate
of the ME, using a minimum variance unbiased estimator (MVUE), from the reliability of the information,
expressed through a \shrinkage" parameter accounting for the signal-to-noise ratio. However, this procedure is
extremely data-intensive and relies on observing a very large number of projects per manager, over countries
and time. Unfortunately, my sample is not large enough to support this estimation and a value-added gure
would be available for less than 15% of the total.
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In order to be able to give a level interpretation to the xed eects, I introduce four nor-
malizations
m =
NmX
k=1
mk
Nm
= 0; c =
NcX
w=1
cw
Nc
= 0; s =
NsX
j=1
sj
Ns
= 0; t =
NyX
y=1
ty
Ny
= 0:
These impose that the average manager, country, sector, and year xed eects (i.e., m, c,
s, and t) are equal to zero. Imposing these normalizations is useful because in this way
the estimated xed eects only provide a notion of how productive a manager is compared
to the mean (a comparison across managers). These normalizations remove all elements of
manager/country quantitative comparison: it would have little value to state that a manager
contributes as much as a country to a project. Instead, I evaluate a manager by benchmarking
against an average manager (normalized to zero for simplicity) and, analogously, I benchmark
countries against a given zero-mean reference.
2.4 Sample Selection
At this stage, two fundamental features of the dataset need to be discussed. First, the identica-
tion of the MEs and CEs demands managers changing countries, countries changing managers,
and multiple managers operating at any point in time. If this was indeed absent, the two eects
would be perfectly collinear and their information indistinguishable. Secondly, because I am
also interested in studying the allocation of managers to countries and the eect of a country
sitting on the World Bank board on manager allocation, I exclude from my sample all projects
during which a country sits on the board (out-of-sample estimation). In this way, I measure the
MEs and CEs only for the years in which none of them operates through the board. Otherwise,
this might lead mechanically to the discovery of a correlation between these two variables, if
the presence of the board alters the technology of project returns.
For these two reasons, from the initial universe of 10,000 World Bank projects, I extract
a sample such that each country and manager presents at least three projects, which oers
support for the FE estimation: this restriction catches 3,385 projects from the initial 10,000,
and from this I observe that a manager changes, on average, 3.19 countries and 2.11 sectors,
while a country experiences 25.03 managers and 10.26 sectors. This is the main sample that
I use for the analysis. However, in estimating MEs and CEs, I further restrict the sample to
exclude projects performed while a country sits on the World Bank board.
This additional restriction leads me to exclude countries that always sit on the board and
are more geo-politically relevant (i.e., China, India, Russia, Bangladesh, and Argentina) and
this implies a further reduction, with the nal sample shrinking to 2,240 projects.
Therefore I proceed in the following way.
1. I use the restricted sample of 2,240 projects to calculate each ME and CE.
2. I match each ME and CE to the corresponding manager and country in the sample of
3,385 projects, which also contains the same countries while sitting on the World Bank
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board.
3. I aggregate the project-level data to country-year level, and investigate the manager-
country allocation.
From the universe of 2,218 managers, I restrict my attention to 642 managers (28.94%). In
Appendix F I show that this selected sample of managers does not dier from the remaining
pool of managers along few important characteristics: 1. they do not conduct more successful
projects on average; 2. their projects do not present higher economic rates of return (ERR);
3. the average interest rates on their projects are not statistically dierent from the other
managers; 4. the countries in which their projects take place do not record statistically dif-
ferent average GDP per capita, which might indicate a particular selection procedure for such
managers. As a result, though this is not a random sample, it seems to be representative along
many dimensions that this analysis develops.
3 Results
3.1 Descriptive Results
Table 1 reports the results of the empirical model described in equation (3). It is useful to note
that both the CEs and MEs are jointly statistically dierent from zero, while this is not the
case for the sector xed eects. For this reason, no policy experiment is conducted by varying
the number of sectors. It is also interesting to note that the lag of mean project outcome of
country c correlates negatively with the current project outcome, but is not signicantly dier-
ent from zero and is very close to zero in point estimate. This may seem surprising; however, in
alternative regressions, this changes as CEs are suppressed. Therefore, the information content
of this variable seems to be country-specic, time-invariant, and absorbed by the CEs.
An immediate concern from this estimation might be the relation between managers and
countries: I might articially nd that a manager operating in a highly performing country
receives a high xed eect estimate. However, this is not the case { indeed, there are large
within-country variations in MEs. Figure 1 provides graphical evidence, where the y-axis reports
MEs, the x-axis shows the CEs, and each dot is a project. Therefore, the negative correlation
and the substantial spreading out of managers for a country address possible concerns about
whether the ME might be indistinguishable from the CE.
Another argument against my estimates could highlight the high standard deviation of MEs,
0.807, and my estimates might be considered to be a mere consequence of sampling error caused
by the short manager panel. Though I cannot fully rule this out, I believe this to be a minor part
of the story. In order to counter this, the upper panel of Table 2 reports the summary statistics
of MEs for the whole sample and, in the lower panel, only for those managers with more than
eight, six, or four projects. By comparing the standard deviations in these dierent samples
(0.448, 0.468, and 0.571), it is clear that 0.807 might contain some noise due to managers with
few projects. However, there seems also to be some relevant information.
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Table 1: Estimating the MEs and CEs from World Bank Project Performance
Variables Project outcome
Lag project outcome  0.005 (0.042)
Constant 4.213*** (0.387)
FE country Yes
Number of countries 125
FE sector Yes
Number of sectors 15
FE manager Yes
Number of managers 642
FE year Yes
Number of years 31
Controls Yes
Number of controls 24
Observations 2,240
p-value of F -test on CEs 0.000***
p-value of F -test on sector FE 0.655
p-value of F -test on manager FE 0.000***
p-value of F -test on controls 0.000***
R2 0.462
Mean dependent variable 4.124
SD dependent variable 1.199
Note: This table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is project level and country, sector, manager,
and year xed eects are included. Standard errors are clustered at country level, with 125 units. Four
normalizations are applied to this regression and impose that the mean of the country, sector, manager, and
year FE are equal to zero, in order to simplify the level interpretation of the xed eects. \Project Outcome"
reports an ordinal rating assigned by the World Bank project manager to the outcome of the project, and is
interpreted as a measure of project success. The variable ranges from 1 (highly unsatisfactory) to 6 (highly
satisfactory) and the mean is reported in the row \Mean dependent variable". The rows beginning with \FE"
indicate the presence of the xed eect at country, sector, manager, and year level. The rows beginning with
\Number of" report the number of available countries, sectors, managers, and years available in the database.
The rows beginning with \p-value of F -test on" provide the results on a test of joint signicance on all xed
eects at country, sector, and manager level, and also a test on controls. The included controls are: (1) at
country level, population, exchange rate, real GDP per capita at constant prices; (2) at project level, the
size of the project in constant USD, the interest rate on the loan, the month of approval, two lending type
dummies, and 15 lending instrument dummies. The two mentioned lending types are, specically, \Investment",
for projects characterized by funding for governments to cover specic expenditures related to economic and
social development projects, and \Development Policy operations", which are types of projects aimed at the
provision of direct budget support to governments for policy and institutional reforms aimed at achieving a
set of specic development results. There are 15 mentioned lending instruments, which characterize dierent
nancial packages in which the projects are designed and delivered to countries, for example the Adaptable
Program Loan (APL), the Financial Intermediary Loan (FIL) or the Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL). All
the country-level controls, the size of the project, and the interest rate are measured in continuous units, with
approval month ranges in integers between 1 and 12, while the remaining are dummy variables.
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Figure 1: Scatter of MEs and CEs: Project Level
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Note: This gure shows a scatterplot, in which each dot is a project. It reports the associated MEs and CEs
estimated in Table 1. The MEs and CEs are the xed eects extracted from a regression of Project Outcome
over country, sector, manager, and time FE, indicated in equation (2).
Finally, it could be claimed that two sources of bias might aect my estimates. The rst
is the Hurwicz{Nickell bias (Hurwicz, 1950; Nickell, 1981), provoked by the presence in model
(1) of a lagged dependent variable combined with xed eects. Two arguments can assist in
addressing these claims. First, the Hurwicz{Nickell bias shrinks the xed eects toward zero,
analogously to an attenuation bias, and therefore pushes against the results that I present.
Secondly, because the panel is relatively large both in N = 125 and in T = 31, it is known
that such bias converges to a process O(1=T ), and is bound not to be larger than relatively few
percentage points.
The second source of bias might be the result of the omission of a dynamic manager{country
allocation rule. The conceptual framework in Section 2.1 implies that a manager{country
allocation is a repetition of static problems, and therefore the xed eect estimation catches
this aspect if MEs are constant and CEs present an additive idiosyncratic component. However,
a dynamic manager{country allocation rule might bias the xed eects, as the error component
would be correlated with the estimated MEs and CEs. In Appendix B, I explore the existence
of a dynamic manager{country allocation rule exploring the time-series dimension of manager
assignments, where I use country and manager performances at time t   1 to predict their
assignment at time t. I do not nd evidence of dynamic matching.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics on MEs and CEs
Variable Obs. Mean Std Dev. Median Max Min
(1) Manager Eects 642 0 0.807 0.062 2.268  2.491
(2) Country Eects 125 0 0.651  0.033 2.132  1.522
(3) Project Outcome 2,240 4.124 1.199 5 1 6
Manager Level: Dierent Number of Projects
(4) MEs: Number of Projects > 8 16 0.142 0.448 0.173 0.868  1.063
(5) MEs: Number of Projects > 6 46 0.033 0.468 0.130 0.868  1.063
(6) MEs: Number of Projects > 4 162  0.006 0.571 0.030 1.394  1.595
Note: This table reports the summary statistics of MEs estimated in Table 1, and the project outcome. MEs are
the xed eects extracted from a regression of Project Outcome presented in Table 1. In the upper panel, such
summary statistics are presented for all MEs, CEs, and Project Outcome; the lower panel reports the summary
statistics for all managers with more than eight, six, and four projects (rows (4), (5), and (6), respectively).
Project Outcome reports an ordinal rating assigned by the World Bank project manager to the outcome of the
project, and is interpreted as a measure of project success. The variable ranges from 1 (highly unsatisfactory)
to 6 (highly satisfactory), and the mean is reported in the row \Mean dependent variable" of Table 1.
Figure 2: 95% Condence Intervals of MEs
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Note: This gure shows the full sample of MEs. The y-axis reports the point estimate of the MEs from Table 1,
and the x-axis the rank of the manager. The thick blue line reports the point estimates. The upper green
dashed line and the lower red dashed line represent the 95% condence intervals of the point estimates.
3.2 A Validation of Manager and Country Eects
3.2.1 Inspecting Manager Eects
Here, I explore MEs and verify their correlation with project and individual characteristics.
Before this exercise, it is interesting to provide a descriptive assessment of the MEs by studying
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Figure 3: Density of MEs
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Note: This gure shows the density of MEs. The y-axis reports the density of the distribution, and it is clearly
noticeable that there is a thick left-tail of lower-performing managers.
Figure 2, which shows a blue line representing the MEs, with the upper and lower bounds
of the estimates shown in green and red, respectively. Because of the short manager panel,
manager standard errors are not small; however, both the bottom 10% and top 10% of MEs
are statistically dierent from zero in their 5th or 95th percentiles. A graphical example of the
existence of several \exceptionally bad managers" is evident from Figure 3, which reports the
density of MEs and shows a noticeable left-tail of low-performing managers.
In Tables 3 and 4, I present some ndings that support the interpretation of MEs consistent
with the conceptual framework introduced in Section 2.1. Table 3 correlates the MEs to the
manager's project characteristics: the length of a project in years (column 1), the number of
countries changed over the career (column 2), the number of sectors (column 3), the number of
managed projects (column 4), the average initial year in which a manager worked on projects
(column 5), and the average nancial size of projects (column 6). It is interesting to note that,
with the exception of column (1), there is almost no action across the other margins; hence,
this correlation states that more successful managers tend to complete projects more quickly
than others. In this setting, given this relatively comparable set of projects, time to completion
can be considered an alternative measure of success. Note that while Kilby (2015) nds that
project preparation time is a positive determinant of project success (time spent on the project
before its beginning), here I highlight that the actual project implementation time is positively
correlated with the corresponding manager eect (the time elapsed from project beginning to
end).
The next step is to relate MEs to individual characteristics, as presented in Section 2.2.
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Table 3: MEs and Project-Level Correlations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables MEs MEs MEs MEs MEs MEs
Project Length  0.0370**
(0.0163)
Number of Countries  0.0353
(0.0314)
Number of Sectors  0.0300
(0.0338)
Number of Projects  0.00954
(0.0138)
Average Year  0.00867
(0.00542)
Average Project Size 0.000445
(0.000368)
Observations 642 642 642 642 642 642
Mean Dep. Var. 0 0 0 0 0 0
Std Dev. Dep. Var. 0.807 0.807 0.807 0.807 0.807 0.807
Note: This table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is manager level and robust standard errors
are in brackets. MEs is the vector of xed eects (FE) extracted from a regression of Project Outcome over
country, sector, manager, and time FE, including 24 controls and the mean lag project outcome, as presented
in Table 1, column (1). Its mean and standard deviation are reported in the nal two rows. Project Length
measures the average number of years a project takes for each manager. Number of Countries is a continuous
discreet variable, reporting the number of countries over which a manager has shifted during a career. Number
of Sectors is a continuous discreet variable, reporting the number of sectors over which a manager has shifted
during a career. Number of Projects is a continuous discreet variable, reporting the total number of projects
executed by a manager during a career. Average Year is a continuous variable measuring the average year in
which the projects of a manager took place. Average Loans is a continuous variable, reporting the average loan
in constant USD held by a manager during an entire career.
Because not all the CVs of the 642 managers are publicly available, I am only able to analyze
a subsample of 210 managers for whom I can observe all the variables reported in Table 4 and
Appendix C. From this analysis, I nd that MEs do not correlate with gender, number of pro-
motions, year of joining the World Bank, years of experience, and number of spoken languages;
all of these results are shown in Appendix C. In Table 4, I report only the characteristics that
are signicant. Thus, high MEs are for managers who do not hold a degree in natural sciences
(i.e., medicine, mathematics, biology, chemistry), took an MBA, studied in their home countries
(rather than abroad), did not work for the IMF, have a higher number of publications, and
did not experience a downgrade in their career (from a hierarchically high position to a lower
position).
The rst four variables can be considered relatively pre-determined. For column (1), it
might be possible that the World Bank is unable to attract the best candidates from natural
sciences (especially medicine or mathematics) compared to other subjects, given that it oers a
relatively uniform benet package. Concerning the MBA variable, there might be other reasons
for this, especially in terms of motivation. MBA students have access to higher salaries and fast
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Table 4: MEs and Individual Correlations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables MEs MEs MEs MEs MEs MEs
Natural Sciences  0.317*
(0.172)
MBA 0.257*
(0.145)
Studied in Home Country 0.160
(0.107)
Former IMF  0.316*
(0.197)
Publications 0.00534*
(0.00327)
Downgrade  0.353***
(0.132)
Observations 210 210 210 210 210 210
Mean Dep. Var. 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Std Dev. Dep. Var. 0.745 0.745 0.745 0.745 0.745 0.745
Note: This table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is manager level and the standard errors in
brackets are clustered at nationality level. MEs is the vector of xed eects (FE) extracted from a regression of
Project Outcome over country, sector, manager, and time FE, including 24 controls and the mean lag project
outcome, as presented in Table 1, column (1). Its mean and standard deviation are reported in the nal two
rows. The right-hand side variables are collected from managers' CVs. Natural Sciences is a dummy taking
unit value if a manager studied for a bachelor degree in medicine, mathematics, biology, and chemistry. MBA
is a dummy taking unit value if a manager completed a Master in Business Administration. Studied in Home
Country is a dummy variable taking unit value if the manager conducted some, or all, of her/his study in the
home country. Former IMF takes unit value if a manager has past work experience with the International
Monetary Fund. Publications is a count variable for the number of publications. Downgrade is a dummy
variable, and takes unit value if a manager has been downgraded to a hierarchically lower position within their
career.
careers, and hence those choosing to work for the World Bank might hold a particularly strong
motivation for working in the development eld. The third variable is particularly interesting
and counter-intuitive, given that among the 210 managers, there are more than 70 represented
nationalities, on average those achieving degrees in their own countries (rather than abroad)
tend to present a higher xed eect. One explanation for this result may be due to cultural
assimilation: managers from particular regions (i.e., Africa) may be better equipped at working
in those regions the stronger is their regional exposure. Indeed, in the last decade the World
Bank has been re-directing its hiring toward local workers. However, this explanation is only
one of possible co-existent ones. Finally, work experience at the IMF is associated with lower
MEs. The remaining two variables are less pre-determined and might be a consequence of being
successful: higher MEs are positively associated with the number of publications and negatively
to a downgrade (being demoted from a hierarchically high position to a lower position).
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Figure 4: Bar Chart of Selected CEs
Note: This gure shows a bar chart of a selected sample of the CE distribution. The y-axis reports the point
estimate of the CE from Table 1, column (1). The x-axis gives the rank of the country. The rightmost countries,
coloured green, are classied in the top ve countries (i.e., Indonesia, Vietnam, Algeria, Latvia, Myanmar, and
Korea). The middle countries, coloured blue, are the ve countries around the mean (i.e., Panama, Lithuania,
Zimbabwe, Turkey, and Guinea). The leftmost countries, coloured red, represent the bottom ve countries (i.e.,
Central African Republic, Somalia, Timor-Leste, The Gambia, Republic of the Congo, and Dominica).
3.2.2 Inspecting Country Eects
In this section, I inquire into the determinants of CEs and their main correlates at institutional
level. The argument behind these robustness checks is that while MEs are thought to embed
managerial performance, the interpretation of CEs is ex-ante less straightforward. In general,
given the value-added interpretation, I can only describe a country with a higher CE as being
higher-performing.
In this section, I attempt to go beyond this and provide some correlations showing that these
xed eects are highly correlated with a well-known series of institutional indicators. While
this exercise does not lead to a conclusive interpretation of this eects, their information goes
in the direction of a loose denition of a measure of public good provision.
First, it is interesting to provide a descriptive assessment of CEs. Figure 4 reports a bar
chart, where I include the countries classied in the top ve and the bottom ve, and the ve
countries around the mean. Figure 5 reports the whole rankings including the 95% condence
interval around each estimate, and Figure 6 shows the density.
Figure 4 shows in green that some of the countries characterized by high CEs tend to be
generally considered development successes (i.e., Indonesia, Vietnam, Latvia, and Korea). The
bottom ve countries, indicated in red, are countries with severe conict problems, and still
with large poverty gaps (i.e., Central African Republic, Somalia, Timor-Leste, The Gambia,
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Figure 5: 95% Condence Intervals of CEs
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Note: This gure reports a bar chart of the 95% condence intervals for CEs. The y-axis shows the point
estimate of the CEs from Table 1, and the x-axis gives the rank of the country. The mean of the CEs is
indicated with a thick blue line showing the point estimates; the upper green dashed line and the lower red
dashed line represent the 95% condence intervals of the point estimates. The two countries with a spike in
their standard errors are Iran and Ivory Coast, which have a respective FE (and standard error of FE) of  0.310
(1.379) and 0.213 (1.792); their standard errors are twice as large as those of the other countries with the largest
standard errors.
Figure 6: Density of CEs
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Note: This gure shows the distribution of CEs. The y-axis describes the density of CEs, and it is noticeable
that there is a fat right tail of high-performing countries.
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Republic of the Congo, and Dominica).
From Figure 5, it is possible to verify that even if the condence intervals are not small,
the top 20% and bottom 20% (with few exceptions) can exclude a zero in their 5th or 95th
percentile. Figure 6 shows the distribution of CEs, highlighting a substantial group of top
performing countries, corresponding to a fat right-tail.
At this point, I inspect the long-run determinants of CEs. In Table 5, I regress the CE
estimates over some of the most common institutional variables: a parliamentary democracy
and high executive constraint dummy (Besley and Persson, 2011); slave trade (Nunn, 2008);
ethnic fractionalization (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Alesina et al., 2003), legal origins (Acemoglu
et al., 2001); the PIM index (Dabla-Norris et al., 2012). It is interesting to note that the CEs
correlate as expected with all these variables: positively with parliamentary democracy in
column (1), with high executive constraints in column (2), and with the PIM index in column
(4), and negatively with slave trade in column (3), with ethnic fractionalization in column
(4), and with legal origins in column (5). These results are in line with the expectation that
countries with a high eect (productivity in public projects) have better institutions in the
broad sense.
3.2.3 Robustness Checks
In this section I provide additional evidence on the estimated MEs, by proposing an exercise
analogous to that in Kane and Staiger (2008). By extracting the manager xed eects from
equation (1), I dene a \manager eects" vector, MEm =cm, which I now use as a regressor in
my analysis. Recalling the original model, equation (1),
yimcst =  + m + c + s + t + 1yct 1 +X1imcst2 +X2ct3 + "imcst; (4)
I dene the ME vector cm, which assigns to each manager a rating emerging from equation (4)
and I dene this as MEm. In the following checks, I use this as a regressor, verifying how it
changes at dierent levels of variation and introducing dierent controls. Therefore, the model
employed for robustness checks follows
yimcst = MEm + Cimcst + uimcst; (5)
where the project success indicator, yimcst, is run over the ME estimates, MEm, and a vector
of controls, Cimcst, which includes all the previous variables (yct 1; c; s; t;	i0) as well as new
variables. Under the hypothesis that MEs estimated in Table 1, column (1), are consistent,
then my null hypothesis is  = 1 for a vector Cimcst and deviations of  from the unit value can
provide some insights on the direction of this bias.
Conceptually, this exercise has a clear interpretation. Suppose I am eectively measuring
a manager's contribution to a project's success, then the introduction of additional controls or
the exploitation of dierent sources of variation should not aect the main results. If the ME
estimates measure the net eect of the manager on a project and not the result of other factors,
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Table 5: CEs and Institutional Correlations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables CEs CEs CEs CEs CEs CEs
Parliamentary Democracy 0.0803
(0.181)
High Executive Constraint 0.246*
(0.153)
Slave Trade  0.0285***
(0.0107)
Ethnic Fractionization  0.467*
(0.255)
English Legal Origins  0.605***
(0.162)
French Legal Origins  0.399**
(0.159)
PIM Index 0.414***
(0.103)
Observations 125 125 125 107 118 56
Mean Dep. Var. 0 0 0 0 0 0
Std Dev. Dep. Var. 0.651 0.651 0.651 0.651 0.651 0.651
Note: This table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is country level and robust standard errors are
in brackets. CEs is the vector of xed eects (FE) extracted from a regression of Project Outcome over country,
sector, manager, and time FE, including 24 controls and the mean lag project outcome, as presented in Table
1, column (1). Its mean and standard deviation are reported in the nal two rows. Parliamentary Democracy
and High Executive Constraint are the average of two dummy variables, which respectively take unit value if
a country is characterized as a parliamentary democracy in a given year or if it presents high constraints on
the executive (taken from Besley and Persson, 2011). These dummies are averaged over the time period of
this analysis (1980{2012). Ethnic Fractionalization is a continuous variable between zero and one, dened as
one minus the Herndahl index of ethnic group shares, as in Alesina et al. (2003). The legal origin variables
(English and French) are dummies taking unit value if a country's legal and judicial system are based on one
of the countries in brackets, as in Acemoglu et al. (2001); the omitted dummy is Socialist Legal Origins. Slave
Trade is the measure of the intensity of the slave trade in a country, dened as the natural logarithm of slave
exports normalized by a country's historic population (as in Nunn, 2012), interacted with a dummy taking
unit value for the 49 countries for which this variable is available. Finally, the PIM Index reports the public
infrastructure management index elaborated by Dabla-Norris et al. (2012).
then this should have a one-to-one correlation with project performance, whichever level of
variation is studied.
Hence, in this section, I run equation (5) and test the null hypothesis  = 1 for the following
cases.
1. Country{sector{year specics. The MEs might be contaminated by an assignment that
means that good managers are exposed to good countries/sectors in good years or good
countries for good sectors. This selection would bias my estimates, because I would
confound the ME with a dynamic matching eect. For this reason, I propose a set of
regressions where I control for country  year, country  sector, and sector  year
interactions, in dierent combinations.
2. Control for compensating eort at manager{country level. Suppose that a manager's ef-
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fort in a project depends on the past project performance of a country (e.g., there might
be arguments concerning political pressure or career concerns for which a manager would
vary their contribution to a project as a best response to previous failing projects). For
example, by exerting higher eort than usual after a failing project, a manager might
increase their probability of receiving a promotion; or, after a failing project, a country
might put pressure on the World Bank to provide a better manager. To address these
claims, I control for an interaction between the ME and lag project outcome, because a
standard omitted variable bias would arise. For this reason, I propose a set of regres-
sions where I control for manager  lag project outcome and then introduce successive
interactions (sector  project outcome, year  project outcome).
3. Control for country{manager and sector{manager pairwise FE. As a further robustness
check, I run the standard regression, replacing CEs with country  manager and, in
another form, with sector FE ME. For the pairwise country{manager FE, I am verifying
the within-country-manager cross-sector average contribution of a manager, while in the
pairwise sector{manager FE, I verify the within-sector-manager cross-country variation.
The tests are applied to the following databases.
 The original sample comprises 3,385 projects executed in 127 countries, in 15 sectors, over
31 years, and with 697 managers. In this database, I can apply checks 1 and 2,but I do
not have sucient observations to apply check 3 for all countries. The standard errors
are clustered at country level.
 For a large-country sample, I select the 10 largest recipients of World Bank operations,
who register 743 of all projects overall. This allows me to apply tests 1, 2, and 3 through
a country{manager pairwise FE, which is non-empty for 413 cases. The selected countries
(and the number of their World Bank projects) are Brazil (123), Indonesia (121), Mexico
(82), Pakistan (78), Colombia (74), Ghana (62), Morocco (60), Yemen (49), Philippines
(47), and Tunisia (47). In this case, I do not cluster at country level, because of the low
number of clusters, but rather at country{manager level. This has also the advantage of
presenting more than twice the average number of managers per country, compared to
the whole sample, which may make the estimates closer to the conceptual model.
In all three tests, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that  = 1. In some estimations, the
point estimate lies below one (0.8) and in others above one (1.3), but the results are generally
in line with the value-added literature. All the plausible biases that I presented in tests 1{3 are
likely to be in place, although their magnitudes might be small enough not to invalidate the
previous ndings. All the tables can be found in Appendix F.
3.3 Evaluating a Reform
In this subsection, I explore the rst-order gains that the World Bank would achieve by re-
placing the 10% worst-performing managers with average managers, and moving them to other
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administrative tasks. Before discussing any reform that might aect project success, I need to
present the benchmark against which any alternative can be compared. For this purpose, I use
the results from Table 1 and construct the predicted outcome of a project, y^imcst:
y^imcst = ^ + ^m + ^c + ^s + ^t + ^1yct 1 +X1imcst^2 +X2ct^3: (6)
This indicates the success of project i predicted in the presence of a manager m, in country c,
in sector s, at time t, and by all project and country observables. In equation (6), the vector of
MEs, ^m, is key because it embeds the average manager contribution to a project. Therefore,
a reform that aects the success of project i by replacing manager m with an alternative m
results only in a change of the ME vector ^m only for the row with project i. In this specic
case, the row i of the ME vector ^m is replaced with the FE of the new manager m
.
In this way, I can construct alternative project success measures by introducing dierent
manager rules. Here I focus only on one reform, CR, meant to increase the average rate of
project success. This assigns all managers with an ME in the bottom 10% to a generic non-
project bureaucratic task, and imposes in those projects the hiring of new managers with an
average ME. Managers in the bottom 10% of the ME distribution add to the success rating of a
project between  1.08 and  2.49 points: considering that the project outcome average is 4.1,
then a manager in the bottom 10% reduces success by roughly 25%{60%.
The reform treatment group is composed only of those projects that are given a manager
from the bottom 10%: in the counterfactual analysis, only these projects are passed on to an
average manager, who presents a normalized ME of zero. Such a reform aects just 190 projects
out of 2,240 (8.4%). All projects with a manager in the remaining part of the ME distribution
are unaected, and I am implicitly assuming that there are no general equilibrium eects of
hiring new managers and moving old managers to other departments, and that there are no
externalities in eort and motivation for existing managers. Therefore, the predicted outcome
of a project in the presence of a reform, y^CRimcst, is given by
y^CRimcst = ^ + ^
CR
m + ^c + ^s + ^t + ^1yct 1 +X1imcst^2 +X2ct^3 (7)
where equation (7) diers from equation (6) only for the vector ^CRm , which equals its estimated
counterpart ^m. The sole exception is that I am substituting the lowest 10% values (between
the 10th percentile,  1.08, and the lower end of the support,  2.49) with a zero, the average.
Using this method, the gains in project outcome for those projects i under the reform, CR, are
y^CRimcst = y^
CR
imcst   y^imcst: (8)
Table 6 provides the summary statistics of such a gain for the treated projects only, keeping
in mind that the untreated projects record no change. Rows (1) and (2) present the summary
statistics of these projects before and after the reform, respectively, and row (3) presents the
dierence between the two (i.e., the gain). The most important result is given by the substantial
extent of the increase: on average, a project increases its success score by 1.476 points out of a
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pre-reform mean of 3.073, which is almost a 50% boost. Because the predicted project returns
may exceed the maximum rating of 6, in Appendix C we report an alternative table in which
the results of Table 6 are correspondingly adjusted: the key nding is slightly lower (1.321
versus 1.476), but still very large.
Table 6: Summary Statistics of a Reform (CR)
Variables Obs. Mean Std Dev. Median Min Max
(1) Project Outcome: Predicted 190 3.073 1.582 2.960  0.249 6.727
(2) Project Outcome: CR 190 4.550 1.584 4.416 1.305 8.161
(3) Project Outcome Gain: CR 190 1.476 0.340 1.407 1.075 2.491
Note: This table reports the summary statistics of gains in the outcome of those projects involved in the reform,
CR. The Project Outcome Gain is dened as the dierence between the new counterfactual project outcome
minus the project outcome predicted by model (3). The reform, CR, simulates what would happen if the World
Bank were to reassign the 10% worst-performing managers to non-project tasks and were to replace them with
average managers. A description of the experiment can be found in the text.
3.3.1 Calculating the Economic Gains of a Reform
Here, I propose a calculation for the economic gains of the reform. Until this point, I have
focused my attention on the project rating measure, yimcst, as an ordinal measure of success,
and have estimated the extent to which this variable would vary with the reassignment of
managers/countries. Now, I go a step further and exploit information from the economic rate of
return (ERR) of the project. These two variables are conceptually and intimately related. Table
7 highlights the fact that each additional point in the project outcome rating, which indicates
a more successful project, does translate to roughly four extra points of ERR. Therefore, once
the ERR denition is taken seriously, I can evaluate the economic gains of the two reforms
and provide some million-dollar measure estimates. As Duvigneau and Prasad (1984) have
formalized in a World Bank technical publication (for more details, also refer to Squire and
Van der Tak, 1975), the ERR measures the internal return of a project by accounting for the
costs incurred and the gains generated by its realization, and adjusting market prices to reect
the eects of the project.12 This analysis relies on considering World Bank projects as a single-
period investment, delivering a certain return (expressed through the ERR) and at a given cost
12Specically, Duvigneau and Prasad (1984) indicate that the ERR \treats import duties, sales taxes, prot
taxes, and other government levies (or subsidies) as internal transfers within the country and disregards them,
since they do not aect the overall wealth of that economy. It also uses `shadow prices' (see para 6.03 below)
instead of domestic input and output prices, in case they do not adequately reect the opportunity costs to the
economy. For traded goods, shadow prices (or economic prices) are international (or world) prices at the border
of the country (border prices) [. . . ]. For non-traded goods (for example, land), the economic cost is dened as
the value of net output foregone (when using that good in the best alternative use) as a result of using that good
in the project. Use of shadow prices enables one to see beyond the eects of taris, exchange rates, interest
rates, and wage rates, as well as administered prices, subsidies, and surcharges that distort a product's true
scarcity value. It enables one to measure an investment's eciency of using the resources of an economy, priced
at border prices." The ERR diers from the nancial rate of return (FRR) because this supposedly reects the
general equilibrium eects of a project. For this reason, the ERR of a project can largely exceed its FRR, if it
alleviates some binding development constraints.
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Table 7: ERR and Project Outcome
Variables Ex-post ERR
(1) (2) (3)
Project Outcome 4.803*** 4.776*** 3.706***
(0.841) (0.846) (0.913)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Manager FE Yes Yes
Controls Yes
Mean Dep. Var. 23.6 23.6 23.6
Observations 840 840 840
Adjusted R2 0.361 0.369 0.873
Note: This table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is project level and country, sector, manager,
and year xed eects are included. Standard errors are clustered at country level. The ERR at the end of a
project (i.e., ex-post ERR) is a continuous variable, dened in a World Bank technical paper by Duvigneau
and Prasad (1984) as the economic merit of a project by accounting for the gains and costs caused by the
project. Its mean is reported in the \Mean Dep. Var." row. Columns (1), (2), and (3) report the results of
a regression of the ERR over country, sector, manager, and year xed eects, including all the 24 previously
used controls. The included controls are: at country level, the population, exchange rate, GDP per capita, the
GDP share of consumption, government spending and investment, and population density; at project level, the
size of the project in constant USD, the interest rate on the loan, the month of approval, two lending type
dummies, and 15 lending instrument dummies. The two mentioned lending types are, specically, \Investment",
for projects characterized by funding for governments to cover specic expenditures related to economic and
social development projects, and \Development Policy operations", which are types of projects aimed at the
provision of direct budget support to governments for policy and institutional reforms aimed at achieving a
set of specic development results. There are 15 mentioned lending instruments, which characterize dierent
nancial packages in which the projects are designed and delivered to countries (e.g., APL, FIL, and SAL).
(the interest rate). A richer analysis would take into account the multi-period component of
projects, and the corresponding compounding of returns. While this is a topic which would
require additional discussion, at this stage I am focusing on the one-period assumption as in
(Duvigneau and Prasad (1984), Squire and Van der Tak (1975)), acknowledging the importance
of this extension, which would however only lead to larger estimates for the returns of such a
reform.
Using the results presented in Table 6, I can calculate how the reform aects the generation
of the ERR. Recalling that the replacement of managers (i.e., the reform, CR) resulted in
an increase in the project success rating for each project (on average, 1.476 points), then the
average increase in ERR for the 190 projects j treated by this core reform is
4ERRCRj = 4ERR4SuccessCR:
By exploiting the results of Table 7, I can construct this counterfactual ERR gain as the product
of the marginal eect of an increase in project success on ERR (3.706 from column (3) of Table
7), 4ERR, times the average gain in project success generated by the reform, 4SuccessTj.
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This leads to the following:
4ERRCR = 3:706 1:476 = 5:470 2 [2:829; 8:111]:
Therefore, the reform increases the average ERR of treated projects by 5.470 points, with a
95% condence interval shown in brackets (which accounts for the standard errors of the impact
of project outcome on ERR). Recalling that the average ERR of a project is 23.6 percentage
points, this implies a 23% increase.
I can also dene the economic gains of project i led by manager m in country c in sector s
at time t, Gainimcst ,
Gainimcst = (ERRimcst   Int:Rateimcst) Amountimcst;
as the product of its economic rate of return, ERRimcst, minus the interest rate of the project,
Int:Rateimcst, times the constant million-dollar amount of the project, Amountimcst. It is
important to highlight that because in the denition of ERR given by Duvigneau and Prasad
\interest charges are excluded", I subtract these from the denition of gains.
Unfortunately, ERRs are only available for 840 of the projects in my sample (37.5%), and
for this reason I cannot extend the previous calculation without further work. Under the
assumption that the projects with an available ERR are a representative sample, I can construct
a predicted ex-post ERR using the coecients of Table 7, column (3). Hence, I have an empirical
analogue available for all projects, dERRimcst.
Because all the required information is available, I can calculate the overall economic gains
of the reform CR by summing the economic gains of each individual project
GainCR =
X
i
( dERRTimcst   Int:Rateimcst) Amountimcst; (9)
where the ERR of project i varies for those projects that are treated by the reform CR. This
calculation gives rise to the gures reported in Table 8. Row (1) reports the aggregate economic
gains by using the observed interest rates, project amounts, and predicted ERRs, while Row
(2) shows the aggregate gains once the 10% worst-performing managers are replaced with
their means. The \Total Gain" column indicates a gure in billion constant dollars of the
economic returns generated by World Bank projects in my sample, with its 95% condence
interval presented in the next column. In order to have some quantitative interpretation of
these reforms, the column \% Increase" shows the percentage increase in the total gains by
introducing the reform (i.e., 3.7%). As a reference, I also present the column \Total Spending",
which shows an aggregate gure of the whole resource spent by the World Bank. Comparing
the gains with the spending, we can dene the ratio as how many dollars the World Bank
produces by lending one dollar to a country. In this case, we can see from my sample that
the World Bank produces 12.8 constant dollars of net returns for every 100 dollars lent to a
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country, which increases to 13.3 after the reform13.
Table 8: Economic Gains of a Reform
Variables Projects Total Gain 95% Interval % Increase Total Spending
(1) Economic Gains: 2,240 21.895 170.216
Predicted
(2) Economic Gains: 2,240 22.697 [22.309, 23.084] 3.7% 170.216
Reform
Note: This table reports the economic gains generated by the World Bank, using equations (7) and (9). Row (1)
reports the observed economic gains, while row (2) reports the counterfactual gains by respectively replacing the
10% worst-performing managers and countries with their respective means. The column\Total Gain"(expressed
in billions of constant USD) reports the aggregate sum of economic gains in all World Bank projects. The column
\95% Interval" reports the 95% condence interval of the Total Gain, where instead of multiplying the project
outcome gain by the point estimate of Table 7, column (3), I use the 95% condence interval of this estimate.
The column \% Increase" reports the percentage increase in economic gains by applying the reform of manager
reassignment. \Total Spending" accounts for the aggregate World Bank spending on all projects, in billions of
constant USD.
3.3.2 Cost{Benet Analysis
Here, I report a cost{benet analysis of this intervention, comparing the gains of the core reform
with its cost. While the gains have already been explained, the costs comprise two components:
the hiring and search costs for 66 additional average managers. From the 2013 World Bank
Annual Remuneration Disclosure Note,14 it can be seen that a manager costs roughly 300,000
USD per scal year, composed of a tax-free average salary of 188,958 USD, and other benets
(e.g., health insurance, termination benets, family allowances) amounting to 108,027 USD.
In order to provide a lower-bound (and upper-bound, in brackets) estimate of hiring costs, I
consider for all managers a payment period of 8 (16) years, which means that they are hired at
the age of 54 (46) and paid until the mandatory World Bank retirement age of 62. This leads
to a lower-bound (upper-bound) scenario of hiring costs for all 66 managers totaling 178 (376)
million USD.
Regarding the search costs, I assume that in the lower-bound (upper-bound) case the search
for an average manager costs one (three) full yearly manager salary. This means that 19.8 (59.4)
million USD are dedicated only to search costs. In Table 9, I report a synthetic summary of
the overall cost{benet analysis of this reform, considering the 95% condence interval bounds
13One possible concern might be that by using the predicted ERR for projects without a published rate,
I might be treating analogously very dierent projects. Indeed, looking at Figure E1 in Appendix E, it is
noticeable that most of the projects with unpublished gures tend to record negative rates of return. For this
reason, I perform the same exercise in Table E1, under two alternative assumptions for projects with a missing
ERR. In the upper panel, I replace all projects with a negative ERR with a zero; in the lower panel, I replace all
negative gures with the mean ERR. These produce the obvious eect of inating the gure of the total gains
produced by the World Bank by three and ve times, respectively. Correspondingly, this reduces the percentage
extent of the reform, from a 4% increase in Table 8 to an increase between 3% and 0.2% in Appendix E. Clearly,
the absolute estimate of the increase in the gains generated by the World Bank does not change, whichever
accounting device is used (i.e., 0.8 billion USD).
14Refer to the following World Bank document, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTANNREP2013/
Resources/9304887-1377201212378/9305896-1377544753431/Remuneration.pdf.
120
(in the upper- and lower-bound columns). On average, this reform delivers 624 million USD
under a moderate scenario, and 426 under an extreme scenario; under no circumstances is the
reform not viable, and the gains are always strictly positive and included in a range between
38 and 1,011 million constant USD.
Table 9: A Cost{Benet Analysis of a Reform
Variables Projects Average Upper Bound Lower Bound
Panel A: Lower-Bound Scenario of Hiring Cost
(1) Gains of the Reform 2,240 802 1189 414
(2) Costs of the Reform 2,240 178 178 178
(3) Total 624 1,011 236
Panel B: Upper-Bound Scenario of Hiring Cost
(4) Gains of the Reform 2,240 802 1189 414
(5) Costs of the Reform 2,240 376 376 376
(6) Total 426 813 38
Note: This table reports the cost{benet analysis gains of the reform aecting the World Bank. Panels A and B
report dierent scenarios on the costs of the reform, under moderate and extreme scenarios, respectively. Rows
(1) and (4) report the gains of the reform, as calculated in the previous sections, rows (2) and (5) report the
costs of the reform including both the hiring and search costs, while rows (3) and (6) report the sum of these
two. The Average column expresses the average costs and benets of the reform. In the Upper Bound and
Lower Bound columns, I introduce the 95% condence interval bound estimates for the gains. All gures are
expressed in constant international 2005 million USD.
3.3.3 The Results of a Reform
In this section I take stock of the results of the reform in analysis. The objective of this exercise
is to improve the results achieved by the World Bank by assigning the 10% worst-performing
managers to non-project bureaucratic tasks, and replacing them with average managers. Be-
cause several economic indicators are available at project level (the USD amount of each project,
its interest rate, the ERR, etc.), I can account for the benets and the costs of such reform.
It is important to notice that given the available sample, such reform aects relatively few
under-performing managers and projects, respectively only 66 and 190. I nd the following
results.
First, projects in which an under-performing manager is replaced by an average manager
experience on average a 50% increase in their success rating (as measured by the project outcome
variable, from 1.476 points out of a pre-reform mean of 3.073). Secondly, such increase in project
performance maps into an average increase in the economic rate of return of treated projects by
23% (the reform leads to 5.470 average points added to treated projects, compared to a mean
of 23.6 points). Thirdly, higher returns on projects translate in the creation of an additional
800 million USD of returns generated by the World Bank, corresponding to a 3.7% increase.
Finally, by consulting World Bank documentation, I am able to provide plausible cost scenarios
to evaluate the viability of the reform, which would deliver net gains of 624 (426) million USD
under a moderate (extreme) cost scenario, with the range included between 38 and 1,011 million
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USD15.
4 Manager and Country Assignment
4.1 Theoretical Framework
In this section I study the assignment of managers to countries, and I focus on the role of
institutional risk aversion. My approach captures a rst-order feature of the manager allocation
problem and ample ocial documentation and articles point to this feature being central in the
institutional culture at the World Bank16.
4.1.1 Environment
A planner (i.e., the World Bank) has access to N managers and decides their assignment to N
countries. All of these are endowed with a given measure of performance in generating project
returns, which is constant, xed per individual and does not respond to the performance of
the assigned country. This is conceptually equivalent to the ME described in the previous
sections, and this is perfectly observable to the planner. Manager performance is described by
mi, and ordered so that the Nth manager presents a higher performance than the N   1th
manager, the N   1th presents a higher performance than the N   2th, and so on. Hence,
mN > mN 1 > : : : > m1. Analogously, country performances are described by cj, are xed
and unchangeable and the same normalization follows cN > cN 1 > : : : > c1. However, the
planner observes in every period a noisy performance for countries, and therefore cjt = ecj + "jt
and "jt  i:i:d:(0; 2). I simplify the dynamic allocation as a repetition of static problems, and
therefore in the remaining sections I omit the subscript t. In addition to this, I normalize both
performances so that the average manager and country performance equals zero:
m =
X
i
mi
N
= 0 and c =
X
j
cj
N
= 0:
This assumption simplies the modeling and allows an interpretation of MEs and CEs in the
following sections.
15Given that my sample spans across several countries and years, these results are to be considered a counter-
factual aggregated lump-sum generation. An appropriate interpretation of these results could be the following:
"the World Bank would have generated additional 624 million USD between 1980 and 2010 by replacing the
bottom 10% under-performing managers with average managers, caeteris paribus".
16For example, the World Development Report 2014 (World Bank, 2014) specically addresses the issue. In
fact, \The World Bank Group is currently undergoing a transformation, which calls for shifting the institutional
culture regarding risk from one of extreme risk aversion to one of informed risk taking". This is indeed consistent
with anecdotal evidence on the internal bureaucratic practices that encourage risk aversion from an institutional
perspective: \as the (project approval) process has evolved over time, it has accrued layers of bureaucracy that
require sta to `bullet-proof' their projects before these even make it to the approval stage" (Stephens, 2014).
However, this is not the only possible explanation in line with the empirical results. Other explanations are
admissible and possibly co-existent. For example, the results could be rationalized through a purely technological
story: a submodularity in the project return production function with respect to MEs and CEs.
122
There are two stages in this game. First, the planner assigns manager i to country j,
indicated asmi;j. Secondly, the project is successful with probability , and hence they generate
returns in a project with a linear technology yi;j = mi;j + cj; otherwise, the project fails, and
with probability 1   such returns are zero.
Planner preferences are described by a quadratic Bernoulli with risk parameter  over
total returns, Y =
P
j yi;j, U(Y ) = Y   Y 2. Because manager and country performances are
normalized to zero, this expression simplies only to the variance component of project returns;
in Appendix A, I show that this is described by V (Y ) = (1=N)
P
j y
2
j . Therefore, the optimal
allocation of manager i to country j emerges from
max
mi
   1
N
X
j
(mi;j + cj)
2:
In this setting, the planner risk attitude, , governs the assortative matching of the allocation:
fmi;j; cjg : i; j =
8>>><>>>:
lli; N + 1  i if  > 0 (negative assortative match)
i; 8j if  = 0 (undetermined match)
i; i if  < 0 (positive assortative match):
Thus, the couple fmi;j; cjg is assigned through a negative assortative matching rule if the
planner is risk averse ( > 0), through an undetermined rule if the planner is risk neutral ( =
0), and through a positive assortative matching if risk loving ( < 0). In this context, I proceed
under the assumption that the planner is risk averse and verify this prediction empirically.
The board is introduced as a set B of N=2 countries, which are randomly assigned to
oversee the planner (Adams and Ferreira, 2007). Access to the board changes the incentives for
the planner, and I model this in a reduced form through a lump-sum transfer,  , going from
countries not on the board BC , to countries in B. The parameter  can have two interpretations,
as follows.
1. Rent-seeking { a planner needs to purchase board support to implement actions, and
this generates a menu-auction problem (Bernheim and Whinston, 1986; Grossman and
Helpman, 1994), which leads to transfer resources toward countries sitting on the board.
2. Technology { countries sitting on the board might be more open to work with the planner,
and such increases in communication might lead to a change in returns, justifying the
alteration in the optimal allocation.
Given this transfer, whichever justication is taken, the problem presents an important
change: the new overall returns are still equal to the previous returns because of linearity,eY = Y . However, the variance of project returns diers and the new problem can be written
as
max
mi
   2
N
X
j =2B
(mi;j + cj + )
2     2
N
X
j2B
(mi;j + cj   )2:
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This makes the new allocation dependent on whether a country sits on the board. Therefore,
under the risk-aversion assumption, the new allocation is described by
fmi;j; cjg : i; j =
8<:lli; f(;N + 1  i) if cj 2 Bi; f( ;N + 1  i) if cj =2 B :
This is still negative assortative, but the transfer  generates a board premium in the manager's
assignment, described by the parameter  and the function f(:). To clarify the intuition behind
this result, the main proposition is given here, and Appendix D reports a short example.
Proposition 1 The optimal allocation of a planner assigning manager i to country j results in:
(a) a negative assortative matching rule if risk averse ( > 0); (b) a manager board premium
for countries sitting on the board (j 2 B), (c) such a premium increasing in the extent of the
transfer,  .
4.2 Empirical Model
At this point, given that the manager and country performances are estimated through MEs
and CEs, I can bring the proposition to the data. To do so, I join the MEs and CEs from the
2,240 sample to the 3,385 sample, which includes projects for countries sitting on the World
Bank board. I aggregate the MEs at country{year level and analyze the following expression:
MEcgt = a1 + b1 Boardcgt + c1 CEcg +X2cgtd1 + g + t + "cgt: (10)
Here, the average ME of country c, belonging to constituency group g in year t, MEcgt, is
regressed over a board dummy taking unit value when a country c in constituency g in year t
sits on the board, Boardcgt. The level of analysis is at constituency level, and this is embodied by
the use of a constituency and year xed eect, g and t, respectively. The country heterogeneity
is caught through two components: the country eect, CEcg, which is constant per country over
time and is supposed to catch the direction of manager{country matching, and a few country
time-varying controls (GDP per capita, population, exchange rate) X2cgt. The core coecients
are b1 (to explore whether board access matters) and c1 (to understand the direction of the
assignment).
4.3 Board Election and Exogenous Variation
Before continuing to the empirical results, I need to mention a key institutional feature. World
Bank countries, both donors (i.e., high income) and clients (i.e., middle and low income),
are allowed to supervise the operations of the World Bank President and senior management.
For this purpose, they are joined in relatively small groups, called constituencies, which meet
every two years, hold a simple-majority election, and vote two countries for a board seat:
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one as Executive Director and another as Alternate Executive Director.17 By looking at the
composition of constituencies, it is clear that the allocation of a country to a group is not
random, because there are some clear determinants of constituency selection (e.g., geography,
World Bank access year, international status). As is clear from the previous section, in this
analysis I exploit only variation at the level of a country within a constituency. Indeed, there
is no country xed eect in equation (8), because this absorbs the estimated CEs, preventing
an understanding of the assignment rule.
As mentioned in the introduction, I exploit board election procedures to provide some plausi-
bly exogenous variation in board access. Constituencies are characterized by a diering number
of countries and dierent long-term agreements governing the rotations in the World Bank board
(Martinez-Diaz, 2008). While all countries belonging to the 17 voting constituency groups can
competitively campaign to reach a board seat, a completely dierent scenario emerges once a
country that has served on the board in the past term tries to be re-elected.
While, in principle, a country serving on the World Bank board should exercise control also
on behalf of all other countries in its electoral constituency, this is seldom the case, and there
is ample evidence of conict of interest in this respect.18 In particular, if a country manages
to obtain a board seat for a second term, this can be particularly valuable both because it is
possible to inuence decision-making and because procedural knowledge of board functioning
can provide a strong comparative advantage over newcomers to the board. For example, it is
explicitly acknowledged that the longest serving executive director enjoys the title and duties
of Dean of the board.19 In such a capacity, the Dean enjoys strong ties with the President (e.g.,
17At least one of these participates in board meetings, with the Alternate Executive Director enjoy-
ing voting power only if the Executive Director is absent. In this work, I do not distinguish between
the two, as both can supervise and provide their input into a variety of World Bank internal aairs. It
is also possible that one country enjoys both positions, although this is generally unlikely. For more
details on the procedure, refer to the World Bank's information on \Election or Appointment of Ex-
ecutive Directors" at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/BODEXT/0,
,contentMDK:20124813~pagePK:64020054~piPK:64020408~theSitePK:278036,00.html.
18For instance, the Zedillo Report (Zedillo et al., 2006) highlighted that\the current (World Bank) governance
arrangements create strong incentives for (board) Directors to prioritize only their duties as the representatives
of governments" (Zedillo et al., 2006, p. 32), and especially, concerning the possible transfer of resources aimed
at securing for the World Bank President and Senior Management a strong support in the board, \senior
Management has a strong incentive to ensure that the board approves Management proposals quickly and with
few changes" (Zedillo et al., 2006, p. 31). Analogous incentives seem to be in place at the IMF, where a 2008
survey (not taken at the World Bank) showed that 68% of former board members admit a conict of interest
in decisions between government interest and the IMF's institutional mission. However, in this work, I take a
normative-free stance on the role of boards, and only explore the allocation change that might arise when a
country is simultaneously a client and a controller of the lender.
19Further information from the Dean of the Board is provided through the page of the current Dean, Kuwait
Executive Director, Mr Merza Hussain Hasan. \Our Executive Director is the Dean of the board of Executive
Directors. The Dean of the board of Executive Directors is by practice the longest serving, full-time Executive
Director. The responsibilities of the Dean include the negotiation of the terms and conditions of the contract
of the President along with the Co-Dean. In addition, the Corporate Secretary consults with the Dean during
the process of informal consultations to select members of the board Ethics and Standing board Committees.
The Dean also chairs the meetings of the Steering Committee, which is the meeting of Executive Directors with
Senior Management to set the board's work program and organizes meetings for Executive Directors among
themselves or with Management, the UN or other high level experts to exchange views informally. The Dean
and Co-Dean of the board also coordinate with the Dean of the Fund's board on matters of mutual interest
such as the Annual Meetings, the remuneration of the heads of the two institutions, and corporate governance
issues." This information was accessed on October 2, 2015, and is available at http://www.worldbank.org/
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Figure 7: Probability of Board Election given Previous Board Experience
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Note: This gure reports the probability that a country c belonging to constituency group g sits on the board
at time t, given that it served on board in the previous year ( 1), two years before ( 2), and three and four
years earlier ( 3 and  4). These probabilities emerge from a regression where I control for a constituency and
year xed eect and country{year controls (GDP per capita, population, exchange rate).
the Dean is responsible for negotiating the terms of the President's contract), and has strong
agenda-setting power in central board committees.
Given the important role emerging from re-election, constituency groups have established
some diplomatic norms through long-term agreements on the extent that countries are allowed
to run for a second consecutive term. Figure 7 shows the probability that country c belonging
to constituency g sits on the board at time t, given that it was sitting on the board during the
previous year ( 1), two years before ( 2), and so on. Because of the two-year board mandate,
it is clear that sitting on the board at time t 1 predicts period t well.20 It is also expected that
being on the board four and three years ago has a negligible eect on current sitting. However,
it is less obvious that if a country was actually sitting on the board in the previous term (i.e.,
time t  2), then it is 10% less likely to sit on the board compared to other countries belonging
to the constituency group.
I argue that such negative correlation is due to the dierent diplomatic norms at constituency
level. Indeed, once I control for the heterogeneity of re-election norms at time t 2, the negative
eect becomes positive in the point estimate but not statistically dierent from zero, as shown
in columns (3) and (4) of Table 10. The heterogeneity in board re-election is displayed in
Figure 8, showing that the negative eect is fully given by a few constituencies that present
en/about/leadership/directors/eds11.
20The point estimate of this probability is 0.6, rather than 1, because there are cases in which a board member
may step down { some members are recalled to join their own countries' governments or other organizations,
and some voluntarily quit.
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Figure 8: Board Re-Election and Constituency Heterogeneity
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Note: This gure reports the probability of election for a country c belonging to constituency group g that sat on
the board at time t  2. This emerges by regressing the country board dummy at time t over the corresponding
dummies at t  1, t  2, t  3, and t  4, and an interaction between the t  2 dummy and constituency group
xed eects, plus constituency and time xed eects. As clear from the text, the probability of re-election is
partitioned into three groups: in the left-most group (constituencies numbered 11, 7, 14, 15, and 10), a country
who sat on the board at t  2 is 50% less likely of sitting on the board at time t; in the central group (numbers
9, 16, 23, 18, 20, 17, and 12), this probability drops to 20%; for the remaining group, there is no statistically
detectable dierence between countries who sat on board at t  2 and those who did not.
lower probabilities of re-election for their countries: there are ve constituencies in which a
country previously sitting on the board is 50% less likely than others to be elected; in the other
six, this probability is 20%, while for the remaining six, the election is open and competitive at
all times.
Therefore, my rst stage to instrument board access is given by the following equation,
Boardcgt =  +  Boardcgt 2 +
X
g
gBoardcgt 2  g +X2cgtd+ g + t + "cgt;
in which the probability that a country c in constituency group g sits on the World Bank board
at time t, Boardcgt, is regressed over a dummy for board access in the previous term, Boardcgt 2,
and an interaction between this variable and the constituency group xed eect, Boardcgt 2g,
the set of country time-varying controls, a constituency group and year dummies, g and t.
The fundamental driver for identication is given by Boardcgt 2  g because it accounts for
the heterogeneity in re-election norms.
My exclusion restriction rests on the assumption that conditional on a country's assignment
to a constituency and other controls, the heterogeneous diplomatic norms in a constituency
have no eect on the current manager's assignment to a country, except through the re-election
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Table 10: Board Access and First Stage: OLS
Variables Board (t)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Board t  1 0.647*** 0.617*** 0.604*** 0.569***
(0.0380) (0.0394) (0.0403) (0.0417)
Board t  2  0.113**  0.130*** 0.145 0.189
(0.0484) (0.0474) (0.124) (0.121)
Board t  3 0.0975* 0.0774 0.0639 0.0423
(0.0504) (0.0498) (0.0510) (0.0495)
Board t  4 0.105*** 0.0751** 0.0695* 0.0356
(0.0391) (0.0382) (0.0390) (0.0379)
Board t  2  Constituency FE Yes Yes
Constituency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes
Observations 1,347 1,347 1,347 1,347
Test 0.000*** 0.000***
Adjusted R2 0.426 0.441 0.442 0.459
Mean Dep. Var. 0.182 0.182 0.182 0.182
Std Dev. Dep. Var. 0.386 0.386 0.386 0.386
Note: This table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is country{year level and standard errors in
brackets are clustered by country  year. Columns (1) and (3) report unconditional results, while in columns
(2) and (4) I control for population, GDP per capita, and exchange rate. Board t takes unit value if country c
in constituency g sits on the World Bank board in year t, and analogously board t  1, t  2, t  3, and t  4. In
all regressions I control for constituency and year xed eects. In columns (3) and (4), I include an interaction
between board t 2 and the constituency xed eect in order to measure the heterogeneous probability in board
re-election, established by diplomatic norms. The estimates of column (4) of such interactive xed eects are
reported in Figure 8. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
probability this country enjoys in the constituency. A major concern here would be that the
heterogeneous re-election probabilities in a constituency are correlated with its bargaining power
with the World Bank and, hence, I am simply capturing its impact on a manager's assignment.
I believe this is unlikely for at least three reasons. First, constituencies do not have other
formal ways of voicing their opinion to the World Bank administrative bodies, except through
their board members. Second, among the 25 constituency groups, those holding elections enjoy,
generally, less bargaining power with the World Bank. In fact, the strongest constituencies in
terms of voting power are the eight single-country constituencies, which appoint their board
members directly { they enjoy a total vote share of 46.59%,21 equivalent to an average share
of 5.8% per country. In contrast, the remaining 17 constituencies enjoy a substantially lower
vote share (i.e., 3.1% per constituency group), which then is further diluted in single-country
vote shares. Third, because in the computation of the CEs I am excluding all countries that
permanently sit on the World Bank board, this analysis excludes countries that may have strong
21These countries are the United States of America (16.12%), Japan (7.47%), China (4.82%), Germany
(4.37%), France (3.92%), United Kingdom (3.92%), Saudi Arabia (3.02%), and Russia (2.95%). For data
regarding International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) vote share in 2013, refer to http:
//siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/278027-1215524804501/IBRDEDsVotingTable.pdf.
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bargaining power with the World Bank (China, India, Russia, Bangladesh, and Argentina).
4.4 Results
Table 11 presents the core results, with columns (1) and (2) reporting the OLS estimates,
while columns (3) and (4) report IVs; columns (1) and (3) report unconditional results, while
in columns (2) and (4) I also report controls. First, it is evident that a country sitting on
the World Bank board seems to enjoy managers with a higher eect in all cases. Secondly,
there emerges evidence of negative assortative matching, with the sign of the CE variable being
unambiguously negative and statistically dierent from zero.
Concerning the dierence between the OLS and IV estimates, the latter are 40%{70% larger
than the OLS, which might be entirely due to a local average treatment eect (LATE): this
IV captures variation in assigned managers for countries that enjoy a seat on the board for a
second period. Because institutional experience might give a stronger leverage for countries in
manager assignment, this coecient is expected to be larger. The board and CE magnitudes
highlight that a country with a full point of FE above the average can eliminate the negative
assortative matching by sitting on the World Bank board. As a relatively secondary point, it
is important to highlight that because the CE is a generated regressor, I use the Murphy and
Topel (1985) correction for the standard errors through a bootstrapping procedure.22
4.4.1 An Additional Prediction of the Model
While Proposition 1(a) and (b) are brought to the data through Table 11, here I extend Propo-
sition 1(c) to the data. Conceptually, I assume that the transfer decreases in the number of
countries belonging to the constituency, (ng). This is based on the fact that the leverage
of a board member in extracting better managers might increase with voting power, which
is a positive function of the number of constituents. At the same time, this implies that con-
stituents who are not on the board have more to lose, and therefore might implement a stronger
monitoring of their board member.
Therefore, the slightly richer equation reported here embodies this scenario, and presents
an interaction between board access with the number of countries present in a constituency
22The generated regressor problem emerges when a right-hand side variable is generated through a previous
regression. Because this regressor includes a point estimate and a standard error, the OLS estimator yields
consistent estimates but invalid standard errors, as highlighted by Pagan (1984) and Murphy and Topel (1985).
Statistical inference based on such standard errors tends to reject the null hypothesis. For this reason, I follow
the approach proposed by Murphy and Topel, using a two-step bootstrapping algorithm to compute the standard
errors of this regression; this is also in line with the work of Ashraf and Galor (2013). The bootstrap procedure
is as follows. (1) In the rst stage, a random sample with replacement is extracted, containing 90% of the
observations. (2) This sample is used to derive a vector for MEs and CEs, as shown in Table 1. (3) Points 1
and 2 are repeated 1,000 times, leading to 1,000 vectors of MEs and CEs. (4) For each ME and CE vector,
the second-stage regression presented in Tables 10 and 11 is run on a random sample, containing 90% of the
observations, and these coecients are stored. (5) This procedure is repeated 1,000 times also in the second
stage. (6) The standard deviation of each coecient from the second-stage stored distribution is used as the
bootstrapped standard error for each variable.
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Table 11: Manager{Country Assignment: Country-Level Evidence
Variables Manager Eects
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Board 0.182*** 0.152*** 0.317*** 0.215*
(0.033) (0.031) (0.083) (0.094)
CEs  0.238***  0.261***  0.252***  0.262***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036)
Constituency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes
Observations 1,347 1,347 1,347 1,347
First-Stage AP F 45.63*** 23.11***
Adjusted R2 0.0721 0.0764 0.0663 0.0753
Mean Dep. Var. 0.0107 0.0107 0.0107 0.0107
Std Dev. Dep. Var. 0.661 0.661 0.661 0.661
Note: This table reports OLS estimates in columns (1) and (2) and IV estimates in columns (3) and (4). The
unit of observation is country level and standard errors in brackets are corrected using the Murphy and Topel
(1985) procedure through bootstraps. Columns (1) and (3) report unconditional results, while in columns (2)
and (4) I control for population, GDP per capita, exchange rate, interest rate, IBRD projects, and approval
month. Manager Eects denotes the vector of xed eects (FE) extracted from a regression of Project Outcome
as presented in Table 1, column (1). The MEs are then aggregated at country{year level, while the CEs are
country-specic and time-invariant. The mean and standard deviation of the left-hand side variables are reported
in the nal two rows. Board is a dummy variable taking unit value if a country c belonging to constituency
group g sits on the board in year t, and zero otherwise. In the IV estimates, this is instrumented through the
probability of re-election in the previous term, t  2, interacted with the constituency xed eects as presented
in Section 4.3. Constituency group xed eects and year xed eects are included throughout this analysis.
The row First-Stage AP F reports the results of the First-Stage Angrist{Pischke F -test on the relevance of the
instrument; in both cases, the IV equation presents an F above 20, considered to be a benchmark case for a
strong instrument. ***, **, and * indicate signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
group, Num:Countriesgt:
MEcgt = a2 + b2 Boardcgt + c2 FEcg + d2 Boardcgt  Num:Countriesgt
+e2 Num:Countriesgt +X2cgtd+ g + t + "cgt:
The increasing nature of the manager premium in the extent of the transfer is caught by the
term d2, which I expect to be negative and statistically dierent from zero given the previous
argument. As is clear from Table 12, this is indeed the case and the interaction is negative and
statistically dierent from zero. The main coecient on the board increases substantially, while
the number of countries, per se, does not aect manager assignment. Conceptually, Tables 11
and 12 are not very dierent, which is also the case in terms of magnitude: if the interactive
coecient is multiplied by the average number of countries in a constituency (13.67), then
it is clearly seen that the average point estimate on the board dummy is indeed unchanged.
However, it is interesting to note that countries sitting on the board in small constituencies
tend to receive managers with a substantially higher eect than other countries, while countries
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Table 12: Manager{Country Assignment: Country-Level Evidence
Variables Manager Eects
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Board 0.430*** 0.383*** 1.038*** 0.938***
(0.075) (0.072) (0.176) (0.199)
Board  Num. Countries  0.0210**  0.0191**  0.0697***  0.0655***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.013) (0.015)
Number of Countries 0.00873 0.0111 0.0240 0.0240
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
CEs  0.245***  0.265***  0.266***  0.274***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.035) (0.035)
Constituency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes
Observations 1,347 1,347 1,347 1,347
Mean Dep. Var. 0.0107 0.0107 0.0107 0.0107
Std Dev. Dep. Var. 0.661 0.661 0.661 0.661
Note: This table reports OLS estimates in columns (1) and (2), and IV estimates in columns (3) and (4). The
unit of observation is country level and standard errors in brackets are corrected using the Murphy and Topel
(1985) procedure through bootstraps. Columns (1) and (3) report unconditional results, while in columns (2)
and (4) I control for population, GDP per capita, exchange rate, interest rate, IBRD projects, and approval
month. Manager Eects denotes the vector of xed eects (FE) extracted from a regression of Project Outcome
as presented in Table 1, column (1). The MEs are then aggregated at country{year level, while the CEs are
country-specic and time-invariant. The mean and standard deviation of the left-hand side variables are reported
in the nal two rows. Board is a dummy variable taking unit value if a country c belonging to constituency
group g sits on the board in year t, and zero otherwise. In the IV estimates, this is instrumented through the
probability of re-election in the previous term, t  2, interacted with the constituency xed eects as presented
in Section 4.3. Number of Countries reports the number of countries belonging to constituency group g at time
t. Constituency group xed eects and year xed eects are included throughout this analysis. ***, **, and *
indicate signicance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
in large constituencies (the historical maximum is 25) tend to receive no statistically dierent
increase in their management assignment.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I study the role of managers in World Bank project success and explore the
resource allocation problem faced by the World Bank in assigning its project managers to coun-
tries. Building on the valuable work of Denizer, Kaufmann, and Kraay (2013), who pioneered
the study of World Bank managers on project success, I join their insights with a few method-
ological concepts from other elds to study these issues. First, I adapt the teacher value-added
empirical framework to identify manager eects (MEs) as managerial performance and country
eects (CEs) as an index public good provision. Secondly, on the data side, I join the World
Bank Project Rating Database with information on manager identities and their corresponding
CV characteristics. In this part I nd that manager eects have a variance higher than country
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eects. This is a surprising result, because it implies that the World Bank systematically hires
individuals with a dispersion in managerial performance exceeding the dispersion in recipient
countries' public good provision.
In order to show that such manager and country eects contain information content in
line with the interpretations of managerial performance and country's public good provision,
I verify that MEs correlate with some individual predetermined characteristics, which can be
considered predictors of high productivity (e.g., study eld, advanced degrees, work experience).
Similarly, I verify that CEs are correlated with institutional measures (e.g., parliamentary
democracy, constraints on the executive, ethnic fractionalization, slave trade, legal origins, and
PIM index).
Having focused on a positive analysis, I suggest a reform to improve the World Bank ef-
fectiveness by assigning the 10% worst-performing managers to non-project bureaucratic tasks,
and replacing them with average managers. This exercise is made possible by the availability
of several economic indicators at project level: the USD amount of each project, its interest
rate, the ERR, among others. By combining the ME information with these indicators, I can
estimate the gains achievable by replacing a few (66) under-performing managers without an
explicit ring operation, which might induce general equilibrium eects. Overall, my results
suggest that such a reform leads to the creation of an additional 800 million USD of returns
generated by the World Bank over the sample under analysis, corresponding to a 3.7% increase.
At the same time, by consulting World Bank documentation, I am able to provide plausible
cost scenarios to evaluate the viability of the reform, which would deliver net gains of 624 (426)
million USD under a moderate (extreme) cost scenario, with the range included between 38
and 1,011 million USD.
At this point, I study the manager{country allocation through a theoretical framework,
which highlights two components as key to aecting resource allocation: the planner's risk atti-
tude and the presence of countries on the World Bank board. I show that a risk-averse planner
intends to minimize the variance of project returns, and hence adopts a negative assortative
matching and allocates higher productivity managers to lower productivity countries. At the
same time, countries sitting on the World Bank board might receive better managers than oth-
erwise, for which there can be two explanations: (1) countries on the board are more capable
of extracting rents from the planner; (2) countries on the board can improve their communi-
cations/relations with the planner. At this point, I present a plausibly exogenous source of
variation for access to the World Bank board. This is given by the diplomatic norms governing
the re-election of countries, and shows that dierent constituency groups are characterized by
heterogeneous rules that prevent or allow a country to run for re-election. Finally, I present
the main results and nd evidence of negative assortative matching and of a manager premium
emerging for those countries sitting on the World Bank board.
All in all, this work contributes to the development literature with a clear message: un-
derstanding public organization can provide valuable policy lessons and their organizational
reform may be as powerful as countries' own institutions. Although development lending is
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hard to assimilate with the aid debate, both bodies of literature have often highlighted that the
poor institutions of recipient countries should be blamed for the inability of countries to take
advantage of aid and development lending resources. Numerous academics, policy makers, and
commentators have suggested radical reforms for the institutional setting of countries, regard-
less of these being largely top-down, possibly undemocratic, and probably destined to fail. In
this work, I revert the focus of this debate and argue for the need to reform the organization
of development lenders, and possibly aid donors. Through a cost{benet analysis, I show that
this seems to be an obvious, readily achievable target.
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